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Introduction
Séagh Kehoe and Gerda Wielander
Welcome to Cultural China, a unique annual publication for up-to-date, 
informed, and accessible commentary about Chinese and Sinophone lan-
guages, cultural practice and production, and its critical analysis. Cultural 
China is published by the Contemporary China Centre at the University of 
Westminster and builds on our weekly blog, launched in October 2019. It is 
structured around a selection of articles that speak with particular relevance, 
originality, and insight into the year under review, and that collectively provide 
an annual snapshot of what we refer to as Cultural China. 
For many readers, our reference to Cultural China will call to mind phi-
losopher Tu Weiming’s famous essay Cultural China: The Periphery and the 
Centre (1991). Cultural China, according to Tu, comprised of three symbolic 
universes; the first consisting of societies predominantly populated by ethnic 
and cultural Chinese, such as mainland China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Sin-
gapore; the second of Chinese diaspora, or Chinese communities who have 
settled throughout the world; and the third of individuals, such as scholars, 
journalists, businesspeople, and writers (implicitly understood as non-Chinese 
by Tu at the time), trying to understand China intellectually and bringing their 
conceptions of China to their own communities. In Tu’s conception, mainland 
China constituted the centre of a Sinocentric order, while all other elements of 
his symbolic universes made up the periphery. Writing in 1991, Tu claimed that 
‘the Centre no longer has the ability, insight, or legitimate authority to dictate 
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the agenda for Cultural China’. However, in his understanding, all constituent 
elements of the symbolic universes shared an interest in and commitment to 
reviving a declining cultural core.
Cultural China is a much critiqued and justifiably contested concept. Schol-
ars have drawn attention to the concept’s essentialising and hegemonic qualities 
given its foundation in Confucian ideals, ‘common awareness’, ‘common ances-
try’ and ‘shared cultural background’, and its subsequent wholesale inclusion or 
rejection of all those who are deemed to fall inside or outside those parameters 
(Ang 1998; Chow 1998; Chun 1996; Choy 2007; Lo 2005; Shih 2007). They 
further critique Tu’s image of a periphery, unaffected by its embeddedness in 
multiple and distinct grounded contexts around the globe (Chun 2017; Dirlik 
1996) that might rescue and revive a declining Sinocentric cultural core. Thirty 
years since the publication of Tu’s essay, much has also changed in geopolitical 
terms, not least the People’s Republic reaffirmation of its position of centrality 
through vastly enhanced economic and military power. Tu’s observation, in 
1991, on China’s often ‘negligible’ position in the international discourse no 
longer applies. Not only has ‘the centre’ reasserted its position in relation to the 
‘periphery’, not least through controversial legislation that attempts to extend 
the PRC’s arm beyond its borders, but China has also shifted from the periph-
ery to the centre of international power constellations. 
Other terms to describe and analyse the various transnational flows, net-
works, and interconnectivities amongst Chinese peoples and  communities 
around the world include ‘Overseas Chinese,’ ‘the Chinese diaspora,’ ‘China, 
broadly defined,’ ‘chiglobalisation’ (Jia 2009), ‘Greater China’ and ‘the 
 Sinophone’. Among these, Shu-Mei Shih’s concept of the Sinophone has been 
the most embraced in the Humanities. It critiques what Shih argues to be the 
homogenising orders underpinning other terms, which base themselves on 
notions of fixed identity, China-centrism, and the hegemonic call of Chinese-
ness that ‘bind[s] the diasporic to the so-called homeland’ (2011, 713). 
Our use of ‘Cultural China’ is a critical rather than deferential reference to 
Tu Weiming. Taking a cultural studies-based approach, it is a term we choose 
to express our focus on Chinese and Sinophone languages, cultural practice 
and production, and its critical analysis, from geographical areas, societies, 
groups, and individuals not confined by the borders of a nation state. Focus-
ing  primarily—though not exclusively—on the less attention grabbing, less 
hyperbolic, less over-powering developments and considerations across Chi-
nese and Sinophone worlds, our use of ‘Cultural China’ signals our critique of 
all kinds of hegemonic discourse while acknowledging the now inescapable 
orbit of the PRC, whether discursive or otherwise. Taking our cue from Ien 
Ang (1998), Rey Chow (1998), Shu-mei Shih (2007, 2011), Deborah Madsen 
(2011) and Alvin Wong (2018), our ‘Cultural China’ is informed by a diverse 
range of  positions including feminism, post-colonialism, communitarianism, 
and  religious pluralism, to name but a few.
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Cultural China is unique and distinctive in its approach. Our aim is to pro-
mote interdisciplinary dialogue and debate about the social, cultural, political, 
and historical dynamics that inform life in Cultural China today, offering aca-
demics, activists, practitioners, and politicians a key reference with which to 
situate current events in and relating to Cultural China in a wider context and 
to better inform their associated engagements and policy-making  practices. 
Given the importance of the PRC, as a state and geopolitical power whose posi-
tion has ramifications across the world, it is perhaps understandable that so 
much writing and analysis on China and the Sinophone emanates from the 
social sciences, and certainly the type of research that finds its way to audiences 
beyond academia appears preoccupied with the dominant and by now unorigi-
nal question around the continuity or sustainability of ‘China’s rise’. We offer 
a different perspective. With this annual collection we want to aid the critical 
understanding of Cultural China from the field of the Humanities, concerned, 
by definition, with what it means to be human and expressions of this human-
kind in different social and cultural contexts. 
2020 was an unprecedented year for Cultural China. It started with the out-
break of Covid-19 in Wuhan, which soon spread around the world and led to 
a surge of racism and xenophobia against people of pan-Asian heritage (Yeh 
2021). Beyond the headlines of Covid-19, 2020 will be remembered for much 
more. It was the year of in which the mass detention, surveillance, and every-
day violence against the Uyghurs and other Muslim minorities across China’s 
northwest continued, and of major protests in Inner Mongolia against pro-
posed changes to language rights. In Taiwan, it was the year of Tsai Ing-wen’s 
landslide election win against the Kuomintang, while in Hong Kong, the brutal 
National Security Law came into effect, making it easier to punish protesters 
and reducing the city’s autonomy. And perhaps less remembered, 2020 was also 
the year of Taiwan hosting the world’s biggest in-person Pride parade, Singa-
pore’s ‘hawker culture’ being added to the UNESCO list of Intangible Cultural 
Heritage of Humanity, the death of acclaimed writer Yu Lihua, who was known 
for her nuanced portraits of Chinese émigré in post-war America and the 
PRC’s first independent Mars mission. And the list goes on!
The articles in this Review speak to this turbulent year that was 2020 as it 
unfolded across Cultural China. They are organised across eight sections, each 
of which is introduced by academics from the University of Westminster’s 
Contemporary China Centre. Thematically, the sections range from celebrity 
culture, fashion, and beauty, to religion and spirituality, via language politics, 
heritage, and music. The sections on representation of China in Britain and 
the Westminster Chinese Visual Arts Project reflect our particular location 
and home. The special introductions contextualise each section and speak to 
the articles’ significance to contemporary Cultural China in 2020. The dispro-
portionate focus on the PRC in this year’s Review, in contrast to our stated 
aims, reflects in large part the original intention of the blog, which sought to 
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 contribute to ongoing discussion and promote interdisciplinary dialogue about 
the social, cultural, political, and historical dynamics that inform life in the 
PRC today. As the blog evolved and the idea for this book began to take shape, 
we realised the importance of probing into what we mean by ‘China’ and our 
own critical positionality as researchers in relation to this. Many of the arti-
cles in this book demonstrate the inescapability of the PRC, but they also draw 
attention to the multiple Chinese and Sinophone cultural practices that exist 
within, across, and beyond national borders.
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CHAPTER 1
Fashion, Beauty, and Nation
1.0 Introduction
Séagh Kehoe
2020 was the year of ‘China Chic’ (guochao 国潮). Coined by social media 
users, ‘China chic’ literally translates as ‘national tide’ and refers to the rise of 
domestic fashion and cosmetic brands that incorporate ‘traditional Chinese 
elements’ into their designs. The term, which for a while even appeared in lists 
as the 2020’s ‘word of the year’, originally referred to homegrown streetwear 
brands but has since been applied to fashion products more broadly. It reflects, 
as Chinese state media frequently mention, a growing enthusiasm for ‘national 
culture’ and, in direct reference to Xi Jinping’s exhortations, ‘a stronger cultural 
confidence’ (Chen 2021).
As part of the shift from ‘Made in China’ to ‘Designed in China’, ‘China Chic’ 
follows a series of similar trends in recent years across the PRC. In 2018, for 
instance, models for sportswear brand Li-Ning paraded down the catwalk at the 
New York Fashion Week in the colours of the PRC’s national flag with ‘China 
Li-Ning’ (Zhongguo Lining 中国李宁) emblazoned across their  tracksuits 
(Hales 2018). In November 2019, hundreds queued for hours in Guangzhou 
to purchase a pair of Air Force 1 ‘Black Silk’ sneakers by Hong Kong-based 
fashion brand CLOT. The sneakers, produced in collaboration with Nike and 
Fragment Design, featured ‘traditional Chinese-style patterns’ and followed a 
similar style from the year before in a Terracotta Warriors design (Xinhua 
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2019). Meanwhile, the Hanfu 汉服 movement, which started in 2003 as an 
online craze with the aim of revitalizing the wearing of Han Chinese ethnic 
clothing, continues to boom (Dzidzovic, Zhou, and Leung 2019).
The emergence of such trends draws our attention to the various ways in 
which fashion, beauty, and nation intersect. Whether in the case of clothes, 
hairstyles, or make-up, sartorial and cosmetic practices have played an impor-
tant role in the production, maintenance, and projection of ‘normal’, idealised 
and/or improved national subjects, often in deeply gendered, classed, and 
ethnicised ways. In Chinese Studies, this has been richly explored in several 
recent studies across a range of contexts, including the beauty economy (Yang 
2011), Mao-era clothing (Chen 2001), fashion-making in the diaspora (Ling 
and Segre-Reinach (Eds.) 2018), and online fashion cultures (Liao 2019). Work 
of this kind offers an opportunity to consider how, as Maxwell (2019) explains, 
individuals may be forbidden, permitted, or even obliged to wear particular 
forms of clothing or cosmetics, and can reveal much about how the ‘Chinese 
nation’ is imagined. However, fashion and beauty practices can be more than 
simply top-down directives, and can work to negotiate, resist, and remake 
national norms and ideals. 
The articles in this section explore these issues in the case of the PRC. Across 
a wide range of contexts, they examine the everyday practices of wearing, dis-
carding, producing, consuming, and designing fashion and beauty, with par-
ticular attention to how these issues variously construct, contest, and negotiate 
a national Chinese identity.
In 2020, nowhere was the intersection between fashion and nation more 
acutely illuminated than in the case of Xinjiang. In July 2020, human rights 
campaigners issued a statement criticising many of the world’s biggest fashion 
brands for purchasing cotton from the region, which the coalition argued made 
them complicit in the forced labour of and human rights violations against the 
Uyghur people (Kelly 2019). This was strenuously denied by the Chinese state 
and dismissed across state media as an attack by ‘anti-China forces’ (Liu and 
Zhang 2020). These claims resurfaced in April 2021 and resulted in an enor-
mous outpouring of support for Xinjiang-produced cotton across social media 
in the PRC, calls for a boycott of western apparel brands, and a number of PRC 
fashion brands and designers proudly confirming the use of Xinjiang cotton in 
their products (Friedman and Paton 2021).
Consumer nationalism is one way in which the intersection between fashion 
and nation in the case of Xinjiang manifests, but there are many others. As 
Leibold and Grose (2016) have argued, the Islamic veil has been at the heart 
of many of the Chinese state’s campaigns to control and standardise Uyghur 
dress and has also become an important symbol of ethnonational resistance, 
religious faith, and global Islamic haute culture. As explored by Tim Grose’s 
article in this section, the state’s attempts to use fashion and beauty norms as 
a way to discipline and transform the appearance of Uyghur women through 
legislation, campaigns, staged public fashion shows, and even a ‘Beauty Parlour 
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and Hair Salon’ initiative to promote particular ideas about modernity while 
also identifying pious and Turkic standards of beauty as deviant. 
Across the PRC, the regulation of bodies through fashion and beauty ideals 
upholds and promotes the state’s political and economic objectives in many 
ways. While in Mao’s era, beauty and fashion were frowned upon as frivolous 
and decadent, in contrast, today they are key sites in the development of con-
sumer capitalism. As Yang (2011, 335–6) argues, this is particularly true for 
female bodies, youth, beauty, fitness, and slimness, all of which have become 
important ‘tokens of class and status distinctions’ in post-Mao China. All of 
this is evident in Zheng’s article in this section, which examines sartorial prac-
tices among rural migrant karaoke bar hostesses in the PRC. She shows how 
migrant karaoke bar hostesses, often derided for their rural origin and assumed 
unstylish, rustic aesthetic, perform fashion in such a way as to imagine a sense 
of global belonging and citizenship, staking a political claim to the cosmopoli-
tan through their foreign ‘ultra-fashion’. 
Zheng’s article draws our attention to another recent fashion trend in the 
PRC: ‘Too Cool’ (tuku 土酷). Tu, which is literally translated as soil, usually 
denotes rural, outdated, or tasteless. However, Too Cool, in contrast, celebrates 
rural aesthetics as a disruption to the top-down authority of fashion and mani-
festing instead through a tongue-in-cheek style and pride in grassroots culture. 
While similar in some ways to the emphasis on pride and confidence described 
above in the case of ‘China Chic’, Too Cool styles itself as a subcultural chal-
lenge to mainstream aesthetics (Jiang 2020). In her article in this section, Jian 
Xiao examines similar dynamics in the case of the punk movement in the PRC, 
describing the various symbols and processes of constructing the ‘punk look’ as 
a visual defiance to the aesthetics of mainstream lifestyles.
Discussions of fashion and beauty often focus on the regulation and manipu-
lation of female bodies in the pursuit of national goals, but since the 1980s, 
masculinity has also become a topic of considerable attention in the PRC. This 
‘masculinity crisis’, as Geng (2010, 406) explains, goes hand in hand with the 
replacing of Confucian and Maoist-based models of manhood with ‘produc-
tivist and consumerist values’. These fears are perhaps best captured in the 
 official hand wringing over the rise of xiaoxianrou 小鲜肉, literally ‘little fresh 
meat’, which refers to handsome male stars who do not conform to traditional 
 gendered style guidelines and are characterised in Chinese state media as 
emblematic of a broader ‘feminisation of Chinese boys’ and as ‘a threat to the 
development and survival of our nation’ (Du and Chen 2021). These devel-
opments are examined by Wen Hua in her article in this section, where she 
describes why cosmetic surgery and beauty practices have become increasingly 
popular among Chinese men in recent years and how this presents an alterna-
tive masculinity that defies the gendered ideals that otherwise informed ‘the 
national character’.
These articles illuminate the myriad ways in which fashion, beauty, and 
nation converge in the PRC today. They also interrogate, in implicit and explicit 
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terms, how national trends are entangled within, informed by, and respond 
to issues that extend far beyond the national borders of the PRC. Indeed, at 
 various points, whether in the case of Turkic beauty norms in contemporary 
Xinjiang, the consumption of Korean and Japanese fashion trends, punk aes-
thetics or masculinity ideals, the boundaries of ‘Chinese fashion’ and ‘China’ 
often blur. Notions of any single or compartmentalised ‘Chinese fashion’ is 
further complicated by articulations of ‘Chineseness’ from outside the PRC. 
Transnational beauty pageants organised for the Chinese diaspora, such as Miss 
China Europe, are a notable example of this. Here, as Chow (2011) describes, 
various forms of ‘Chinese selves’ are performed, all of which negotiate complex 
expectations and ideals of a ‘Chineseness’ rooted in ancestral connection and 
linguistic ability. Then, there are designers from Taiwan, Hong Kong and the 
diaspora who eschew the title of ‘Chinese’ designer and use of ‘Chinese’ aes-
thetics in their work (Ling 2018). What does it mean in the case of Cultural 
China, then, to speak of ‘Chinese’ fashion and beauty, and who does it refer to? 
Even within the PRC, as we see in this section, the answers to these questions 
are far from straightforward.
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1.1 Beautifying Uyghur Bodies: Fashion, ‘Modernity’,  
and State Power in the Tarim Basin
Timothy Grose
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) routinely stages public fashion shows 
in Uyghur communities of the Tarim Basin (present-day Xinjiang Uyghur 
Autonomous Region). In Yopurgha County (Yuepuhu 岳普湖), Kashgar 
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 Prefecture, young girls, teenagers, and middle-aged women sit patiently as 
Uyghur  beauticians dab face whitening cream, draw perfectly symmetrical 
eyebrows, and paint lush red lips on their faces. Meanwhile, groups of Uyghur 
women, organized by age and dressed in either blue jeans, mini-skirts, or pencil 
 skirt-business coat ensembles, are paraded on stage to display age-appropriate 
attire. Usma, henna, braided hair and other (secular) grooming habits typical to 
Turkic Muslims of the Tarim Basin and Fergana Valley (Nalivkin and Nalivkina 
2016, 89–102) are notably absent from the stages. 
These events represent the CCP’s recent efforts to transform the appearance 
of Uyghur women; yet, the party began disciplining the Uyghur feminine body 
in earnest nearly a decade ago. In 2011, officials unrolled Project Beauty (Grose 
and Leibold 2015), a five-year, US$8 million dollar multi-media initiative that 
encouraged piously-dressed Uyghur women to ‘look towards modern culture 
by removing face veils and jilbāb’ (Tianshan Net 2012). Throughout southern 
Xinjiang’s rural villages, officials organized fashion shows, beauty pageants, 
longest-hair contests as well as lectures on ethnic policy, ethnic attire, and 
social etiquette to persuade Uyghur women to ‘let their hair down and show-off 
their pretty faces’. By 2015, lawmakers in Ürümchi introduced legislation that 
outlawed hijab, lichäk, chumbäl, and jilbāb as well as ‘abnormally long’ beards 
and clothing featuring star and moon insignia in any public area (ChinaFile 
2014). These measures effectively discouraged Uyghur women from donning 
many veiling styles. During my visit to Ürümchi and Turpan, June–July 2017, 
two years after the veiling ban, I did not observe any women covering their 
faces with veils or hair in hijab. Some, mostly older, women continued to don 
a scarf or yaghliq, which they either knotted behind their heads or tied loosely 
under their chins. 
In 2017, the CCP rolled out the ‘Three News’ campaign (Haiwai Net 2017). 
This package of study sessions, cultural programs, and workshops organ-
ized by local-level governments aims to ‘advocate a new lifestyle, establish a 
new atmosphere, and construct a new order’ (changdao xin fengshang, shuli 
xin qixiang, jianli xin zhixu 倡导新风尚，树立新气象，建立新秩序). Bur-
ied beneath the campaign’s jargon is the ‘prohibition against wearing strange 
clothing’ (chuandai qiguai 穿戴奇怪). Although the language is ambiguous, it 
signals the CCP’s recommitment to standardizing and Sinicising sartorial prac-
tices among Uyghurs, especially women. 
Officials are carrying out this campaign by farding the complexion of Uyghur 
feminized beauty with ostentatious glamour. Representatives of the All-China 
Women’s Federation (funü lianhehui 妇女联合会) have organized step-by-
step makeover tutorials in several southern counties. During one such event in 
Qaraqash County (Moyu 墨玉), Khotan, a Uyghur beautician taught her peers 
how to style hair and apply cosmetics (Qaraqash County Government 2018). A 
May 2018 cosmetology training course in Atush called ‘Let your beautiful long 
hair down and show your pretty faces,’ which ‘drew on the influence of “Project 
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Beauty”’ provided instruction on fashion and cosmetics to over two hundred 
women. A report on the event featured dramatic before-and-after photographs 
of women who underwent makeovers. After her beauty treatment, a woman 
named Amangül Alim celebrated her new look: ‘I’ve never been as beautiful 
or confident as I am today. We used to have to go to the city for these services, 
which was a long way from here and expensive. So, we hesitated to go. Now 
we’ve learned to apply cosmetics and style our hair ourselves. We don’t have to 
spend money, yet we look great!’ (Fanghuiju zhi sheng 2018).
To provide rural Uyghur women with access to these new fashion trends, 
county-level governments launched the ‘Beauty Parlor and Hair Salon’ (liang-
fawu 靓发屋) initiative. This campaign has funded the construction of salons 
across rural Uyghur villages. In 2018 alone, the government boasted 2889 new 
beauty parlours (each equipped with facial steamers, shampoo chairs, styling 
chairs, and disinfectants (People’s Daily 2018) and 7954 newly certified Uyghur 
beauticians in Xinjiang’s southern four districts—i.e., Kashgar, Khotan, Aqsu, 
and Qizilsu (CRI Online 2018). To put these numbers into perspective, govern-
ment officials built a new beauty parlor for approximately every 3,600 people or 
one facility per 1800 women in these districts. Residents of Qaraqash County 
alone can visit 252 newly built salons; every village operates at least one busi-
ness (Sina 2018). 
Fig 1.1.a: Photo taken by author in Ürümchi, June 2015; captions by Darren 
Byler.
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Uyghur women are often coerced into cosmetology careers. For instance, 
over one hundred women from Ulughchat County (Wuqia 乌恰) in Qizilsu 
Prefecture completed a twenty-day ‘closed-door’ (fengbi shi 封闭式) course, 
which required them to live and study, ‘without charge,’ in a vocational  facility. 
In addition to learning the ropes of cosmetology, these women also studied 
Putonghua and Chinese law (CRI Online 2018). Therefore, their curricu-
lum resembles that of women ‘studying’ cosmetology and hairdressing in the 
region’s concentration re-education centres (The State Council Information 
Office of the People’s Republic of China).
The Three News campaign provides an illuminating example of what Michel 
Foucault called ‘biopower’. Foucault observed that the state saw human bodies 
through a crude coloniser or colonised binary. He introduced this concept to 
describe the subtleties of power and its ‘calculated management of life’ (Pylypa 
1998, 24). Foucault argued that political order cannot simply be imposed on a 
population; it has to be taught, replicated, and self-inflected to effectively regu-
late human behavior. Power, therefore, functions to control life—not end it—
through ‘continuous regulatory and corrective mechanisms’ (Foucault 1978, 
144). In other words, biopolitics need to work in tandem with discipline, which 
Foucault conceptualises as a type of physical and mental subjugation imposed 
to increase human efficiency. 
To be sure, Foucault introduces ‘biopower’ to describe the types of power 
that permeate neoliberal societies; however, his theory may have utility in 
understanding how CCP power targeting Turkic Muslims operates outside 
the  concentration re-education centers. In the case of setting new standards 
of beauty, the impulse to look a certain way is not forced upon an individual 
through threats of violence; rather, power ‘constructs normality and deviance’ 
and creates the desire to conform (Pylypa 1998, 22). A young Uyghur woman 
from Qaraqash remarked, ‘Since our village opened a salon, I’m able to main-
tain a beautiful hairstyle, attend to my skin, and apply make-up. I feel as pretty 
as a city girl’ (Qaraqash County Government 2018). Her statement exposes the 
CCP’s biopolitical intentions. The Party is inscribing ‘modernity’ and urban 
beauty on cosmetics, permed hair, and casual dress, thus normalising these 
practices, while it is identifying pious and Turkic standards of beauty as  deviant.
Officials confidently predict that this campaign will transform Uyghur 
women into docile Chinese subjects. A representative from the XUAR’s 
 Women’s Federation explained that ‘the Beauty Parlor and Hair Salon initiative 
will bring forth three transformations in the lives of women. First, women will 
transform their body image. Then, they will transform their way of life. Finally, 
they will transform their way of thinking’ (Sohu 2019). Certainly, the beauty 
parlors introduce new beauty standards. Dozens of photographs depict newly 
trained beauticians dying hair, styling it in curlers, applying face whitening 
cream, and putting thick layers of cosmetics on their clients. However, accord-
ing to Foucault’s theory, the practices required to maintain this manicured 
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countenance at home—i.e., mimicking a stylist’s techniques and repeating this 
process daily—inscribe the body with state-produced knowledge and sustain 
their own subjugation (Pylypa 1998, 24). A work team member in Yopurgha 
County, Kashgar Prefecture claims to have noticed a significant change among 
women: ‘Now, women in the village have changed from shy and old-fashioned 
to cheerful, lively, and generous’ (China Women’s Paper 2018).
To be sure, this tactic to impose new beauty standards and, more impor-
tantly, teach them to ethnic and racial minorities is reminiscent of colonial 
methods to control indigenous bodies. Federal boarding schools for Native 
Americans provide instructive examples. Students at Haskell boarding school 
were forced to adopt ‘white’ appearances: boys were forced to cut their hair 
and keep it trimmed while women were required to wear blouses and dresses 
(Child 2000, 30–31). Strict dress and appearance codes at Chilocco were part of 
the federal government’s efforts to train domesticated and subservient women 
(Lomawaima 1993). Six hundred miles north, the Native boarding school 
children in Flandreau, South Dakota trained as beauticians and barbers and 
learned how to wash, style, and cut hair in the Euro-American fashion (Child 
2000, 81). 
The US example not only provides us with a lens to understand the ‘Three 
News’ campaign, it also portends its potential failure. Indeed, the US govern-
ment could not completely uproot Native Americans from the land and disas-
sociate them from their cultures. This history provides a gleam of optimism 
for Uyghurs: as long as they remain committed internally to their cultural, 
 linguistic, and spatial roots—both individually and collectively (Lomawaima 
1993)—they will insulate a space wherein Uyghurness can blossom and flour-
ish, on their own terms, again. 
Note
I would like to sincerely thank Gina Anne Tam and Guangtian Ha for thought-
fully commenting, politely critiquing, and enthusiastically challenging earlier 
versions of this paper. 
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1.2 Karaoke Bar Hostesses and Japan-Korea Wave  
in Postsocialist China: The Politics of Fashion,  
Class Hierarchy, and Transgression
Tiantian Zheng
Fashion has always been the key for me in noticing a rural migrant karaoke bar 
hostess during my research with them in Dalian, China (Zheng 2009). On the 
street, it is hard not to spot a hostess wearing exotic fashion and with a distinct 
appearance. Indeed, they are fashion trendsetters and bright components of 
the human landscape in Dalian. Their fashion ensembles challenge traditional 
Chinese sartorial practices in a myriad of ways, including exposing large por-
tions of the body, combining ostentatious and outlandish colours, and featur-
ing irregular styles and unfamiliar cuts. Their attire is derived from foreign or 
foreign-inspired fashion products. 
From head to toe, rural migrant karaoke bar hostesses are covered in Korean 
and Japanese fashion. These fashion products include, but are not limited 
to, plastic hair trinkets, scarlet hair dye, fake second eyelids, fake eyelashes, 
fake tattoos, cosmetics such as whitening cream and black lipstick, brace-
lets, clothes, and pointed-toe shoes. Almost all hostesses’ feet are sheathed in 
pointed-toe, high-heeled shoes which were first introduced from Korea and 
later produced and manufactured in China. Their black or other dark-shaded 
lipsticks are also produced and manufactured in Korea, inspired by Korean 
movie and music celebrities. Their cell phones are adorned with Japanese 
 Hello-Kitty-emblazoned transparent plastic baubles that flash blinking lights 
upon every incoming call. 
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Rural migrant karaoke bar hostesses’ fashion practices embody the Japan 
—Korea Wave in the context of global cultural flows (Zheng 2011). The 
Japan–Korea Wave first rippled into China in the early 1990s, with a deluge 
of  Japanese and Korean commodities and a rising popularity of Japanese and 
Korean popular culture across the country. Just one decade after China opened 
its door to the outside world and began to play an increasingly significant 
role in the global market, this Wave grew into a full-fledged tidal wave, 
 enveloping Chinese youth in the conspicuous consumption of Japanese and 
Korean products.
The Japan–Korea Wave can be seen in the popularity of Japanese and 
Korean products either directly imported from Japan and Korea or copied 
and  manufactured in China. These products include, but are not limited to, 
comic books, DVDs of film, TV series, and singing idols. Many Chinese youth 
adore and follow the Japanese popular looks of bleached white or blond hair 
streaks, white eye make-up, tubular-front elevated shoes, or Hello-Kitty embel-
lishments. However, this pursuit of Japanese popular culture was stymied by 
the nation-wide anti-Japanese boycott movements in the 2000s (Gerth 2003). 
In contrast, the popularity of Korean cultural products in China contin-
ued without animosity, mainly because both China and Korea were victims 
of Japan during World War II and an affinity between the two countries was 
felt by many. Korean popular movies, TV dramas, and singing idols flooded 
the Chinese consumer market and were consistently the highest rated nation-
wide for many years. Under the Korean influence, many Chinese youth cop-
ied the Korean style and started Chinese Hip-Hop and R&B bands. Young 
people also pursued Korean-style plastic surgery and Korean-style scarlet red 
long hair, fake stick-on tattoos, drawn-on thin eyebrows, fake double-eyelids, 
black or dark shades of lipstick, pointed-toe high-heeled shoes, and other lace 
embellishments. A fervour developed toward Korean fashion that eschews 
simple colours in favour of juxtaposed, outlandish colours and features a 
tight, transparent, and skimpy style that exposes skin, irregular skirt open-
ing, vests or bellybands exposing the whole or half of the back, and single-
shouldered style. 
Chinese popular media compared the Korean Wave to rural migrant karaoke 
bar hostesses. For example, as one piece published by Shenzhen Weekly (Shenz-
hen Zhoukan 深圳周刊) noted, ‘Korea almost seems like a young country girl 
who suddenly arrives in the city. She sees all kinds of strange and novel things 
and doesn’t wait a second to try them out on herself. The result is an odd-
looking mess of colours. It seems to be ultra-extravagant (chaoxuan 超炫) and 
ultra-modern (chaoxiandai 超现代), but in fact it cannot cover up her country 
air (tuqi 土气). Country air goes hand in hand with Korea’s astonishing rise to 
wealth (baofu 暴富). We can see the same sort of cultural mentality reflected 
in those Chinese youth who hold the Korean Wave in highest esteem’ (Wang 
2002, 41). 
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Anthropologists Sandra Niessen and Ajun Appadurai have pointed to attire 
as a class-signifier (Appadurai 1996; Niessen 2003; Wilson 1992). In China, the 
anti-peasant derogatory term ‘tuqi’ applies the concept of qi 气 an essence or 
energy, to all peasants, to reify them as country bumpkins whose bodies are 
seen as radiating a rustic and unstylish essence. Indeed, many urbanites claim 
that, even though rural migrants in the city shed their countryside clothing and 
refashion themselves in new clothes, the tuqi essence of their rural origin can 
never be concealed by this disguise, instead seeping through their dark skin 
and ‘ultra-flashy’ and ‘ultra-modern’ fashion to give away their rural origin. In 
other words, their rural origin impedes them from being perceived as capable 
of fully grasping the ‘true’ aesthetic sensibility of modern fashion, a foil against 
which urban women’s mastery over fashion is staged. Since fashion is perceived 
as an embodiment of urban women’s membership in a global, modern commu-
nity (Johansson 1998; Schein 1999), the alleged fashion ineptitude of peasants 
denies them this membership. 
The opposite term of tuqi is yangqi 洋气- sea, ocean essence. Yang signi-
fies a foreign world outside China, and yangqi represents a foreign, stylish 
essence, associated with urban women. Rural migrant hostesses employ an 
‘ultra-fashion’ strategy to perform fashion by avoiding tuqi 土气 and striving 
for yangqi, thus resisting the ‘rural tuqi - urban yangqi’ hierarchy and imagining 
a sense of global belonging and citizenship. They appropriate the Japan–Korean 
fashion as the most visible hallmark of social status to claim their legitimate 
 membership in the global community and destabilise, subvert, and transgress 
the rural–urban class hierarchy. They deride urban women’s conservative, 
parochial fashion sense and stake a political claim to the cosmopolitan, global 
community with their foreign, ‘ultra-fashion’ that heralds them trendsetters at 
the forefront of China’s fashion landscape (Zheng 2011).
Note
This article is adapted from Zheng, Tiantian. 2011. Karaoke Bar Hostesses 
and the Japan–Korean Wave in China: Fashion, Cosmopolitanism, and 
Globalization. City and Society, 23 (1), 42–65. 
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1.3 Punk Culture and Its Fashion in China
Jian Xiao
Possibly the first punk musician in China, He Yong, arrived on the scene 
in 1994 in Beijing, and the first two punk bands, Underbaby and Catcher in 
the Rye, emerged at the same time. Only a few years later, 1998 witnessed the 
 explosive growth of punk bands in China. At that time, there were several influ-
ential bands, such as 69, Brain Failure, and Anarchy Boys, which inspired the 
younger generation to sport mohawks and leather jackets. Another landmark 
event occurred that year: a punk club called the Scream (haojiao jülebu 嚎叫
俱乐部) opened in Beijing, which would soon become a significant cultural 
space for the punk musicians of the day, such as Wuliao Contingent (wuliao 
jundui 无聊军队). One important performance took place on April 8th, 1998, 
when more than 200 people came to this club, which was only supposed to 
house a maximum of 100. The founder, Mr. Liao, commented later: ‘Just as 
Tang Dynasty [Tang Chao 唐朝, a Chinese band] showed us what a heavy metal 
scene could be like, people began to understand what hardcore, ska, or Oi! punk 
were […]. I can still remember the intense punk atmosphere – it was strong, 
simple, straightforward, and powerful, while also full of happiness and excit-
ing anger’. Further to this, Yang (2012) has used the term ‘youth restlessness’ to 
describe this atmosphere, especially in the case of Underbaby performances. 
Adopting a similar style to punks in the West, Chinese punk musicians can 
be recognised as skinhead punks by their bald heads, Doc Martens boots and 
belt trousers, or as street/metal punks by their Mohawk and studded leather 
jackets. Following the unprecedented economic growth and new cultural 
spaces that emerged after the Reform and Opening-Up, being a punk became 
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a way to speak and act against commercialisation. Moreover, because of 
 commercialisation, Chinese punks have had greater access to resources. This 
differs from the punk scene in Portugal, for example, where, as Guerra and 
Xiao (2018, 178) describe, ‘the present context of economic crisis and social 
precariousness has accentuated a recourse to punk (and it’s DIY ethos) both 
as a word and as praxis pertinent to everyday concerns such as housing, work, 
and urban sociability and conviviality’. Comparatively speaking, the Chinese 
punk musicians have not been driven by necessity to apply a DIY attitude to 
fashion—it has been entirely possible to purchase the punk-type clothing items 
they desire, such as black leather jackets or Doc Martens boots, in China. 
The DIY ethos is still important to Chinese punks, particularly for overcoming 
challenges relating to actualising other aspects of punk activity—for example, 
music performances or punk media (music videos, publications such as zines, 
etc.). For punks to ‘dress like punks’, they needed to resort to various expedi-
ents for dressing in accordance with their stylistic code; for example, whenever 
they needed a belt, they had to customise it with spikes purchased from hard-
ware stores as there were not yet any shops selling punk belts. The musicians 
would also make their own labels and craft their own hairstyles. Those creative, 
 enjoyable and entertaining moments have also become culturally significant, 
allowing the musicians to integrate into the punk community in a global sense.
The meaning of punk fashion is often associated with resistance. Research-
ers at the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies, which was established 
at the University of Birmingham in 1964 and examined various aspects of 
youth, subculture, and resistance, assigned great relevance to style. Cohen 
(1972) described style in terms of four central characteristics: clothing, music, 
 rituals, and language. However, he also noted that style is not a quality inherent 
to  subcultures but something that is constructed over a long period of time. 
Hence, what creates a style is the stylisation—the active organisation of objects 
alongside different activities and perspectives, which, in turn, produces an 
Fig 1.3.a: Punk show. Photo by the author.
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organised group with a coherent identity and distinctive ‘being-in-the world’ 
(Guerra 2010, 416). 
In the Chinese social context, subcultural resistance in individual practice 
occurs in a more intimate environment and on a smaller scale. It manifests in 
various forms, such as insisting on dressing in a distinctly punk fashion, living 
a lifestyle of attempting to resist the mainstream, joining and staying in punk 
groups to resist peer pressure and parental expectations, and seeking alterna-
tive forms of employment and income to maintain a state of expressing one’s 
true self and opinions, and of resisting what is interpreted as a phenomenon 
of widespread ‘blindly following’ in mainstream society. In fact, the conflict 
between punk musicians and the mainstream can evolve from being just an 
alternative visual style at variance with ‘normal’ fashion into an alternative life-
style against that of the mainstream. 
The behaviour of dressing as a punk in a group can appear especially offen-
sive and threatening to the public since their visual look can be associated with 
gangs. For instance, one punk musician’s decision to adopt a skinhead Oi! punk 
visual style in public was criticised by teachers, neighbours, and peers early in 
his life. As a consequence, he developed a form of visual resistance—insisting 
on his particular punk visual style specifically as defiance to the mainstream 
visual style—despite constant pressure from the surrounding mainstream. At 
this stage, the mainstream response to his visual resistance played a role in his 
construction of his punk identity, but did not immediately influence his life in 
other significant ways. It was at a later stage that this musician’s visual resistance 
caused problems at work, prompting him to leave his job. 
Generally speaking, the state responds to the Chinese punk scene in a nega-
tive way. Punk events can often be stopped by the government for reasons of 
political sensitivity relating to some of the messages contained in the lyrics. For 
those events that are not shut down, the state intervenes through strict surveil-
lance to prevent punk musicians from expressing alternative political opinions. 
This intervention, which is usually led by government officials, can sometimes 
turn into a violent one. 
While variations are hardly noticeable in terms of punk style across differ-
ent Chinese regions, internal differences within punk groups still exist and 
are related to concerns about punk authenticity. Punk musicians in Wuhan, 
for instance, believe that the Beijing punk circle is full of small subgroups and 
issues of hierarchy, possibly due to the difference between punk musicians born 
and raised in central Beijing, and those who grew up in the suburbs. Thus, 
they create their own intimate groups based on ideas of equality and existing 
without a hierarchical approach, such as supporting newcomers. By doing so, 
Wuhan punks regard themselves as being more authentic. In this sense, being a 
punk is never just about dressing like a punk.
Ultimately, fashion is a means of expression, and the choice of style is a pro-
cess of identity-building. One Chinese punk musician once commented: ‘We 
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started to learn about skinhead culture, then the clothes. We like boots, braces, 
Levi’s trousers, and a simple working-class style. It suits us’. In this sense, dress-
ing in a particular style is not only symbolic of cultural and musical resistance 
to a troubling status quo, but also a concrete expression of an urban movement 
focused on music, fashion, and a particular lifestyle, sometimes bohemian, 
sometimes working-class, and in this case, punk. 
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1.4 Cosmetic Surgery, Flower Boys,  
and Soft Masculinity in China
Wen Hua
SoYoung, one of the biggest Chinese cosmetic surgery mobile apps, released a 
report in 2017 stating that the Chinese cosmetic surgery market was develop-
ing at six times faster than the global average in terms of the number of people 
undergoing non-surgical and surgical procedures. It also noted that Chinese 
consumers accounted for around 41% of the global total cosmetic surgeries, 
among which about 10 percent of consumers were men (SoYoung 2017).
Compared with their female counterparts, beautification practices for men 
constitute new territory. To participate in the improvement of one’s appearance 
through daily grooming, let alone through surgery, men need to overcome their 
entrenched perception of beautification practice as women’s domain. Who are 
these men and what procedures do they opt for? What does the new trend of 
male beauty in China look like, and how do beautification practices affect con-
structions of masculinity?
It has been widely reported (Wang and Cai 2016) that entertainers, young 
white-collar workers, successful career men in their 40 and 50s, and college 
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students are the main customers of male cosmetic surgery in China. Male 
entertainers such as models, actors and TV hosts are generally more concerned 
about appearance, in all its aspects, because appearance is particularly impor-
tant for their career development. Although male and female public figures 
seldom admit they have undergone cosmetic surgeries, Hu Ge, one of most 
influential Chinese male celebrities appearing on the covers of most fashion 
magazines, admitted that he underwent a number of procedures to restore his 
looks after he had a serious car accident in 2006.
Young white-collar workers normally opt for small operations rather than 
going under ‘the big knife’; typical procedures include nose jobs (rhinoplasty), 
jawline recontouring, and ‘double-eyelid surgery’. For successful middle-aged 
men, they are more concerned with aging, the signs of which they combat 
by having eye bags reduced, sagging cheeks, jowls, and necks restored, hair 
implanted, and excess fat removed by liposuction. Less invasive procedures 
such as injections of Botox or hyaluronic acid, which reduce wrinkles and help 
the skin look younger, are also popular. Young students who ask their parents 
to pay for their surgery sometimes go to cosmetic surgery clinics and hospi-
tals armed with pictures of movie stars and pop stars. Genmei (2016), another 
influential cosmetic surgery app, reported that the most desirable facial fea-
tures of China’s male cosmetic surgery trend were the eyes of Huo Jianhua, nose 
of Hu Ge, face of Yang Yang, and mouth of Lu Han. Popular procedures for 
this group included ‘double eyelid surgery’ (to make their eyes appear larger), 
together with operations to sculpt their noses or shave their jawbones to pro-
duce a softer face.
The increasing popularity of male cosmetic surgery shows the rise of 
 aesthetically conscious men in China. In the past decades, the media, soap 
operas, and lifestyle magazines have been saturated with messages about men 
discovering their ‘feminine’ sense of beauty. A new type of male beauty idol, 
‘flower boys’, or in a new catchword, xiaoxianrou 小鲜肉—literally, ‘little fresh 
meat’—has become extremely popular as a label of a new type of Chinese male 
icon, who are known for their flawless, boyish appearance, exemplified by the 
cute-faced TF Boys, one of China’s most popular teenage boy bands. Although 
there are different ranking charts for the most popular xiaoxianrou, celebrities 
such as TF Boys, Lu Han, Wu Yifan, and Yang Yang appear in most charts’. 
These male idols are shaping new images of male beauty, which is in contrast 
to the macho stereotype tough guy image which dominated the Mao era. The 
rise of ‘flower boys’ and xiaoxianrou is not limited to China. Something very 
similar has also taken place in other Asian countries, especially Japan and 
South Korea (Holliday and Elfving-Hwang 2012; Jung 2011; Miller 2003). The 
rise of ‘flower boys’ and men’s growing interest in their appearance challenges 
conventional macho masculinity and presents an alternative soft masculinity, 
or ‘metrosexual’ in Simpson’s term (1994).
The term ‘masculinity’ in Chinese today, yanggang zhi qi 阳刚之气, implies 
‘macho’. However, scholars (Louie 2002;  Song 2004) have argued that the 
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 configurations of Western hegemonic macho masculinity are not  applicable to 
wu 武 masculinity in China. In Chinese history, sometimes soft wen 文 mascu-
linity was superior to macho wu masculinity because it was the literary skills and 
cultural attainments conceptualised as wen masculinity that was more closely 
associated with social status than wu  macho masculinity. Of course, there 
is never just one kind of masculinity and masculinities change over time. As   
Connell and Messerschmidt (2005, 836) argue, masculinities are  ‘configurations 
of practices that are accomplished in social  interaction and, therefore, can 
differ according to the gender relations in a particular social setting’.
Under the revolutionary ideology of the Maoist China form the 1950s 
to the later 1970s, the traditional predominance of wen  masculinity over 
wu  masculinity was overturned when intellectuals were labelled as ‘bourgeois 
rightists’ and workers, peasants, and soldiers (gong 工, nong 农, bing 兵) as the 
proletariat central to the power of the state. The hegemonic macho masculinity 
was exemplified by strong and muscular ‘iron girls’ (tie guniang 铁姑娘) who 
were supposed to look and act like men.
Wen masculinity made a comeback following China’s reform and opening-
up in the 1980s. With consumerism becoming increasingly important during 
this time, wen masculinity came to embody not only scholarly attainment, but 
also an ability to consume. It also became associated with metrosexual traits, as 
vividly exemplified by the rise of aesthetically conscious ‘flower boys’ or ‘little 
fresh meat’ and beauty products advertised by those influential androgynous 
male idols. As part of this consumer culture, an attractive and groomed male 
body has come to represent a new form of sophisticated identity and consum-
erist masculinity.
The rise and popularity of ‘little fresh meat’ challenges representations of 
masculinity in contemporary China and has received a strong pushback from 
powerful state media. The state news agency Xinhua  published an editorial 
denouncing ‘sissy pants’ (niangpao 娘炮) or those who are ‘slender and weak’, 
warning of the adverse impact of this ‘sick’ culture on teenagers (Xing 2018). 
The editorial stressed that ‘what a society’s pop culture should embrace, reject 
and spread is really critical to the future of the country’. While some fear the 
popularity of effeminate male idols may threaten the country’s future (see Teix-
eira 2018), others believe in an open and diverse society. Aesthetics can be 
varied and there is plenty of room for diversity.
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In the People’s Republic of China, the year 2020 started with a new set of reg-
ulations for the management of religious groups, which came into effect on 
1 February. These regulations only confirmed what has been a clear trend under 
Xi Jinping: the ever-tighter control of all religious activity in China. While in 
2020 international attention mostly focused on the Chinese state’s repressive 
measures in Xinjiang with its religious and ethnic aspects, all religious faiths 
have seen the scope and range of their activities severely curtailed in recent 
years, with many religious leaders sentenced to long prison sentences. 
The new set of regulations is designed to ensure further progress in the ‘sini-
cisation’ of religion which started in 2016 when Xi Jinping chaired the National 
Working Meeting on Religions. In his speech he emphasised the need to ‘build a 
socialist theory of religion with Chinese characteristics’, insisting that ‘religions 
must adhere to the direction of sinicisation, and interpreting values and dog-
mas in a way that corresponds to the needs of China’ (UCA News 2018). The 
need for ‘sinicisation’ is not confined to belief systems which have  historically 
been considered foreign like Christianity and Islam—and indeed Marxism. 
Even Chinese religions need to ‘sinicise’ in order to follow up the developments 
of China in the New Era and to dig into religious elements in line with core 
socialist values. 
The Central Institute of Socialism—headed up by Ye Xiaowen who from 
1995 to 2009 led China’s State Administration of Religious Affairs (SARA)—
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provides lectures on religious ‘sinicisation’ and has issued five-year plans for all 
major religions setting out planned developments from 2018–2022. For Islam, 
this includes the so-called ‘four entries:’ entry into mosques of the national 
flag, the Chinese Constitution, love of socialist values, and the teaching of tra-
ditional classical literature. For Christianity, this means promoting a ‘Chinese 
Christianity’ and plans for a retranslation and annotation of the Bible to find 
commonalities with socialism and a ‘correct understanding’ of the text (Kuo 
2019). What we have learnt since 2015 is a clear determination on the part of 
the government to bring all religious activity into the realm of the state and to 
redefine it within the parameters of state ideology. The government’s systematic 
attempts to control and ‘re-educate’ Muslim Uyghurs in large-scale detention 
camps is the most extreme example of this control. The destruction of religious 
statues of all faiths (Wang 2019) and the detention and subsequent sentencing 
to nine years of prison of well-known house church figures like Wang Yi of 
Chengdu’s Early Rain Church (Johnson 2019) are further signs of the severity 
of the crackdown on religious activity outside the state-defined realm. 
By starting this piece with a focus on religious repression, I follow the well-
established pattern of emphasising the repressive measures and curtailment of 
religious freedom which many observers and academics adopt. In the remain-
der of this introduction, however, I want to focus on additional facets of Chi-
nese religious life and its interaction with other sectors of society which the 
pieces in this section of our Review invite us to think about.
The first is wealth. Religion used to be mostly associated with the rural popu-
lation, often with low levels of education, feudal values, and a lack of devel-
opment. But religion and spirituality in China are no longer predominantly 
associated with the poor or destitute. A 2017 survey found that more than one 
third of all surveyed stated that they engaged in some form of religious prac-
tice across all religions (Lu and Gao 2017). The appeal of religion and spiritual 
practices to middle class audiences is well documented. This ranges from a 
growth of Christian believers in urban areas to the romanticisation of Tibet as 
a spiritual place by China’s urban middle class (Yeshe Lama 2018) and a whole 
raft of spiritual practices often originating in Asia but reimported in western-
ised forms through the forces of globalisation (Borup 2017). That wealth has 
become a factor in Chinese religion is also recognised in the new regulations 
which set out clear rules on accounting practices and tax regulations, a change 
that signals awareness of the change in the demographics of religious believers 
in China in the twenty-first century and the amount of funds now available to 
some of them. 
This leads to the issue of how best to spend this money? Caroline Fielder’s 
and Jane Caple’s pieces provide examples of the different views on how best to 
support religion through donations, or, conversely, how to spend one’s money 
in a religiously inspired way. Charity lies at the heart of this debate. The first 
nationwide week of religious charity in China took place in 2012, organised 
by China’s State Administration of Religious Affairs, which signalled support 
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for religious groups’ involvement in charitable services. This event came a 
few years after the Wenchuan earthquake, which is seen as the true turn-
ing point in China’s  charity activities. For social groups trying to prove that 
their values are compa tible with the state’s and a state keen to tap into social 
resources to  provide essential services, charitable work appeared to be the 
perfect area of activity for religious groups. Until recently, religious organisa-
tion could only carry out charitable work of a very limited scope, relying on 
‘religiously inspired organisations’ (as Fielder puts it) such as the Amity Foun-
dation (which many would consider an entirely secular organisation), now 
China’s largest charity, to plan and implement projects to which they might 
contribute funds and volunteers. 
Amity Foundation is the lead organisation in the type of work which the 
 Chinese government considers desirable activities for social organisations, 
including religious organisations, with a specific focus on areas like poverty 
alleviation, education, and health care. Amity’s and many other social organi-
sations’ charitable activities fall into what Weller et al. (2018) refer to as NGO 
facilitated industrial philanthropy. But Caple’s article shows that not all agree 
on this type of philanthropy. In the case of the Tibetan Buddhist donors she 
has studied, investing in ritual and temple construction is seen as a preferable 
way to show support for their religion. Indeed, religious communities in China, 
Taiwan, and SE Asia and their leaders aren’t all willingly drawn into the com-
pulsion to engage in charity. Among the alternative public goods provided by 
religious communities are community ritual, cultural heritage and community 
identity, spiritual goods, and solving life’s problems (Weller et al. 2018), all ser-
vices that fall more into the realm of psychological support and thus also con-
tribute to the well-being of the community and society more widely. 
Networks are hugely important in Chinese business culture and society and 
belonging to a religious or spiritual congregation or community constitutes 
membership of an important in-group that can bring tangible benefits. David 
Stroup’s piece highlights the importance of such networks when in need of 
social support as a result of migrating to a different part of the country. Many 
migrants will seek out faith-based communities or networks in their new place 
of residence to get help with both the mundane challenges of everyday life like 
filling in forms or applications, but also with the psychological challenges of 
being a stranger in a new place. Different religious groups have different ways 
of signalling their belonging to a faith-based network. In a climate where overt 
signalling like particular dress, hairstyle, or regularity of prayer has become 
problematic or even dangerous, more discrete ways of signalling one’s belonging 
to a certain faith can become important. Naming is an overt yet invisible signal 
of belonging to a particular group, as in the Christian names Mark McLeister’s 
informants have adopted. While these names sound foreign—and provide a 
degree of anonymity when used in writings (Wielander 2013)—they are also 
a sign of inculturation and follow the tradition of expressing one’s hopes and 
aspirations (in this case spiritual aspirations) through the naming of a child. 
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Finally, the pieces remind us that intra- and inter-faith relations remain an 
under-researched issue in the Chinese context. David Stroup’s article gives us 
a glimpse of what dynamics come into play when members of the same faith 
but from different geographical areas get the chance to interact, a process in 
which both sides stand to benefit and learn about themselves and each other. 
More interestingly still would be studies that explore inter-faith relations. 
Where do Chinese Buddhists and Chinese Muslims find common ground? 
How do urban middle-class spiritual fantasies about Tibet hold up when expe-
riencing Tibet first hand? What are other faith groups’ positions on the treat-
ment of Uyghur Muslims? 
The new regulations which came into effect in February 2020 stipulate that 
religious groups must ‘follow the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party’ 
and ‘shall publicise the Communist Party of China’s directives and policies;’ 
they also make a statement about research. Article 22 stipulates that religious 
groups ‘shall carry out research on religious culture and religious texts… thor-
oughly uncover content in religious teachings and rules that are conducive to 
social harmony…and in line with the outstanding traditional Chinese culture’ 
(China Law Translate 2020). It seems we will need to frame our writings on 
Chinese religion and spirituality within the context of regulation and suppres-
sion for some time to come. 
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2.1 Religion, Economy, and the Social Good:  
Reflections from Tibet
Jane Caple
As China has got richer, more funds have flowed to monasteries on the Tibetan 
plateau. Growing interest in Tibetan Buddhism among affluent urban Chinese 
has been an important factor, but there has also been an upsurge in local reli-
gious giving. This has paralleled the dual processes of accelerated development 
and increased securitisation of Tibetan areas following widespread unrest in 
2008 and a subsequent series of over 150 self-immolations. In the part of north-
east Tibet (Amdo/Qinghai) where I have been working, Tibetans have poured 
resources – in some cases the equivalent of hundreds of thousands of pounds 
– into a wave of new religious construction and escalating levels of expenditure 
on rituals and the sponsorship of monastic events.
Supporting the monastic community and building temples and other reli-
gious structures have historically been among the most common forms of Bud-
dhist generosity practice in Tibetan and other societies heavily influenced by 
Buddhism. Yet, in northeast Tibet the dynamics and scale of these practices 
have been the subject of debate. It is not surprising that criticisms have been 
voiced by those Tibetan intellectuals critical of Buddhism or Buddhist institu-
tions, but concerns have also circulated among monks and laypeople across 
social strata who have themselves participated in these practices. In explor-
ing and thinking through the terms of these debates, I have been reflecting on 
what they might be able to tell us about conceptions of wealth, virtue, and the 
social good in Tibetan communities in China experiencing break-neck socio-
economic development as well as political uncertainty.
It is clear that contemporary debates about the ethics of religious giving are 
enmeshed in Tibetans’ participation in and experiences of economic transi-
tion and state-led development. Over the period 2008–2015, I witnessed rapid 
urbanisation through conversion of land for urban development, as well as vol-
untary, state-sponsored and forced migration. A general increase in disposable 
incomes was accompanied by rising levels of consumption and a growth in 
highly visible wealth disparities. These transformations were reflected in prac-
tices of religious giving. For example, when the members of one village pooled 
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over four million yuan (around £444,000) for the reconstruction of a temple in 
2014, individual pledges ranged from 2,000 to 200,000 yuan (roughly £22,000). 
A local businessman I met in 2013 said he had readily spent roughly 280,000 
yuan (over £30,000) to fund a spectacular one-day religious event for monks 
without needing to save or get into debt. This kind of spending power was far 
beyond that of most of the people I knew – not to mention myself.
In the West—as indeed among many Chinese—Buddhism and Tibetan 
 culture are often imagined to be other-worldly and anti-materialist, represent-
ing the antithesis of today’s ‘global’ consumer society. In reality of course, even 
those Tibetans who are ambivalent about marketisation and openly aware of the 
politics of state-led development enjoy more comfortable lifestyles and aspire 
to greater prosperity. This does not in itself pose any inherent contradiction 
with Buddhist values: wealth is positively associated with virtue in  Buddhist 
discourse, which makes explicit a connection between virtuous action (like 
generosity) and wealth, status, and personal efficacy and power. Nevertheless, 
this has all sat uneasily with a popular feeling that an increasing economic-
mindedness and a weakening of faith and virtue are undermining the very 
grounds of Tibetan communal well-being, morality, and identity.
On the one hand, people are concerned that contemporary practices of reli-
gious giving reflect and exacerbate this broader shift in minds and values. The 
cynical view is that a lot of giving is primarily prestige-oriented and motivated 
by competitiveness or social pressure. As such it risks contributing to com-
munity breakdown, as well as creating difficulties for households that struggle 
to keep up with escalating expectations. On the other hand, these are clearly 
Fig 2.1.a: Rongwo Monastery, northeast Tibet, 2013. Photo by the author.
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moral practices. As I have dug deeper into the histories and affective  dynamics 
of specific cases, I have started to glimpse a more complex picture in which 
practices of religious giving are experienced and received as (sometimes exem-
plary) practices of and expressions of faith and virtue. It is precisely from this 
– as well as from the flashing of cash – that prestige is derived. But can we go 
as far as saying that the dynamics and scale of contemporary religious giving is 
(sometimes?) oriented towards countering the very societal shift in values for 
which it is being critiqued?
This would certainly seem to fit with observations made by other scholars 
about the ethics of an emergent ‘Tibetan’ entrepreneurialism: ideally, profits 
from business should be used for the benefit of both self and others (contrary 
to Christian notions of charity, self- and other-interest are not dichotomous in 
Buddhism). But the debates circulating in relation to religious giving take us 
further, showing what seem to be (newly emerging?) fault lines in ideas about 
how that ideal should be realised. Leaving to one side the question of mind 
and motivation, a key area of contention concerns what people should do with 
new-found wealth. Is it better to build a temple or to give money to monks? Or 
should people instead fund hospitals, local education, or vocational training? 
What makes someone an exemplary Tibetan and a good Buddhist – and what 
brings the greatest benefits and best serves the social good?
Fig 2.1.b: A new temple under construction in northeast Tibet, 2015. Photo by 
the author.
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The recent controversy prompted by the outpouring of donations for the 
reconstruction of Notre Dame Cathedral indicates that such questions about 
religion, economy, and value are of global relevance. They are imbricated in a 
politics of value and can provoke strong moral-emotional responses grounded 
in common sense understandings of benefit, virtue, and the social good. Many 
commentators were outraged that a burning cathedral in Paris prompted peo-
ple to give a total of nearly one billion euros in days when systemic poverty 
in France was not being addressed, black churches were being burnt down in 
racist attacks in the US, the planet was facing extinction… and the list goes on.
It might seem obvious to a tertiary-educated Tibetan schoolteacher that 
spending hundreds of thousands of yuan to sponsor a one-day religious festival 
for monks is excessive and wasteful. How could this possibly compete with the 
good of giving compassionate aid to poor neighbours or school students? But 
for his brother it might be equally self-evident that sponsoring such a festival 
is the most virtuous way to spend his money – or that rebuilding the village 
temple is of greater collective benefit than spending money on education. These 
divergent ideas about benefit and the social good can tell us something about 
the different ways in which Buddhism has been mediating people’s engage-
ments with accelerated development—as well as the different ways in which 
Buddhism and Buddhist values are understood, felt, and engaged with in con-
temporary Tibet.
2.2 Names from God: The Power of Protestant Names in China
Mark McLeister
Zheng Shengjie (郑圣洁), a second-generation Christian, is a young preacher 
and one of the leaders of a growing Three-Self-affiliated congregation in 
Huanghaicheng. Shengjie was originally named Zheng Xinkai (郑新开) by 
his mother, a clear reference to Deng Xiaoping’s ‘reform and opening policy’ 
(gaige kaifang 改革开放) of the early 1980s. His mother’s reasoning for choos-
ing such a name was due to ‘her strong patriotic feelings’ (ta dui guojia de re’a 
i 她对国家的热爱, lit. ‘her strong love for the country’) and the hope that her 
son could contribute to the reform process. Shengjie’s mother converted to 
Christianity when he was five years old, and when he was seven, his mother 
changed his given name from Xinkai to Shengjie, having sought advice from 
her church leaders. Shengjie means ‘holy and pure’ and is a term which appears 
frequently in the biblical text. Her prayer was that Shengjie would be a ‘clean 
person’  (ganjing de ren 干净的人). Beyond the literal meaning is the idea that 
when something is pure and holy, it is ‘separated’ (fenli 分离) for God’s use. 
The change in name was a clear signal that Shengjie’s mother now had a love 
for God which superseded her patriotism, although she insists that she is still 
patriotic and is a better citizen now than she was before becoming a Christian. 
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As a preacher, Shengjie is now an embodiment of his mother’s aspiration (and 
prayer) that he would contribute to the building of the church. According to 
Shengjie, when he was young, he didn’t really understand the meaning of his 
name. Now, in his thirties, he sees the ‘deep spiritual meaning in his name’ (tai 
da de shuling de hanyi zai qizhong 太大的属灵的含义在其中). His name, he 
believes, is something which he needs to follow, and has a real impact on his life 
as a ‘binding force’ (yueshu li 约束力).
Broadly speaking, personal names in Chinese societies have much more 
social and political significance than in Western societies. In contemporary 
China, it is common for people to have two names, and not uncommon for 
people to have multiple names, with each name signalling something about 
the holder’s position within a given social setting. Shortly after birth, many 
children are given a diminutive or ‘milk name’ (ruming 乳名, aka ‘small name’ 
xiaoming 小名), generally used by family members and close friends, and a 
formal–legal name (xingming 姓名 aka ‘big name’ daming 大名), registered 
Fig 2.2.a: One of Huanghaicheng’s churches. Photo by the author.
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with the state. Nicknames, ‘online’ or ‘cyber’ names, and ‘English’ names are 
also common, but we won’t consider these here. Formal–legal names (and milk 
names to some extent) are particularly important because they typically belong 
to the bearer for life. Parents and family elders often consider in depth the 
meaning, sound, and form of the characters when naming a child. There has 
been something of a revival in recent years of diviners and professional name-
givers being consulted.
Protestant Christianity is the fastest-growing religion in the People’s Repub-
lic of China, with adherents numbering an estimated 70 million (Stark and 
Liu 2011). However, despite Protestant Christianity’s remarkable growth, the 
everyday lived religion of Christian adherents is under-researched. I have been 
conducting ethnographic research in a group of Three-Self-affiliated churches 
(which are registered with the state) in a coastal city in northern China for 
the past decade in order to further understand the everyday lives of Chinese 
Protestant Christians.1 I am currently examining formal-legal and diminutive 
names in this Three-self-affiliated Christian community.2
Many of my research participants who are Protestant adherents have personal 
names which are recognisably ‘Christian’, and these can be divided into differ-
ent name-types. The three main name-types are names composed of Christian 
concepts such as ‘grace’ or ‘holiness,’ e.g., Qi’en 起恩 or Shengjie 圣洁; names 
borrowed from the biblical narrative such as ‘Joseph’ (Yuese 约瑟) or ‘John’ 
(Yuehan 约翰); and names made of a combination of characters which repre-
sent a verse from the biblical narrative, e.g., ‘Manna’ (Mana 吗哪) from Exodus 
16:31. It is common for Christians to explain their given names when they meet 
new people or for parents to explain their child’s Christian-themed name to 
others, revealing that these names are much more than a personal label. 
Born in the 1980s, Zheng Shengjie was one of the first to receive a Protestant 
name in his church community. Having experienced the excesses of the Cul-
tural Revolution era, many Christian parents in Huanghaicheng in the 1980s 
and early 1990s were reluctant to choose overtly religious names for their chil-
dren because they ‘did not have a sense of security’ (meiyou anquangan 没有安
全感). Now, however, it is much more common for people who have grown up 
in these church communities to have a clearly defined Protestant name. 
As was the case with Shengjie, church leaders play a central role in the nam-
ing process and some are regarded as such adept name-givers that they are 
approached by people from outside of the church to name children. I have 
examined in some detail in previous research the role of the Holy Spirit in 
Huanghaicheng congregations (McLeister 2019). Some church leaders I inter-
viewed believe that the Holy Spirit gives names to children through them. All 
name-givers in the churches spend time reading the Bible and praying before 
making a final decision on a name. The Holy Spirit gives them ‘an insight’ (yi ge 
kanjian 一个看见) or ‘moves’ (gandong 感动) them so they choose an appro-
priate name. Many Christians in this community believe that the ability to 
bestow names on children is a special spiritual gift (teshu de enci 特殊的恩赐). 
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Some parents believe that the names given by church leaders are more ‘effec-
tive’ (youxiao 有效) than names which lay Christians choose themselves. Just 
as Shengjie believes that his name has an impact on his life, many Christian 
parents believe that a Protestant name can have a powerful positive influence 
on the behaviour of their child, and the name will serve to guide the bearer 
through their life. Some parents talked to me about their child’s name as a 
‘reminder’ (tixing 提醒) of the Christian message. Sometimes, when call-
ing their child’s name, these parents explained that they would reflect on the 
idea that God had bestowed the name on the child and that the child would one 
day learn about the fuller and deeper meaning behind it.
From this brief overview, we can see some aspects of the power of Protes-
tant names in this Christian community. In seeking such names for their child, 
Christian parents are making a conscious choice about their religious  identity 
and their aspirations for their child. As bearers of parental aspirations, the 
Fig 2.2.b: A Christian grave in Huanghaicheng. The personal name of the 
Christian is Yongjie 永杰, which means ‘forever pure’. Photo by the author.
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names protect and guide the child. As markers of a shared religious identity, 
the names help to foster community ties.
Notes
 1. To protect the anonymity of my participants, I use the pseudonym Huang-
haicheng for my fieldsite.
 2. This research project has been generously supported by funding from The 
Carnegie Trust and The Royal Society of Edinburgh.
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2.3 Migration, Faith, and Belonging  
in Urban Hui Communities
David R. Stroup
On a cold, grey day in early December 2015, I sat in a booth in a restaurant 
in Jinan’s Hui Quarter. Specialising in the famous halal hand-pulled noodles 
(shou gong la mian 手工拉面), the staff of the restaurant all hailed from the 
rural suburbs of Xining, in far-away Qinghai Province. Over a heaping plate of 
piping hot stir-fried cumin and mutton noodles (zi ran yang rou gai jiao mian 
孜然羊肉盖浇面), I talked with my interviewee, one the restaurants’ cooks, 
an 18-year-old man recently arrived at Shalndong from the west. In between 
mouthfuls I asked him about his impressions of Jinan after only a month of 
living in the city. Glumly, he replied ‘Jinan’s okay’. Pressed for further details he 
explained, ‘It’s not as good as back home. The Hui here just aren’t as faithful’.
Later, a lifetime resident of Jinan who worked as a baker in the Hui Quarter 
echoed these sentiments. He explained ‘The Hui from the northwest go to pray 
more often than a lot of locals. For them, Islam is absolutely a part of their daily 
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lives. But, we local Hui are very business-minded (shangye hua 商业化). We’re 
really concerned about work, and don’t have a lot of time to go pray’. Through-
out my time in Jinan, responses like these became common. Time and again, 
respondents told me about how the arrival of migrant Hui from outside the city 
changed the neighborhood’s social landscape.
Jinan’s experiences hardly stand alone in contemporary urban China. Cities 
across the country currently struggle to incorporate the millions of in-country 
migrants who leave home in search of economic opportunity. The challenges 
members of this ‘floating population’ (liu dong ren kou 流动人口) face are 
numerous, and well documented (Zhang 2001; 2005; Zheng et al. 2009; Loyalka 
2012). For shaoshu minzu 少数民族 (ethnic minorities) like the Hui, migration 
may pose even more acute difficulties in the form of cultural barriers and local 
prejudices (Iredale and Guo 2003; Côté 2015). Such shifts in cultural landscape 
may prove especially difficult for the Hui, whose in-group cultural heterogene-
ity, may cause feelings of alienation even within their own community (see, 
especially Erie and Carlson 2014). As they attempt to find a place in their new 
environs, these Hui migrants often feel forced to decide between maintain-
ing tradition and meeting the demands of the usually marketised, secularised, 
Han-dominant local culture (Burgjin and Bilik 2003).
In part, these difficulties stem from the gap in economic status between Hui 
migrants and locals. As one respondent, a Hui engineer and lifelong Jinan 
 resident explained, ‘(migrants) are still integrating. They still face some dis-
crimination. They are not as educated or economically well off ’. Another Jinan 
resident, a local member of the clergy, remarked that migrants from rural 
western China exhibited different priorities in education. He claimed, ‘some of 
them, in places like Ningxia, when they’re young can speak and read Arabic but 
can’t even write their own names in Chinese’. An educator in Xining, himself 
a transplant from a rural community, argued that moving to cities provided a 
positive opportunity for migrant children to become better educated, claiming 
‘(Migrants’) children also see so much more of the world. At the very least, their 
Putonghua 普通话 (Mandarin) is standard’.
More frequently, though, respondents argued that gaps in literacy and cus-
tom prevented rural migrants from fully integrating into their new commu-
nities. These difficulties even trickled down into an inability to access public 
services, respondents argued. A man in his thirties who worked as a salesman 
in Jinan argued that, ‘For People from the northwest (Xibei 西北), religion is 
the centre of their whole life. Not only that, they frequently ask the ahong 阿
訇 (imam) to be a mediator for their life’s conflicts. So, when conflicts arise in 
their lives, when they need an intermediary between people, they go find the 
ahong’. A member of the local clergy echoed these assertions, lamenting that 
unfamiliarity in dealing with civil services led so many migrants to depend 
upon the mosque to resolve their problems.
Conversely many of those Hui who move from the rural countryside to cities 
like Jinan, or Yinchuan (the capital of the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region) 
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express frustration with their urban ethnic and religious counterparts. As one 
academic in Yinchuan explained ‘A lot of migrant Muslims who come here find 
Yinchuan to be very danhua 淡化 (‘watered down,’ or secular)’. A cab driver 
in Xining who had spent time living in east China groused, ‘Muslims from 
the east like in Shandong don’t know anything about Islam’. Incredulous, he 
added ‘They smoke, and drink and everything!’ Others made similar remarks. 
An electronics salesman, originally from Gansu, but living in Beijing listed the 
ways in which Beijing’s Hui were different from those in his hometown. Cit-
ing everything, from manner of dress, to diet, and attitudes no marriage, he 
complained, ‘Beijing Muslims’ way of thinking is just more kaifang 开放 (used 
negatively to imply permissiveness or libertine behavior)’.
Despite these tensions, however, the engagement between different segments 
of the Hui community that migration causes does stimulate transformations 
in how Hui communities negotiate boundaries of ethnic identity. Daily prac-
tices like those of diet, dress, or religious observance are key markers of an eth-
nic identity (Fox and Miller-Idriss 2008; Goode and Stroup 2015). Continued 
negotiation and debate over which practices should stand as the ‘correct’ mani-
festations of identity may trigger shifts in the boundaries of ethnic identity, or 
subdivide communities along cross-cutting identity cleavages (Chandra 2012; 
Wimmer 2013). In Hui communities, renewed conversations concerning the 
content of Hui identity stimulate change on many levels.
In some cases, secular Hui rediscover faith after engaging with more pious 
migrants. A respondent in Xining beamed with pride at the positive exam-
ple provided by northwestern migrants, boasting ‘the people who live in East 
China, they’re very danhua, but when people from Qinghai go to the cities they 
start to pray more often, and believe more deeply’. A woman who operated a 
corner shop in Jinan’s Hui quarter also attributed changes in mosque attend-
ance to migrants, stating ‘I think they’re a big influence on the neighbourhood. 
They go to pray every Friday. Local Muslims aren’t this observant’.
Likewise, experiences in the predominantly secular environments change 
the outlooks of migrants. The socioeconomic and political consequences of 
migration are not only evident at the destinations at which migrants arrive, 
but also in their places of origin (Bastia 2011; Brubaker 2010; Redclift 2016). 
A Hui scholar in Yinchuan remarked, ‘ It works both ways; (migrants) adapt 
to Yinchuan but they also spur locals to think about being more active’. A 
young woman who worked as a teacher in Xining, herself having grown up as 
a migrant in Zhejiang, remarked ‘Because (migrants) go out to work, they also 
widen their horizons, open up their worldview, meet different people. This will 
also make changes. Some learn new things and transform their hometowns’.
The impact of these exchanges is wide ranging. Not only does this 
 re-engagement of disparate parts of the Hui community serve to draw internal 
boundary lines that cross-cut ethnic identities with competing class, age, gen-
der,  sectarian, and other identities, it also forges new understandings of what 
it means to be Hui. Especially for the young people who understand  migration 
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first-hand, the experience of living around and with Hui from other back-
grounds opens up opportunities for a new, broader negotiation of the cultural 
markers which denote group membership.
Thus, the changes wrought by shifts in population demographics forge new 
conceptions of Hui ethnic identity. As one lifelong Hui resident in Yinchuan 
mused, ‘Maybe these (migrant) people’s children, the next generation, they can 
become residents of a New Yinchuan (xin de Yinchuan ren 新的银川人). This 
includes residents of Old Yinchuan’s children’s children also becoming a part of 
New Yinchuan. Maybe it could be like that’.
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2.4 Out of the Margins: The Rise of Religious Charity in China
Caroline Fielder
China has enjoyed a long and rich history of religious charity and philan-
thropy with some of the earliest forms of Chinese charity inspired by Confu-
cian,  Buddhist and Daoist teachings promoting the values of benevolence and 
 compassion and focused on mutual assistance and charitable giving between 
kinship lines. Since the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, 
however, both religion and charity became viewed with suspicion and over time 
events and practices waned until the mid–late 1980s when it became possible 
once again for religiously inspired organisations to become involved in social 
welfare and development work. A decade later, following deliberate efforts by 
the state to rehabilitate the concept of charity within wider society, religiously 
inspired charitable organisations (RICOs) began to re-emerge in earnest. 
Today, after a period of marginalisation, we can see that religious charities 
from a number of traditions are once again on the rise. This year’s annual char-
ity fundraising event held by Chinese internet giant Tencent (the ‘Tencent 99 
Giving Day’) saw the Nanjing-based RICO, the Amity Foundation, become its 
10th biggest beneficiary. Given that religion and charity have been sensitive 
spheres of influence in China’s recent history and have therefore been tightly 
managed, the exposure given by the event was doubtless extremely meaning-
ful in bringing Amity’s work, its vision and mission to the fore of the general 
public’s imagination. The 435 projects that Amity put forward for support must 
have resonated with a lot of individual donors as they managed to raise a total 
of almost 66,520,000 RMB (approximately £7.3 million) over the course of 
three days. 
For any organisation this would be considered a major success, but as one 
considers Amity’s religious heritage it is worth spending a moment asking what 
the rise of Amity, and the emergence of the wider RICO sector, can teach us 
about contemporary Chinese society. Scholars like Durkheim and Troeltsch 
have long-since argued that religion can mirror wider society and I would sug-
gest that RICOs such as Amity present us with a particularly interesting lens 
through which to explore developments in wider Chinese society.
Firstly, as organisations created at a specific time and for a specific purpose, 
their very existence, organisational values and ideals can help us appreciate 
changes in Chinese society, including shifts in rhetoric, modifications in social 
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behaviour, and changes in political focus. The growing presence of RICOs in 
wider society reflects a much-changed social and political reality compared to 
that of the 1950s to early 1980s, when both charity and religion were viewed 
with suspicion. Charity, once seen as a marker of a feudal society and a means 
of keeping the poor in their place is now no longer seen as a challenge to the 
Party or a critique on its ability to provide for its citizens. Similarly, although 
differing voices can still be heard, religion has morphed from being viewed as 
a ‘drug’ which should be eradicated, to a ‘medicine’ with the potential to bring 
about social stability and provide healing for the nation. Christianity, previ-
ously viewed with disdain, as summed up in the old adage ‘One more Chris-
tian, one less Chinese’ (duole yige jidutu, shaole yige Zhongguo ren 多了一个基
督徒，少了一个中国人), has seen a considerable change in fortunes since the 
period of reform and opening up. A renewed openness in both policy circles 
and society has allowed for Christianity to now be seen by some as a potentially 
progressive force with a distinctive and growing Chinese voice. 
From the outset Amity has taken a lead in challenging stereotypes and 
 initiating positive forms of dialogue between religious groups and wider soci-
ety, including those outside China. In Chinese its name is made from two char-
acters ‘爱德’ (ai de) meaning love and virtue (or virtuous deeds). In 1984 one 
of the founding fathers of the organisation, Bishop KH Ting, wrote a letter to 
international friends where he laid out his vision for Amity to be an organi-
sation which promoted love and virtuous deeds, emphasising the positive 
 contribution of Chinese Christians to society. No longer should they be seen as 
foreign lackeys or traitors, instead Amity would be a vehicle for Chinese Chris-
tians to come together to do their part ‘as citizens in nation-building’ in order 
to ‘make the fact of Christian presence and participation better known to our 
people, without in any way weakening the work of the church proper’ (Amity 
Foundation n.d.). 
Established formally in 1985, the Amity Foundation has grown from a three-
man organisation with limited resources to a multi-million-pound foundation, 
headed by a woman and which now serves as an incubator to aspiring young 
charities within the wider sector. Since its inception Amity’s work priorities 
have echoed and reinforced patterns from wider Chinese society. These include 
a mirroring of the reform and opening process through the re-establishment 
of links with international ‘friends’ in the 1980s (including the establishment of 
a new model for overseas relationships which focused on people-to-people 
sharing based on mutual respect, comprising an understanding of the changing 
realities of local church life rooted in new China and led by Chinese); a focus 
on social changes and the need to mitigate against growing inequality within 
Chinese society through the rehabilitation of charity within Chinese society 
in the 1990s (taking up the call to ‘Go West’; facilitating technical knowledge 
exchange and the sharing of best practice with grassroots communities within 
impoverished sectors of Chinese society; building trust across social divides and 
channelling funds and help to where they were most needed); building social 
resilience in the 2000s, including the rebuilding of communities  following a 
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number of natural disasters, and recognising the need to develop a Chinese 
funding base so as to become more self-sufficient (the financial crisis had a 
big impact as 98% of project funding still came from overseas in 2008); and 
undertaking a process of internationalisation in the 2010s (acting as a conduit 
for Chinese volunteers going overseas, and the transmission of Chinese ideas 
of development and charity to the world through the opening of Amity offices 
in Ethiopia in 2015, in Geneva in 2017, and in Kenya in 2019). 
Alongside this mirroring of social changes, RICOs such as Amity have also 
acted in the cognitive sense of allowing society to see itself, and in that pro-
cess to become more self-conscious and open to change. As such it has more 
subtly served as a catalyst of socio-cultural change. In a society which has 
sought to privatise religious thought and confine religious activities to within 
the physical walls of religious institutions, such as churches, temples, and 
mosques, RICOs have sought to extend religion’s scope by taking their work 
firmly into the public sphere and working with faith communities and those 
with no religious belief. The process of taking religion into the public sphere 
has not only been a challenge to forces in support of secularisation but also 
questions more conservative elements from within the church who see charity, 
social welfare, and development as the work of the state and criticise RICOs for 
diverting important resources away from what they see as ‘real’ religious work. 
Such  challenges bring to mind C. K. Yang’s (1961) distinction between what he 
saw as  institutional and diffused religion, emphasising the fluid and dynamic 
potential of the cultural role of religion, as opposed to the more restrictive tra-
ditional institutional embodiment as emphasised in both policy circles and 
 traditional church structures.
In many ways the appeal of the Amity Foundation is simple and lies in its 
ability to connect people and to build trust across communities, religious and 
ethnic divides. It is also in its ability to present a form of religion which echoes 
Bellah’s (1967) notion of a civic religion—drawing inspiration from a particular 
religious tradition, in Amity’s case working alongside Protestant churches both 
inside China and globally, and yet at the same time being independent of those 
same churches or indeed any other recognised religious institution. As such 
Amity draws on particular teachings and yet remains religiously ‘distinctive’, 
and is therefore able to develop its own character and cultivate its own sense 
of integrity. Not being rooted in the church structures and hierarchies frees it 
from many political and doctrinal constraints and broadens its appeal to wider 
sectors of society. 
This more nebulous, non-doctrinal approach does not necessarily align 
with organised religion but should not be seen as a weakening or a rejection 
of religious values. As its popularity in recent fundraising events also shows, 
this form of religious expression arguably has an appeal to wider sectors of 
 society who themselves are more fluid and questioning in their approach to 
religious and other issues of concern. RICOs such as Amity are becoming 
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 increasingly a more active and vocal sector of society, not just within China but 
now also internationally. As such these organisations, which have historically 
had  relatively little attention paid to them, deserve to be much better under-
stood and scrutinised. 
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Academic research on China and the Sinophone world has largely disman-
tled the Orientalist conceptualisation of a ‘traditional’ Chinese music existing 
in threatened opposition to ‘Western’ music by means of research on genres 
as diverse as Cantopop, revolutionary opera, silk-and-bamboo (sizhu 丝竹) 
instrumental music, and Tibetan hip hop. Such genres are not only diverse in 
relation to each other, but also internally complex, drawing on various regional, 
national, and global influences. In the following paragraphs, I examine another 
type of diversity, which is the ways and the extent to which the experience of 
music contributes to a sense of self and/or community. I examine this diver-
sity of musical experience from three perspectives: as a simultaneously shared 
experience of organised sound; as integral to the imaginings of wider national, 
regional, ethnic, political, and generational ‘communities’; and as superficially 
heard amid the sensory overload of contemporary cities.
From the first perspective, musical performance constitutes an intimate shared 
experience which can create or reinforce strong emotional bonds among partici-
pants. A classic example from recent PRC history is the performance of the rock 
singer Cui Jian in May 1989 in Tiananmen Square. Peng Lei (2019) describes 
how this performance, taking place in the nation’s ‘symbolic central space’, 
 carried an ‘explicit political message’ of support for its audience of  student pro-
testors. Indeed, much has been written of early Chinese rock music’s  involvement 
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in the production of a politically aware, questioning youth culture in the late 
1980s (e.g. Jones 1992). Since those heady days, rock music in China has increas-
ingly refrained from involvement in collective political statements. However, its 
 performance still plays an important role in the production of identities, which 
are not necessarily grounded in a sense of either the political or the  collective. 
For example, Peng Lei also describes the more individualist rock bands and 
identities of the 2000s, particularly those associated with the venue D-22 in 
Beijing’s university district. Moreover, non-mainstream music does not have a 
monopoly on the ability to produce a sense of identity or community. Thus, in 
this volume, Zou Sheng examines the recent patriotic singing of ‘red songs’ by 
flash mobs throughout the Sinophone world. Whereas these  revolutionary (and 
 post-revolutionary) songs have continued to be performed by the elderly in parks 
and other urban spaces during the post-Mao era (see Kendall 2019), these ‘choral 
flash mobs’ are notable for bringing together young groups of nationalists. Zou 
understands these gatherings as providing an occasion for what the ethnomusi-
cologist Thomas Turino refers to as ‘sonic bonding’, as participants perform their 
sense of belonging to a national community through singing and movement. 
In none of these examples is the sense of self or community solely restricted 
to the experience of music as a shared moment in space. This brings the article to 
a second, interrelated perspective on the modern experience of music. Revisit-
ing two of the examples above, Cui Jian’s album, Rock ‘N’ Roll on the New Long 
March, would have been heard by many students on cassette players prior to 
his performance in Tiananmen Square, just as participants in flash mobs might 
brush up on their renditions of ‘red songs’ via online streaming before singing 
in public. Looking to earlier technologies, the invention of the gramophone in 
the late nineteenth century enabled the separation of musical sound from time 
and space, so that a performance could be frozen and then reproduced far 
beyond the geographical and temporal limitations of its acoustic space. The 
invention of the radio, in turn, reproduced across vast spaces the previously 
local experience of musical sound as simultaneously heard, so that music came 
to play an important albeit sometimes underestimated role in the construction 
of ‘imagined communities’ (Anderson 1983). 
These imagined communities are not just of the nation, but also of region, 
ethnicity, generation, and political orientation, among others. For example, 
Yiu-Wai Chu (this volume; 2017), has argued for the importance of Cantopop 
in reflecting and defining a specifically Hong Kong identity, with lyrics about 
not only (a sometimes distanced) Chineseness but also the city itself. Else-
where, Anna Morcom (this volume; 2015; 2018) has written of how Tibetan 
popular musics have created proud representations of Tibetan geography and 
culture. The social groups that shape – and are shaped by – these musics are 
not necessarily the cuddly, bounded states of collective existence that the term 
‘community’ typically (and uncritically) implies, but rather exist in complex 
and sometimes antagonistic relations with other imagined communities. For 
Morcom, Tibetan popular musics’ representations of ethnic identity partially 
align with the PRC’s own colourful representations of the Tibetans as a distinct 
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ethnic group within the imagined multicultural community of Chineseness, 
but sharply diverge when accompanied by political demands. In neighbouring 
Xinjiang, the state has actively encouraged certain Uyghur musical practices 
but as secularised, staged performances of PRC heritage, rather than as more 
local, religious expressions of identity (Harris 2020). Moreover, in recent years, 
even state-sanctioned, sanitised Uyghur musics have been treated with suspi-
cion and replaced by genres more associated with the Han Chinese (Harris, this 
volume; Anderson and Byler 2019). 
There is also, of course, conflict over music within the narrower boundaries of 
an acoustic space, particularly in cities, where the ubiquity of music can create the 
perception of music as noise (see Frith 2002). For Beijing,  Caroline Chen (2010) 
has shown how folk dancing amid the city’s architectural and  demographic 
density has led to generational conflict, as elderly dancers (and their music) 
 irritate parents trying to maintain a quiet study environment for their children. 
For Hong Kong, Winnie Lai (2018) has described how pro-democracy dem-
onstrators sang Happy Birthday to You to drown out, confuse and  embarrass 
their opponents during the Umbrella Movement. Face-to-face (or ear-to-ear?) 
communities of musical sound are not necessarily warm and cuddly either. 
Focusing on the dense soundscapes of urban spaces also suggests a third per-
spective on the experience of music, as an ubiquitous but relatively unheeded 
element of everyday life that does not significantly contribute to a sense of 
community or even self. My own research on a small city in Guizhou prov-
ince explores this aspect of music, as struggling to exert significant influence 
amid a dense, high-decibel soundscape (Kendall 2019). Georg Simmel ([1903] 
1997) famously argued that the city dweller becomes indifferent as a defence 
mechanism against the sensory onslaught of the metropolis. In the contem-
porary world, even a small Chinese city presents an aural onslaught, so that, 
unless played at particularly high levels, music may simply be tuned out by 
urban residents. 
In the city of Wuhan, Samuel Horlor (2021, 25) finds that street perfor-
mances ‘exude a mundane quality, manifest not only in their settings and cir-
cumstances, but also in the underwhelming collective responses…that they 
provoke’. These loosely-bound collections of individuals may be more typical 
of everyday urban musical life than the ‘exceptional, underground or minority 
cases’ of music-making that scholars tend to prioritise (Horlor 2021, 90). And 
for these mundane musical gatherings, the notion of community needs to be 
radically conceptualised, away from the idea of ‘a community’ that denotes a 
‘collection of people to which individuals belong, enduring bodies defined by 
the duality of insiders and outsiders’ and towards ‘community’ as an uncounta-
ble noun ‘evoking a descriptive quality of a situation or strip of activity’ (Horlor 
2021, 11). Only then does it become possible to grapple with the full extent of 
music’s relationship with senses of self and community, as sometimes a power-
ful force—amid close interactions of bodies and sound, as well as in the wider 
production of social belonging—but also as sometimes fleetingly and superfi-
cially experienced amid the complexities of contemporary urban space.
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3.1 Performing Devotion: Revitalized ‘Red Songs’,  
Choral Flash Mobs, and National Identity
Sheng Zou
As nationalist sentiment climaxed in Mainland China in the wake of the 
Hong Kong protests and amid the celebrations of the 70th anniversary of 
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the  founding of the PRC, new life has been breathed into a number of classical 
propagandistic songs, or ‘red songs’ (hong ge 红歌), which were both broadcast 
and  performed en masse across the country. One of the revitalised songs is 
‘My People, My Country’ (wo he wo de zuguo 我和我的祖国), a propaganda 
anthem from 1985 that has recently been covered by Chinese pop diva Faye 
Wong with a new musical arrangement for a hit Chinese movie of the same 
name. The song is included in the catalogue of 100 red songs released by the 
Central Propaganda Department to celebrate the anniversary.
The revival of classical red songs has taken a participatory and performa-
tive turn, as patriotic singing competitions and choral flash mobs spread across 
Chinese communities at home and abroad. In August, patriotic Chinese stu-
dents around the world took to the streets, waving national flags while sing-
ing together to defend and honour their homeland. In September, pro-Beijing 
demonstrators in Hong Kong gathered in malls to sing China’s national anthem 
and classical red songs such as ‘Ode to the Motherland’ (gechang zuguo 歌唱
祖国 ), which constituted a counter-voice to ‘Glory to Hong Kong’, an anthem 
adopted by Hong Kong protesters to foster internal solidarity. Meanwhile, 
organisations and communities across China, large and small, held singing 
competitions where citizens performed patriotic songs live.
This fervent wave of choral flash mobs and singing competitions  constitutes 
a re-emerging sonic infrastructure grounded in local and identity-based 
 communities where music is circulated and practiced in the service of national 
cohesion. Over the past decades, from loudspeakers and radios, to tapes and 
CDs, and further to digital devices and apps, practices of music making 
and listening have been radically decentralised and personalised; yet these 
recent flash mobs signify a return of the collective in people’s everyday experi-
ence with music. In the following, I will discuss how music could be deployed 
to consolidate national identification; how choral flash mobs allow for a kind of 
sonic and bodily bonding (Turino 2008; McNeil 1995) due to their distinctive 
participatory and performative properties; and how these flash mob perfor-
mances relate to cultural/national identity formation.
Much attention is paid to the ways music is deployed as a means of political 
resistance, such as the iconic protest song ‘March for the Beloved’, which, since 
South Korea’s Gwangju Democratisation Movement, has inspired other social 
movements in Asia. Nonetheless, music can also be harnessed as a medium of 
political and ideological control. In China, political and ideological control via 
music is achieved through appeals to people’s nationalist sentiment and iden-
tity. Since the late 1970s, patriotic red songs, sung by a few professional singers 
employed by state troupes, often featured metaphoric terms such as ‘home’/ 
‘homeland’ (Baranovitch 2003), in order to blur the line between political 
nationalism and cultural nationalism, or to transfer people’s love for the nation 
to the Party–state. However, with the market-oriented reforms in China’s media 
and cultural scenes and the influx of foreign music genres, many of these red 
songs gradually lost their grip on people, especially younger generations. On 
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the one hand, other music genres, such as hip-hop, have been incorporated into 
propaganda campaigns (Zou 2019). On the other hand, attempts have been 
made to revitalise the red songs through new renditions and covers.
The power of music in evoking nationalistic tendencies should be analysed in 
terms of both its sonic and symbolic qualities. Music is often seen as a vehicle 
for lyrics, but as Revill (2000, 602) observes, the ‘physical properties of sound, 
pitch, rhythm, timbre’ work on and through the body, granting music ‘a singu-
lar power to play on the emotions, to arouse and subdue, animate and pacify’. 
Therefore, the sonic, rhythmic, and melodic qualities of music that give rise 
to particular sensory, somatic, and mental experiences should be examined in 
their own right. In this sense, the ideological power of patriotic red songs stems 
largely from their rhythmic and melodic qualities that induce particular emo-
tional orientations, such as solidarity, solemnness, or conviviality.
The symbolic quality of music—realised through meaningful lyrics or 
associated memories and tropes—constitutes another major source of musi-
cal power. Music is made at a particular time in a concrete place; its specific 
temporal and spatial dimensions allow it to carry memories and mark spatial 
boundaries. Bohlman (2004), for instance, argues that nationalistic music not 
only  contributes to ethnic consciousness, but also serves nation-states in their 
struggle over contested territory. Likewise, red songs such as ‘My People, My 
Country’ and ‘Ode to the Motherland’ not only give people access to a symbolic 
past, but also invoke ‘cultural geographies of exclusion and inclusion’ (Revill 
2000, 598). Such terms as ‘people’, ‘country’ and ‘motherland’ have definitional 
boundaries that demarcate the in-group from the out-group, reinforcing a 
sense of national sovereignty and integrity.
Memories, however, are not just ‘transmitted’ by these songs to new genera-
tions; they are also reconstructed, reformulated, and re-inserted into contem-
porary structures of feeling. The symbolic open-endedness of these patriotic 
songs makes this reformulation possible. Faye Wong’s cover of ‘My People, My 
Country’ manifests another technique to re-insert memories of the past into 
the fabrics of contemporary life in ways legible to the contemporary audience.
The choral flash mobs as an embodied sonic infrastructure further contrib-
ute to the consolidation of national identification. Different from the top-down 
Red Culture campaign operative from 2008 and 2012 in Chongqing, the latest 
wave of patriotic flash mobs appears to be spontaneous and self-organised. The 
participants, as both singers and listeners, gather together to make collective 
sound, live. The liveness of flash mob performances—manifested in the acts of 
singing, cheering, or moving together in synchrony—has the potential to create 
‘strong emotional links between the individual and the group’ (Eyerman 2002, 
450). Group singing as a participatory and performative ritual leads to a sense 
of unity and intersubjective connection, similar to what Victor Turner (1991, 
96) calls ‘communitas’, namely a state of ‘homogeneity and comradeship’ among 
individuals in rituals. In the context of nation–states, Benedict Anderson (2006, 
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145) observes that people singing national anthems on national holidays share 
an experience of simultaneity that he characterises as ‘unisonance’—a sonic 
and embodied experience of an imagined community.
In these choral flash mobs, people also have a similar embodied experience 
of simultaneity as they sing the same verse to the same melody. During a flash 
mob taking place at a shopping mall in Hong Kong on September 12, pro-
Beijing demonstrators sang the ‘Ode to the Motherland’ in unison, while facing 
toward a large national flag hanging from the second floor. Many of them were 
also waving small national flags while singing. In much the same way individual 
voices converged into one, the individuals merged into a homogeneous group 
where particularities were temporarily cast aside. Choral flash mobs provide 
an occasion for ‘sonic bonding’ (Turino 2008), where people make collective 
sound, move in synchrony, and experience a sense of togetherness. Participants 
perform not only music, but also their devotion to the nation-state, when their 
sense of national identity and pride is challenged by the ideological and discur-
sive battles of the latest geopolitical crisis. Characterised by liveness, embodi-
ment, participation, and performance, choral flash mobs enable a spectacular 
and aesthetic representation of national identity, where top-down ideological 
governance coalesces with bottom-up nationalist sentiment.
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3.2 Rethinking Hong Kong Identity through Cantopop:  
The 1980s as an Example
Yiu-Wai Chu
‘Music, like identity, is both performance and story,’ argued by Simon Frith in 
his often-cited essay ‘Music and Identity’: it ‘describes the social in the indi-
vidual and the individual in the social’ (Frith 1996, 109). In the context of Hong 
Kong where more than 90 percent of the population speak Cantonese, Canton-
ese popular songs (Cantopop) have functioned as a major source of the city’s 
cultural identity by connecting the individual and the social. I have argued 
elsewhere that the story of Cantopop, the voice of the city, was also the story of 
Hong Kong identity (Chu 2017, 40–41). While it is widely believed that Can-
topop has been declining in the past two decades or so, it is not surprising that 
Hong Kong identity has also been waning. In June 2019, the  anti-extradition 
bill movement opened a Pandora’s Box that the Hong Kong government has 
still failed to nail shut. Arguably, the diminishing Hong Kong identity and 
its relation to China is one of the important controversies related to the saga. 
Given the limited scope, the 1980s will be used as an example to explain the 
cultural politics of identity (trans)formation in Hong Kong when Cantopop 
played out across society in that decade of changes.
It is well known that ‘Below the Lion Rock’ (1979), originally the theme song 
of a Radio Television Hong Kong (RTHK) television drama, is the unofficial 
anthem of the city. The song written by the Cantopop godfathers Joseph Koo 
(melody) and James Wong (lyrics) signalled the dawning of a new era of local 
identity. As astutely noted by David Faure in ‘Reflections on Being Chinese in 
Hong Kong’, ‘If the Hong Kong Chinese up to the 1970s were Chinese sojourn-
ers in Hong Kong, the generation of the 1970s [were] Hong Kong people of 
Chinese descent’ (Faure 1997, 104). Cantopop turned a new page in the his-
tory of Hong Kong identity by singing the city in the subsequent decades. If 
the recent anti-extradition saga had pit Hong Kong against the Mainland, the 
crises in the early 1980s brought forth various imaginaries between the former 
British colony and its motherland. In 1982, the then British Prime Minister 
Margaret Thatcher fell on the stairs in front of the Great Hall of the People in 
Beijing, which stirred up a confidence crisis among Hong Kong people. Hong 
Kong’s relationship with China was somehow a major issue shortly before and 
after that infamous slip. It was argued by Esther Cheung (1999), my late dear 
friend, that Hong Kong popular music (including Cantopop and Mandopop) 
has  generated intensely vigorous imaginations of homeland, nation, and 
 ‘Chineseness’ in that special context. 
Notwithstanding the fact that the Cantopop industry has long been domi-
nated by romantic ballads, mainstream songs did present various national alle-
gories. For example, Cantopop diva Liza Wang’s big hits ‘Always Love across 
Ten Thousand Waters and One Thousand Mountains’ (1981) and ‘The Brave 
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Chinese’ (1981) expressed Hong Kong diasporic and national sentiments 
respectively in the early 1980s. It should not be difficult to tell from the titles 
that ‘Ode on the Great Wall’ (1983) and ‘Call of the Yellow River’ (1983) (sung 
by the then leading Cantopop singers Roman Tam and Adam Cheng respec-
tively), among others, are good examples of rethinking if not glorifying Chi-
neseness as the cultural root of Hong Kong identity. Besides ‘Below the Lion 
Rock,’ interestingly, Roman Tam also sang ‘The Chinese Dream’ (1983)—almost 
three decades before President Xi Jinping’s version of the Chinese dream of 
national rejuvenation. The song was so popular that Tam was invited to per-
form the Mandarin version on the 1985 Spring Festival Gala of China Central 
Television (CCTV, state television broadcaster), the immensely popular show 
watched by countless Chinese families on Chinese New Year’s Eve. Meanwhile, 
Hong Kong’s root-searching stories were perfectly summarised by the Side A 
of Teddy Robin’s vinyl disc Extraterrestrial Man (1984), which was a medley 
comprising of five songs sharing the motif of longing for home. Not just to be 
found in the north, home could also be constructed locally, with conceptions 
of the past, present, and future. Agnes Chan’s ‘Hong Kong Hong Kong’ (1982) 
was a lavish praise of the then Hong Kong as a home as well as an energetic city. 
‘Fond Memories of Hong Kong’ (1983), theme song of the RTHK television 
programme bearing the same title, was nostalgic as well as forward-looking at 
once, trying to imagine a new future for Hong Kong through the examination 
of its history of developing from a small island into a world city. 
Alongside mainstream pop songs, Hong Kong folk songs were also good 
examples of creative hybridisations. Different from the highly commercial 
mainstream Cantopop, the wave of folk songs generated across the territory 
in the early 1980s represented the visions of young literary hipsters back then. 
Not unlike the examples mentioned above, however, many Hong Kong folk 
songs were root-searching, and Ivy Koo’s ‘My Home My Land’ (1982), as 
implied by the title, is a convenient example. Suite of Hong Kong City (1982), 
a concept album masterminded by Armando Lai, was a pioneering attempt to 
use different districts of Hong Kong as the setting-cum-theme of all the songs 
except ‘1997,’ which is a bold reflection of Hong Kong youngsters’ bewilder-
ment toward the future after Hong Kong’s reversion to China. Besides folk 
songs, band songs also imagined different futures for Hong Kong at that criti-
cal  historical juncture. Shortly after the official signing of the Sino-British 
Joint Declaration in December 1984, Hong Kong music industry witnessed 
the advent of band music, which continued to hybridise different imaginar-
ies toward the future beyond 1997. The group ‘Island,’ the forerunner of this 
wave of band music, released its debut album entitled Island in 1985. Similar 
to ‘Fond Memories of Hong Kong,’ the main plug ‘Legend of the Island’ retold 
the story of how Hong Kong developed into a metropolis. While the legendary 
rock band ‘Beyond’ targeted the establishment with their pointed critiques of 
social issues, the duo ‘Tat Ming Pair’ voiced out the concerns of the lost genera-
tion of Hong Kong youngsters when facing an unknown future. In short, the 
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cultural  identity of Hong Kong was an intricate hybridisation of the national, 
the local, and the global. 
Hong Kong people’s sense of belonging was fostered, according to Gordon 
Mathews, Tai-lok Lui and Eric Ma (2008, 146), ‘through the “bottom-up” expe-
riences of ordinary people’s everyday lives’. Back in the 1980s, Cantopop was 
one of the most important sources of those kinds of Hong Kong everyday expe-
riences. To borrow Frith’s terminologies, Cantopop was a beautiful example 
of how popular music, like identity, is both performance and story of the city 
during times of uncertainty. Its decline in recent years has inevitably exerted 
negative impacts on the sense of belonging of Hong Kong people.
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3.3 Tibetan Popular Music: Politics and Complexities
Anna Morcom
In today’s Tibet, popular music is showcased vigorously by the state on televi-
sion and in festivals, and in fact, popular music emerged in Tibet from state 
institutions. At the same time, it is widely seen as subversive or patriotic for 
Tibetans, or at least assertive of Tibetan identity. Here, I explore some layers of 
complexity in the politics of music in contemporary Tibet.
A deeply-loved song of 2012 that exemplifies how Tibetan pop music power-
fully embodies Tibetan identity is Tsewang Lhamo’s  ‘Glory of the Ancestors’ 
(2012). The lyrics praise the distinct Tibetan language, writing, culture, and 
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customs, and the video showcases the beautiful landscape in particular. I focus 
here on the video.
Rather than a land that is worked and is the basis of life, the Tibetan scenery, 
animals and clothes in the video evoke aesthetic beauty. Tsewang Lhamo is pic-
tured mostly in grasslands with sheep and yak, yet is clearly not a herder, and 
the person herding is a small dot in the background who appears momentarily 
(see Fig 3.3.a.). The three sumptuous Tibetan outfits she wears are a long way 
from what Tibetans who live on the land wear.
Such a view of the land is a vision from a distance, one that shows a funda-
mental separation from the land, and belies a modern and urban viewpoint, as 
I have explored (Morcom 2015). It is in fact a classic example of what has been 
termed the ‘landscape idea’ by the geographer Denis Cosgrove (1998 [1984]), a 
way of looking associated with the rise of capitalism, the transformation of land 
into a commodity, the movement of people from subsistence living off the land, 
and a shift to urban rather than rural centres of power.
This vision in Tsewang Lhamo’s song is particularly clear when we compare 
it to the way land and nature are portrayed in the lyrics of pre-modern oral 
folk songs. For example, this is a housebuilding song, from a book by Dawa 
Dolma (2012):
The rammers resembling southern dragons built a wall, resembling the blue sky. 
The rammers resembling white-chested eagles built a wall, resembling a white 
rocky mountain. 
… 
The rammers resembling fierce tigers built a wall, resembling a forest.
Fig 3.3.a: Still from Glory to the Ancestors’ music video.
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In seven lines (three shown here), the humans working are compared to  ordinary, 
rare, and mythical creatures, and similarly, the wall they build,  intertwining 
people, animals, and environment. The parallel lines (an age-old characteristic 
of Tibetan oral poetry) outline a ‘vertical’ hierarchy of cosmos, religion, society, 
where land and animals and nature and environment are an integrated part, 
rather than contemplated in and of themselves as beautiful. In pop songs, in 
contrast, we have a ‘horizonal’ view of the land as territory, the Tibetan land. 
This is ultimately a nationalist vision of ownership. But it is also a fundamentally 
ambiguous one, as it could be seen as ‘China’s Tibet’, or a ‘Tibetans’ Tibet’.
It is crucial to note that the celebration of Tibetan identity  per se  is not 
restricted and cannot be said to be resistant or subversive in and of itself, as I 
have explored (Morcom 2018). Tibetans as a distinct people with distinct cul-
ture is not denied, but rather, is core to the structure of the Chinese multi-
cultural nation, the minzu 民族 system. Assertions of Tibetan identity are not 
fundamentally subversive (unless this framework changes, which it may).
The pristine landscapes and glossy representations of Tibetans and their cul-
ture in music videos are often equivalent to what we see in tourist magazines 
and publications produced by the state to showcase Tibet as an exotic, beautiful 
paradise that they nurture. Tibetans in these videos look well-to-do, wealthy 
and successful, and, crucially, not dirty, and not embedded in rural life and 
work. This encapsulates the process of development, urbanisation, and trans-
formation of Tibet under China in recent decades.
The gloss and high production standards of pop music are also a key part 
of the larger ideology of modernisation and development led by the state. As 
I have argued (Morcom 2007), the ballet-based, Sinicised dance style of state 
troupes aesthetically embodied socialist progress; it then surfaced in popular 
culture, its polish and professionalism utterly salient for market- or capitalist-
based development too. The song ‘Tibetan’ (Gangchanpa), by the singer Dolma 
Kyab, for example, is seen as extremely powerful and subversive in its descrip-
tion of the Tibetan people and their primordial history, yet the dancing and 
costumes as performed here in a festival are entirely that of the state troupes, 
born of the socialist era (2006) (see Fig 3.3.b.).
In Tibet, rapid development and its ideologies subsume life, and people natu-
rally seek to do well in this climate. Glossy portrayals of Tibet and Tibetans and 
slick, highly professional performance are inevitably appealing. Given the prev-
alence, still today, of Chinese stereotypes of Tibetans as backward, it is hardly 
difficult to understand how songs that assert Tibetan identity and culture and 
portray it richly are loved, and also fuel patriotism and to some degree, anti-
state emotion. Nevertheless, the value of such a popular culture to the state 
should not be underestimated. State promotion of Tibetan language education 
or Buddhism is much less enthusiastic and comprehensive than popular music, 
to say the least.
Tibetan hip hop is an interesting new space where we can see Tibetan iden-
tity being created in ways that break from these state visions, with the presence 
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of anger, swear words, and the portrayal of urban lives that are gritty or tough 
or poor (see Su Buer’s article on Tibetan hip hop (2019)). Negative emotions 
that present Tibetans as not happy, wealthy, successful, etc., have in fact played 
a part in politically potent songs before, notably, the deep sadness in Dadon’s 
songs of the late 1980s,  described by Isabelle Henrion-Dourcy (2005). With 
the state all-controlling, negative emotions of the people point directly to its 
failures and wrongs. However, many hip hop songs are strongly focused on a 
personal feeling of alienation or anger, undermining the potential for political 
critique of the state. 
In a different mode, some songs, particularly from Amdo, also exhibit a style 
of video very different to the glossy norm. An example is  ‘Lamentation’ (Kyo 
bod), by the singer Pema Trinley (2013). The lyrics are a searing complaint 
against the state of affairs in Tibet as ruled by the Chinese communist Party 
and the singer was arrested for this song. The video, however, is more subtly 
subversive, and on its own would not get anyone into trouble. There are some 
shots of landscaped land typical of music videos, but they are paired with more 
bleak shots and overall, the style is not glossy, but DIY, or even ethnographic 
(note DIY was central to the protest of the Punk movement). There are no 
costumes or exotic locations and much more closeness to Tibetan people and 
their lives. For example, from 56 seconds into the video, the camera lingers 
long on a crowd of real-looking rather than merely picturesque Tibetans, then 
after a shot of meadow flowers, it enters into and underneath a web of prayer 
Fig 3.3.b: Still from ‘Gangchanpa’ music video.
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flags where people sit here and there (see Fig 3.3.c.). There is no professional 
shot composition. Rather than aestheticised and landscaped and a view from 
outside, this is animated, sensuous, and immersive.
I would describe this video as having ‘thickness’, as in ‘thick description’. 
If, as Sherry Ortner analyses (2006, 42–62), scholars failed to adequately ana-
lyse and understand resistance due to a lack of ethnographic thickness, we can 
see how ‘thinness’ in pop songs and videos potentially undermines resistance, 
and how the state, with its thin, stereotyped portrayals of Tibetans, exerts 
 control. I would add, ‘Glory of the Ancestors’, even as it portrays culture and 
identity in a glossy and landscaped way, still has richness, especially in lyrics, 
and the potency people perceive arguably lies in this. This is even more the case 
for Dolma Kyab’s ‘Tibetan’.
In terms of high production standards, gloss, slickness, sheer wealth, power, 
conspicuous grandeur, material success and upward mobility, the state is always 
more powerful, and these are its terms of modernity. Music videos that speak 
on these terms can, inadvertently, support state structures, even if in other ways 
they challenge them or assert within them. But ‘thickness’ of representation 
is another dimension, beyond and contrary to the way power is wielded by 
authoritarian states.
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3.4 Music in the Disciplinary Regimes of Xinjiang’s  
‘Anti-Extremism’ Campaign
Rachel Harris 
Beginning in 2017, news began to leak out from China’s Xinjiang Uyghur 
Autonomous Region of the construction of a huge, secretive network of 
 detention camps, dubbed ‘transformation through education centres’ in  official 
Chinese sources. Overseas journalists and scholars began to piece together 
the evidence, and by mid-2018 international organisations (CERD 2018) and 
national governments (U.S. State Department 2018) were raising concerns that 
well over a million Muslims—primarily Uyghurs but also Kazakhs and other 
Muslim  peoples—had been interned in the camps for indefinite periods of time 
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without formal legal charge. Reports by former detainees, teachers and guards, 
supported by satellite imagery, revealed a network of over a hundred newly built 
or greatly expanded detention facilities, heavily secured with barbed wire and 
surveillance systems, some of them large enough to hold up to 100,000 inmates.
Government documents leaked in autumn 2019 (Ramzy and Buckley 2019) 
used the language of epidemic to justify these extraordinary abuses. Detainees 
were said to have been ‘infected’ by the ‘virus’ of Islamic extremism and must 
be quarantined and cured. In practice, as careful documentation by human 
rights organisations (HRW 2018) has revealed, enormous numbers of people 
have been detained simply for the peaceful pursuit of their faith, or because 
they had travelled abroad, or installed ‘suspicious’ apps on their phones. Detain-
ees include hundreds of prominent academics (UHRP 2019) and Uyghur 
cultural icons.
In the testimonies of former detainees, regimes of forced repetition and 
self-criticism feature strongly. Detainees recount being made to recite repeat-
edly, ‘We will oppose extremism, we will oppose separatism, we will oppose 
terrorism’. Before meals they were required to demonstrate their gratitude to 
the Communist Party by chanting, ‘Thank the Party! Thank the Motherland! 
Thank President Xi!’ As Gerry Shih (2018) observed, ‘the internment program 
aims to rewire the political thinking of detainees, erase their Islamic beliefs and 
reshape their very identities’.
Musical performance has played a key role in the ‘re-education’ program. A 
leaked video clip which circulated on Uyghur exile networks in 2017 showed 
two rows of Uyghur detainees holding plastic bowls and singing the revolu-
tionary song, ‘Without the Communist Party there would be no New China’. 
Former detainee Abduwali Ayup explained that these inmates were singing for 
their food; a daily practice noted in many accounts (Byler 2018a). Outside the 
camps as well, Uyghurs in villages and towns across the region were mobi-
lised in weekly mass singing and dancing. Their repertoire included the canon 
of revolutionary songs, but also Chinese pop songs, notably the internet hit 
‘Little Apple’.
Chinese media reports explicitly linked these activities to civilising projects: 
countering religious extremism and fostering modernity. I have argued that 
these activities were intended to break down the embodied norms of Uyghur 
culture by enforcing forms of public behaviour that violated religious expecta-
tions (Harris 2017). This was particularly striking in the case of the images of 
dancing Uyghur imams (religious clerics) which circulated on social media, 
and this singing and dancing formed part of a raft of measures including bans 
on beards and headscarves, beer drinking competitions, and proscriptions on 
halal food.
In this context of mass incarceration and documented abuse, such coer-
cive use of musical performance may be understood as an example of the 
 ‘weaponisation’ of music. Suzanne Cusick (2008) has described how US forces 
in the Iraq war also used music in detention centres as part of a package of 
measures designed to break down an individual’s identity and will. In Abu 
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Ghraib, music videos were used against Muslim detainees as part of a set of 
attacks on their ethical sense of self. In Xinjiang’s detention camps we find 
detainees subject to very similar processes, in which the coerced singing of 
revolutionary songs is used to break down the embodied habits of religious and 
cultural identity, as part of a set of attacks on detainees’ will and sense of self. 
Musical performance was also to the fore in the carefully choreographed 
 visits to the camps organised in 2019 by the Chinese authorities for selected 
international media organisations (Blanchard 2019). Staged in response 
to international concerns about mass human rights abuses, these visits sought to 
reassure the international community that the camps were in fact voluntary 
‘vocational training centres’ designed to re-educate people led astray by extrem-
ist ideology and prepare them for gainful employment. Assembled inmates 
sang the English song ‘If you’re happy and you know it clap your hands’ for the 
press crews. The irony of these coerced displays of happiness was highlighted 
by international observers, but this was no more than the latest manifestation 
of the long-standing practices of the staged representation of China’s minority 
peoples through singing, dancing, and smiling.
In the measures it has employed, and the ideological justification of its actions, 
China’s project to securitise Xinjiang and re-engineer its Muslim peoples can be 
read as a colonial project. As Dibyesh Anand (2019) has argued, built into colo-
nial projects is the assumption that the Other is inferior to the progressive Self, 
which has the duty and the right to mould the violent and backward Other into 
its own image. The focus of the Xinjiang campaign on embodied practices is far 
from unique; we can find many similarities in its approach to re-engineering 
Uyghurs in other, historical colonial projects around the world. 
In the Americas, studies of colonial rule reveal an almost obsessive inter-
est in the embodied, performative practices of the subjugated—rituals, songs 
and dances—suggesting that colonial elites understood the importance of 
these practices for the expression and transmission of identity and memory. 
Diana Taylor (2003) suggests that an important aspect of the colonising project 
throughout the Americas consisted in controlling and discrediting indigenous 
ways of preserving and transmitting cultural identity. There are many parallels 
between these historical accounts and the events unfolding in Xinjiang in the 
twenty-first century. Just as Uyghur religious and cultural practices are dubbed 
religious extremism and terrorism in China, for example, so indigenous perfor-
mance practices were dubbed devil worship under colonial rule in the  Americas.
But Taylor’s account also makes clear that the persistent attempts by the colo-
nisers to erase these Indigenous performance practices were matched only by 
their obstinate resurgence. She summarises: ‘the performance of the prohibi-
tions seems as ubiquitous and continuous as the outlawed practices themselves. 
Neither disappeared’. Lessons from history warn against easy assumptions that 
the campaign in Xinjiang will achieve its goal of erasing the religious and cul-
tural identity of its subjects and rewiring them as patriotic automatons. 
In the crowded cell of the re-education camp where Gulbahar Jelil was held 
in 2018, the detainees were under constant surveillance, and strict punishments 
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were enforced against anyone seen to be performing the movements of prayer. 
Gulbahar recounted how the women in her cell whispered to each other to 
‘pray on the inside’ (Byler 2018b). Even when they cannot be sounded out, the 
sonic traces of Uyghur cultural identity may be reactivated—internally, repeti-
tively—through these simple acts of remembering engrained bodily practices. 
Such small acts of resistance hint at the possibility of sustaining embodied 
memory even under extreme conditions of coercion and control, and they sug-
gest the inevitable failure of state projects of re-engineering. 
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Representations of ‘China’ in Britain
4.0 Introduction
Cangbai Wang and Gerda Wielander
Media representations of China have gone from rapturously depicting an eco-
nomic miracle and powerhouse that may hold the answer to the UK’s chal-
lenges, in particular post-Brexit, to a chorus of cautionary tales about Hong 
Kong, Xinjiang, the South China Sea, and, of course, Covid-19 within just a few 
years. This reflects a turn in UK–China relations; the only recently celebrated 
‘golden age’ has apparently turned into ‘dust’ (The Diplomat 2020) or the ‘deep 
freeze’ (Financial Times 2020). When future historians write an account of the 
rise of racism and xenophobia in the UK (and the world) as a parallel devel-
opment of the unfolding coronavirus crisis, the relationship between media 
coverage and public opinion will no doubt be closely scrutinised. They may 
try to uncover in what way the British media coverage of China’s handling of 
the coronavirus impacted or possibly fed the rise of racism and xenophobia in 
British society. 
Luckily, some media studies scholars have made a start. Zhang and Shaw 
(2021) analysed the coverage of China’s handling of the coronavirus in three 
British media outlets—the BBC, Daily Mail, and The Guardian—between 
January and May 2020 and coded their coverage as neutral, negative, or posi-
tive. They concluded that these three media outlets did not exhibit significant 
 differences in the themes through which they represented China when  dealing 
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with the same health issue. However, there were differences when it came 
to the different media’s respective evaluation of China’s actions. Overall, the 
 researchers concluded that the general public in the UK would have consumed 
a largely negative or neutral coverage (85%) of China’s handling of the virus. 
If coverage represents readership views, then the BBC consumer would seem 
to hold the most balanced or neutral view of China, while more than half of 
Daily Mail readers may form a negative view of China. This may not surprise 
many, yet half of Guardian readers, too, seem to hold a negative view based on 
the nature of its coverage. Both may, of course, be a reflection of wider public 
opinion and media organisations’ pandering to their target audiences. 
Interest in China by British media and society is, of course, not new. Brit-
ain’s fascination with China can be traced to the time of Shen Fuzong, the 
first Chinese individual in recorded history who visited Britain as a Chris-
tian missionary and a scholar in 1685. In the following two centuries, China 
caught the imagination of wider British society. From the mid-nineteenth 
century onwards, when China and other Asian countries were entangled in 
various degrees with the British empire as a result of its global colonial expan-
sion, China frequently appeared in British newspapers, journals, literature, art 
 performance, and  exhibitions as a significant ‘Oriental Other’. These included 
publications for children and young readers. Whether missionary texts, popular 
children’s magazines, or adventure stories and detective fiction of the Victorian 
era, Shih-Wen Sue Chen’s article shows that the representation of China in the 
period was dominated by racialist discourse that depicted Chinese  people—as 
representative of an alien empire—as physically alien and psychologically infe-
rior to British children and as subjects in need of Christian salvation. 
Representations of China, as our review of most recent media coverage 
shows, are never neutral nor consistent. They have always been associated with 
a particular discourse of representation that has shaped by and, in turn, has 
been shaping the changing state of the relationship between China and the UK 
over the past two centuries. Then and now, this discourse has been ambiva-
lent, informed by an often foreboding recognition of China’s potential power 
(Parker 1998, 72). Perceptions of China swing from a mythical and exotic cul-
ture seen through the fetishistic gaze of chinoiserie in the eighteenth century 
Britain and Europe (Clunas 1998; Witchard 2015), to a threat embodied in the 
evil fictional figure of Fu Manchu in the early twentieth century Britain (Clegg 
1994). In the post-war period we then find examples of a more sympathetic 
representation of China and its people as an awakening populace who are able 
and united, taking up arms against fascist invaders and playing their part in 
the war (Thorniley, this volume). This sympathetic view of the Chinese people 
afar is offset by the discourse around isolated and subservient alien caterers in 
post-war UK (Luk 2009) and a ‘successful’ model minority in the discourse of a 
multi-ethnic and multi-cultural Britain (Pang and Lau 1998; Yeh 2014). Rarely 
do these discourses focus on individuals like Chiang Yee who reversed the gaze 
by offering a Chinese perspective on familiar British destinations, but who, as 
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an artist, made a significant contribution to British national ballet and hence 
British cultural life, as Witchard points out. Even more rarely do they bring to 
the fore the linguistic and cultural diversity within the diasporic Chinese world, 
nor do they often ask questions about the relationship between Chineseness 
and Sinophone identities (Shi, this volume). 
Every engagement with an ‘Other’ offers insights into the ‘Self ’. While 
 scientific interest or cultural curiosity may play a part in the various depic-
tions of China in Britain as they have circulated over the centuries, why and 
how China is represented has always reflected British desires and anxieties of 
a  particular period. What we see through Chen’s and Thorniley’s pieces—as 
much as through the shifts in contemporary media coverage—is a pattern of 
representation: the image of China oscillates between the two poles of posi-
tivity and negativity with the corresponding perceived needs and associated 
public opinions at different points in history. 
China is, of course, neither a homogeneous nor a fixed entity. Over the 
 timespan collectively covered by the four articles in this section, the term ‘China’ 
refers to an empire, a republic, Taiwan, the diaspora, and ideas of Chinese high 
culture respectively; it is used as a collective noun for people and bodies rather 
than a specific country. We refer the reader to the introduction of this volume 
for the many ways this is problematic and has been problematised in scholarship.
This degree of diversity also applies to those who do the representing. As the 
articles clearly show, creators of Chinese representation in Britain are not 
 necessarily British. Individuals like Chiang Yee (Witchard) or Ye Junjian 
(Thorniley) could be referred to as ‘accidental cultural brokers,’ as could Jenny 
Lu, the Taiwanese director based in London whose film is the subject of Shi’s 
article. Travelling back and forth across geographical and cultural boundaries, 
they facilitated, intentionally or unintentionally, the representation of ‘China’ 
to other cultures while their own identities in relation to Britain and British 
culture were surely complex and conflicted.
And finally, what about the audience of these representations? The depiction 
of China appearing in the children’s texts in Victorian Britain was primarily 
intended for the domestic audience. The same was perhaps the case for Chiang 
Yee who caused a cultural sensation in 1930s Britain but was a largely unknown 
figure in China until very recently. Similarly, Lehmann, The Penguin New Writ-
ing editor, never published the whole manuscript submitted by Ye Junjian but 
only those parts that he felt would appeal to his Anglophone readers. However, 
audiences are not static. Chiang Yee’s books have recently drawn the attention 
of a new generation of Chinese readers who are keen to find out how Britain 
was seen through the eyes of an exilic Chinese artist more than half a century 
ago. In the same vein, the cinematic portrayal of Chinese women in London 
resonates simultaneously with British and Chinese audiences. 
In a globalising and, at least digitally, connected world, all actors in the 
 complex theatre of representation and their audiences are themselves forever 
moving and dynamic pieces, variously occupying the position of ‘Self ’ and 
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‘Other,’ and both representation and reception are shaped through the interplay 
of global and local contexts. 
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4.1 Representations of China in Historical Children’s Texts
Shih-Wen Sue Chen
Children’s writers mediated a complex textual discourse on China for young 
readers in the Victorian and Edwardian period, trying to make ‘knowledge’ 
of ‘the Celestial Kingdom’ accessible to the British public after China was 
‘opened up’ to the West after losing the Opium Wars. A plurality of viewpoints 
on China is evident in the numerous books for children that were produced in 
the years between the Opium Wars and the First World War. Here, I provide 
a glimpse into the rich texture and scope of British representations of ‘China 
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and the Chinese’ in children’s texts published in the late-nineteenth and early-
twentieth centuries.
The British children’s book market changed as literacy rates rose after the pass-
ing of Forster’s Education Act in 1870. The Act allowed for the  establishment of 
board schools and authorised school boards to make attendance compulsory. 
By 1880, there were over one million new places in schools set up. Observing 
this phenomenon, publishers took the opportunity to market various forms of 
literature to the children of the British Empire. 
Sunday School Texts: The editor and author J. A. Hammerton (1871–1949) 
remembered being excited about ‘a beautiful colour-book on Chinese life’ given 
to him by his great-aunt for Christmas (Hammerton 1944, 13). For those chil-
dren whose families could not afford books like the ones Hammerton received, 
Sunday schools provided a repository of discourses on China. Children may 
have pulled books such as Peeps into China, The Children of China, The Chi-
nese Boy and Girl, and The Land of the Pigtail off the shelves of Sunday school 
libraries, or received them as rewards. Some Chinese Waifs and The Boy with a 
Borrowed Name were among the various Sunday school leaflets published by 
religious organisations such as the Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge 
and the Religious Tract Society. These Sunday school texts were often used to 
encourage children to raise money for missions. While many of these mission-
ary texts reinforced the image of the Chinese as ‘Other’, some authors empha-
sised the similarities between British and Chinese children to point out the 
universal need for Christianity, as I have explored (Chen 2016). By taking part 
in religious plays and cantatas such as Queen Lexa’s Chinese Meeting: A Mission-
ary Recitation for Eight Girls and Three Boys, Busy Bees: A Missionary Dialogue 
in Three Scenes, and Missionary Cantata: Every-day Life in China, children were 
exposed to representations of Chinese children, particularly girls, as pitiful, 
helpless innocents suffering at the hands of adults who forced their daughters 
to be foot-bound and gave their children ‘very strange’ names, as I have exam-
ined (Chen 2014).
Children’s Periodicals: Children interested in China could satisfy their 
curiosity by reading the wide range of magazines that flourished in the late 
nineteenth century. For example, the CMS Juvenile Instructor and The Juvenile 
Missionary Magazine frequently carried articles on China, with titles ranging 
from ‘Chinese Children’ to ‘A Chinese Funeral’. Young readers could also gain 
information from the Religious Tract Society’s numerous periodicals, such 
as the Child’s Companion and Juvenile Instructor, Child’s Paper, The Girl’s Own 
Paper, and The Boy’s Own Paper. 
Stereotypical images of ‘the Chinese’ circulated in The Boy’s Own Paper 
(1879–1967), one of the most popular children’s magazines in the Victorian era. 
Chinese people were considered distinctly different physically, with their ubiq-
uitous queue, slanted eyes, and buck teeth; psychologically, they were believed 
to be devious, cruel, and evil. One telling visual example of this stereotype can 
be found in vol. 28 of The Boy’s Own Paper. On page 312, there is an engraving 
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by Leo Cheney inserted into the space between the end of one story and the 
beginning of another. The words ‘The End’ appear above the illustration. These 
words could either be used to signify the closure of the previous story, or be 
interpreted as the image caption. The engraving features the profile of a skinny 
Chinese man with an elongated neck and a big head standing in front of a table 
preparing to kill an innocent-looking puppy. With one hand, he lifts up the 
puppy by its neck, in the other, he holds a large scythe-like knife. Underneath 
his cap, a very long pigtail, adorned at the end with a ribbon, flows down his 
back, reaching past his knees. His narrow, slanted eyes appear even smaller 
in contrast to his big smile, which might suggest that he has been starving for 
so long that he, the stereotypical dog-and-cat-eating Chinese, is very eager to 
devour the dog. The adorable fat puppy stares pitifully at the readers, remind-
ing them of their own pets and making them shudder at what will inevitably 
take place. While racial caricatures were present in numerous children’s texts 
published in Britain when it was at its height of imperial power, my research 
has shown that diverse images of China and the Chinese appeared in children’s 
travelogue storybooks, historical novels, adventures stories, and periodicals 
published in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries (Chen 2013). 
Adventure Stories, Historical Novels, and Detective Fiction: Edwin Harcourt 
Burrage’s Ching-Ching series provides a counterpoint to the image of the dog-
killer described above. Ching-Ching first appeared in a story serialised in The 
Boy’s Standard (1875–92), and later featured in his own magazine called Ching 
Ching’s Own (1888–93). On the surface, Ching-Ching seems to be a  stereotypical 
Fig 4.1.a: Image from Isaac Taylor Headland’s The Chinese Boy and Girl (1901). 
Source: Wikimedia Commons. Retrieved from: https://bit.ly/3h5lglx.
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Chinese comic relief character who speaks Pidgin English and sports pigtails. 
However, child readers loved his character so much that the author decided to 
transform Ching-Ching from a minor sidekick into a detective hero who solves 
cases in England. In the early twentieth century, another ‘great Chinese detec-
tive’ entertained child readers: Charles Gilson’s Mr. Wang (Chen 2015). 
Mr. Wang is a key character in at least nine stories, including The Lost Column 
(1909), which is set during the Boxer Uprising (1899–1901). Adventure novels 
such as The Lost Column, Bessie Marchant’s Among Hostile Hordes: A Story of 
the Tai-ping Rebellion (1901) and G.A. Henty’s With the Allies to Pekin (1903) 
underscore the historically complex relationships between Britain and China. 
Boxer narratives for children published between 1900 and 1909 provided dif-
ferent interpretations of the same event. As I have argued, the Boxer Uprising 
was a pivotal conflict from which negative images of the Chinese and fears of 
the Yellow Peril emanated (Chen 2013). It is therefore important to consider the 
state of Sino-British relations during the text’s production because they influ-
enced how ‘China and the Chinese’ were represented in children’s literature. 
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4.2 Dire yet Diverse: Desperate Diaspora in Jenny Lu’s  
The Receptionist (2016)
Flair Donglai Shi
Jenny Lu (Lu Jinming 盧謹明) is a Taiwanese director based in London. She set 
the focus of her first feature-length film on sex workers in an illegal massage 
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parlour on the outskirts of the city after she found out, with shock, that one 
of her Chinese friends had had similar experiences and committed suicide. As 
the title makes clear, The Receptionist does not dive into the world of the illegal 
massage parlour directly. Instead, audiences are led into it at a slow and reluc-
tant pace by the protagonist Tina, an international student from Taiwan. Hit 
by the financial crisis of 2008, Tina found her literature degree useless in her 
regular job hunt and took up the receptionist position at the massage parlour 
so that she could pay her rent and stay in London.
Lu is aware of the inevitable voyeurism that comes with the plot of her story. 
On the one hand, making Tina the observant outsider offers a clear object of 
identification for the film’s audiences to enter the world of these sex workers, a 
world that is rarely discussed without prejudice. On the other hand, this setup 
nevertheless creates moralist boundaries between Tina/the audiences and the 
sex workers. In the film, Tina slowly befriends the women in the massage par-
lour but never really becomes one of them. This social distance thus safeguards 
the audiences’ ethnographic gaze towards the Other throughout the film and 
consolidates its fundamental conservative tone. It calls for sympathy but stops 
short of real affirmation for what these women do.
A British–Taiwanese co-production,  The Receptionist  contains short dia-
logues in English, Mandarin, and Taiwanese, and its representation of women 
can be examined in both the context of British visual culture and that of Tai-
wanese cinema. 
The representation of China in British popular culture has not really improved 
since the 1980s. This is the case in terms of the level of visibility afforded to the 
Chinese living in Britain as well as the ways in which Chineseness as a generic 
ethnic marker is featured. Even with the end of the Fu Manchu film series in 
1980, entrenched ideas about the Chinese threat have persisted into the 2010s. 
For example, in the episode ‘The Blind Banker’  of the hugely popular TV 
series Sherlock (2010), the heroic protagonist investigates and defeats a Chinese 
crime syndicate called Black Lotus lurking in the tunnels beneath London’s 
Chinatown—a less-than-subtle mutation of the evil yellow gangs imagined by 
Fu Manchu’s inventor Sax Rohmer a hundred years ago. Similarly, in the thriller 
series One Child  (2014) produced by BBC, old tropes of Oriental despotism 
and Cold-War red scare narratives are mixed to create an updated Sinopho-
bia. It provides a fictional account of an adopted Chinese–British kid travelling 
back to her racial motherland, only to have her dreams crushed by the oppres-
sive, authoritarian regime. Or if these haunting reappearances of the Yellow 
Peril are not entertaining enough, plenty of ironic self-racism about impotent 
Chinese men and crazy rich new immigrants can be found in the pilot episode 
of the 2017 BBC comedy Chinese Burn (Shi 2017). 
Against this background, The Receptionist is perhaps a better fit in the series 
of feature films about the Chinese diaspora in Britain made in the 1980s and 
1990s: Ping Pong (1986), Soursweet (1988), and Foreign Moon (1996). Like Lu’s 
story, these films carry many characteristics of the ethnic bildungsroman and 
illustrate Chinese women’s struggles in juggling tasks of survival and demands 
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from different cultural expectations. However, what sets The Receptionist apart 
is Lu’s focus on the relations between women, which are to do with neither 
familial ties nor heterosexual romance.
Dim and hidden, the illegal massage parlour run from an ordinary subur-
ban English house is a space of homosocial bonding that doubles as the main 
site of Tina’s journey of  bildungsroman. Here she meets a diverse group of 
Chinese-speaking sex workers, including the money-oriented mamasan Lily, 
the  Taiwanese single mother Sasa, funny Chinese Malaysian student Mei, and 
Anna, the obedient and reserved newcomer. As she initiates her new job in the 
parlour, Tina tries to keep her distance from the women with a holier-than-
thou attitude during meals. However, she eventually moves in with the girls 
after her puritanical white British boyfriend discovers that she has been lying 
about her new job and kicks her out. In this process, Tina becomes more and 
more integrated in the world of the sex workers and forges meaningful connec-
tions with them. In contrast to its largely sympathetic and humanistic portrayal 
of these women, the film’s depiction of men is almost always negative and does 
not afford them much complexity of character.
Unlike the generic way many British cultural products depict Chinese people 
living in Britain,  The Receptionist  takes a very Sinophone approach towards 
its Chinese-speaking female characters and foregrounds the linguistic diver-
sity among the different accents and dialects used in the parlour. While Mei’s 
Malaysian accent often delivers comic effects to temporarily relieve the desper-
ate atmosphere of their working environment, Lily’s harsh northern Chinese 
tones coupled with an unapologetic materialism make her the most unlike-
able person in the house. Although these features enable the audiences to see 
Chineseness as larger and more complex than the nation state of China, the 
Sinophone as employed in this film does not confine itself to Shu-mei Shih’s 
paradigm against Chinese hegemony (Shih 2010). In the film, the women 
encounter racist glances from their white neighbours and endure precarity and 
hardships in an unfriendly Britain paved with frustration and hostility rather 
than gold and opportunities. As the director admits, these women’s marginality 
in relation to white middle-class Britain unites their diverse Sinophone back-
grounds, and thus ‘華人’ (huaren) as an ethnic and cultural identity in this con-
text becomes an inclusive and yet place-based force against white racism and 
economic precarity, rather than the kind of exclusive critique against Chinese 
hegemony advocated by Shih and other scholars (Xie 2016).
Moreover, rather than depicting a hegemonic China oppressing Taiwan 
and the other communities in the diaspora,  The Receptionist  brings in more 
complex social dynamics among its Sinophone subjects and provides subtle 
criticisms against Taiwanese nationalism or cronyism instead. In the middle of 
the film, Tina steals money from Sasa and then frames the mainland Chinese 
girl Anna (Lu’s fictionalisation of her real-life friend). Anna is then forced to 
take more sex work upon herself as punishment, which eventually leads to her 
 suicide. Later, during a conversation about missing Taiwan as their home after 
Anna’s death, Sasa reveals to Tina that she actually helped Tina cover up her 
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theft even though she knew all along that Anna did not take the money. The 
bond between Tina and Sasa is therefore partially built on this shared Taiwan-
ese identity, which propelled them to treat the mainland Chinese girl Anna 
unfairly and left them with strong senses of guilt.
At the end of the film, Tina returns to her hometown in the Taiwanese 
 countryside to help rebuild her family’s farms after a devastating typhoon. 
She finds peace at home and tells Sasa in a letter that if she ever decides to 
come back as well, she must let her know. In many ways this homecoming call 
is  reminiscent of the nativist (xiangtu 鄉土)  tradition in Taiwanese literature 
and film. For example, the famous novella ‘A Flower in The Raining Night’ (Kan 
hai de rizi 看海的日子) by Huang Chun-ming also centres on the tough jour-
ney of a female sex worker, who returns to her native village with a son and 
is finally accepted by a community with warmth and kindness (the story was 
made into a film in 1983). This nativist message is brought up in The Reception-
ist more than once with the metaphor of the earthworm, and the sentence ‘If 
the earthworm leaves the soil for too long, it will die’ is repeated in Tina’s letter 
to Sasa as the last line of the film. Admittedly, ‘just go back to where you come 
from’ is a rather escapist, if not outright essentialist, solution to the diasporic 
condition no matter how dire the situation is. In other words, the film’s critique 
of racism and sexism indeed stops at the level of ethnographic empathy and 
redemptive homecoming.
Just minutes before Tina reads these lines in her letter, the film shows Sasa 
and her son wander in a London park and receive flyers about a church event. 
When asked about where she lives, Sasa hesitates and is unable to respond. 
What the film seems to suggest with this ending for Sasa is that the only way 
for the diasporic sex worker to make peace with herself is to get rid of her 
professional identity and diasporic condition altogether. Namely, she should 
become a ‘good and normal’ mother in Taiwan. As such, the persistence of a 
strong conservatism against the transgressive power of both cultural displace-
ment and sex work becomes the most limiting aspect of the film, a film that is 
otherwise interesting and refreshing in its representation of a diverse group of 
Chinese-speaking women getting by in the unseen corners of British society.
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4.3 The Silent Traveller and Sadlers Wells (1942)
Anne Witchard
The artist and writer Chiang Yee is best remembered for his Silent Traveller 
books, a series of illustrated travelogues that presented Anglophone readers 
with a Chinese perspective on familiar destinations. Informative, thought 
 provoking and humorous, they found a wide readership and are still enjoyed 
today. Chiang Yee’s contribution to the art of ballet however is quite overlooked, 
perhaps because – as it turned out – it was a one off. But it is an episode that has 
much to tell us about his artistic versatility and about his wider significance to 
British cultural life.
After his Hampstead home was destroyed in the Blitz, Chiang Yee relocated 
to Southmoor Road, Oxford (in 2019 the recipient of a Blue Plaque), where he 
would reside for the next 15 years. In the penultimate chapter of The Silent Trav-
eller in Oxford, titled ‘Friday the Thirteenth’, he describes the woes of the Lon-
don commute and bewails the inadequacies of the train system, erratic no doubt 
due to the exigencies of wartime rather than because on this particular day, as 
an old lady points out to him, it is Friday the Thirteenth (Chiang 1944, 172).
Chiang Yee had become something of a regular commuter because he had 
been commissioned to design a new ballet, The Birds. And, as he explains: 
‘There seemed perpetually to be some detail or other for which my attendance 
was required – some costumes had been finished and were to be fitted, or cer-
tain materials that I had chosen had proved unobtainable and others must be 
selected. And always the matter was urgent. No time to be lost’ (Chiang 1944, 
169–70).
He had been appointed by Constant Lambert, the celebrated conductor with 
Ninette de Valois’ recently formed Sadlers Wells company, a great gathering 
point for artists which, after a passionate wave of wartime patriotism would 
emerge as the Royal Ballet. Lambert was a remarkable man, something of a 
Sinophile and in order to appreciate his choice of Chiang Yee, it is important 
to recognise the significance of a British national ballet at this time – and Lam-
bert’s part in establishing it.
Until the arrival of Sergei Diaghilev’s ground-breaking Ballets Russes in 
1910, ballet on the British stage had been an amateur affair. The effect of the 
Ballets Russes was to raise the status of British ballet from a rather risqué 
music-hall entertainment, frequented mostly by men, to an artistically respect-
able art form. Unlikely as it might seem, the conditions of the Second World 
War were to prove the hotbed in which the young seedling of British ballet 
grew to maturity and to popularity. Soldiers on leave eagerly swelled the regular 
audience and the dancers’ reputations grew from minority cult to star status. 
It seems likely that one reason for Constant Lambert’s wish for The Birds to be 
given a Chinese design was a nod to the various Ballets Russes productions of 
The Nightingale, based on Hans Christian Andersen’s chinoiserie fairy tale, ‘The 
Emperor’s Nightingale’ composed by Igor Stravinsky.
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Diaghilev had always employed the most cutting-edge artists rather than 
theatre designers to work on his ballets, and in asking Chiang Yee to design The 
Birds, Lambert (who had worked with Diaghilev) was following suit.
The lesson Lambert learned above all from Diaghilev was that ballet could be 
an intoxicating creation in which dance, music and design are one. The Birds 
was a brand new ballet choreographed by Robert Helpmann to showcase the 
talents of the company’s up-and-coming young ballerina, 15-year old Beryl 
Grey. Elaborate feathered costumes required frequent trips to London at short 
notice. Chiang Yee, we learn, managed to get to his rendezvous on time despite 
it being Friday the 13th and he goes on to describe the fittings. He arrived at the 
studio of costumier Matilda Etches to find Helpmann attempting ‘to put on his 
head the tailpiece of the male dove’s costume, which was fan-like and looked, 
on him, like a Red Indian’s feathered head-dress’ (Chiang 1944, 172).
Reviews of the ballet were mixed and suggest that the design was its strongest 
suit – The Dancing Times described its ‘ravishing garden setting and charming 
costumes’. Horace Horsnell in The Observer (17 May 1926, 19) loved its pretty 
‘animated chinoiserie’, writing: ‘The birds … are delightfully dressed by Chiang 
Fig 4.3.a: Beryl Gray as ‘The Nightingale’. Courtesy of Victoria and Albert 
Museum, London.
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Fig 4.3.b: Costume Design for Male Dove. Courtesy of Royal Ballet Benevolent 
Fund., Royal Opera House Archive with kind permission of San Edwards 
(Chiang Yee’s Estate).
Yee, and roost, one feels, not in his decorative wallpaper trees but in cabinets of 
rare porcelain’. Elspeth Grant in the Daily Sketch, (25 November, 1942) called 
it ‘light, sweet, delicious’ and James Redfern in The Spectator, (27 November, 
1942, 11) found it ‘an entrancing ballet’ with a ‘rewardingly complete unity of 
style in music, choreography and décor’.
Chiang Yee’s costume and set designs are stored in the archive of the Royal 
Opera House.
Note
Thank you to The Royal Ballet Benevolent Fund for permission to reproduce 
the featured images.
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4.4 Representations of China in The Penguin New Writing 
(1940–1950): How Chinese Writers Shaped Responses  
to China
Tessa Thorniley
The publication of the literary journal, The Penguin New Writing (TPNW), 
spanned a traumatic period of history including WWII and its aftermath, and 
in China, the Second Sino-Japanese War. It was a period when representations 
of China in Britain shifted as sympathy for the plight of the Chinese people 
increased, particularly after Britain and America declared war against Japan 
at the end of 1941. This shift was reflected in the literature about the country 
and its people published in Britain at that time, most noticeably in newspapers, 
magazines, journals and in the output of publishers with Leftist and/or pro-
Communist political sympathies which viewed Japanese occupation as an act 
of fascist aggression. 
After securing the backing of Penguin Book’s co-founder Allen Lane, TPNW, 
soon became one of (if not the) most successful literary magazines published in 
Britain during WWII. Alongside the British and Chinese writers whose short 
fiction and literary criticism about China is briefly introduced here, the journal 
published original fiction, reportage, poetry and criticism by: George Orwell, 
Elizabeth Bowen, Stephen Spender, Christopher Isherwood, V.S Pritchett, W.H 
Auden and Cecil Day-Lewis among others. 
At the helm was the autocratic editor, John Lehmann, who is probably better 
known for his 1930s New Writing periodical (of which TPNW was a success-
ful offshoot) and as co-owner of Leonard and Virginia Woolf ’s Hogarth Press. 
Lehmann’s contribution to the promotion of international writers has received 
scant critical attention, even though the magazine’s circulation - which reached 
100,000 shortly after the war - points to an extremely wide readership for a liter-
ary magazine and around a third of the contributors (to Lehmann’s New Writing 
venture in its entirety from 1936–1950) were non-British. As well as literature 
from and about China, TPNW featured paintings by official British war artists 
who travelled to Hong Kong and Burma, but here I will focus on ten stories.
Access to modern Chinese literature in the 1930s and early 1940s Britain 
was limited. While publications such as Life & Letters Today, The New States-
man & Nation, and Left Review published short stories and poetry by Chinese 
writers, there were few serious literary editors inclined to or capable of seeking 
it out. And while Lehmann’s pro-Communist affiliations had steered his initial 
interest in and sympathy towards China, he required a wider network of trans-
lators and experts - which came to include the Sinophile Harold Acton and 
the  Chinese writer Xiao Qian (Hsiao Ch’ien 萧乾) - before he would consider 
publishing works in Chinese translation.
One of Lehmann’s early collaborators was Ralph Fox, the British Com-
munist whose contribution in the first issue of TPNW (1940) was published 
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 posthumously after his death in the Spanish Civil War. Fox’s story, set in Mon-
golia where he had travelled, is a dialogue between a narrator and a lama or 
holy man in which they muse, over tea and airik, on Russian and Chinese influ-
ence in the region. Fox’s tale is an exploration of the potential for deeper under-
standing between East and West, and it sets the tone for ideas relating to China 
(and indeed Russia) in the journal. 
In the same issue, Lehmann published a short story by the Chinese writer 
Zhang Tianyi (Tchang T’ien-Yih 张天翼) whose longer fiction is still being 
translated today (Zhang Tianyi [tr. David Hull] The Pidgin Warrior,  Balestier 
Press, 2017), a grim and powerful account of the suffering of Chinese  civilians 
and soldiers during the period of early Japanese occupation in the north 
of China and civil war. In his memoirs, Lehmann wrote of the ‘brotherhood of 
oppression’ which united contributions to his magazines from around the world, 
Zhang’s story being a particularly striking example of this spirit of  writing.
Lehmann’s most significant and fruitful link with China came through his 
close friendship with Julian Bell (son of artists Clive and Vanessa Bell and 
nephew of Virgina Woolf) who briefly taught English at Wuhan University. 
In correspondence, Bell introduced his best pupil, Chun-chan Yeh (Ye Junjian 
叶君健), to Lehmann and they struck up a friendship that lasted for several 
decades, long after Bell was killed fighting in Spain. In 1939, Ye sent Lehmann 
a manuscript of the translations of 20 wartime short stories by Chinese writers 
which he had worked on while engaged in semi-official propaganda work in 
Hong Kong.
The manuscript was never published whole but Lehmann selected several 
stories from it which he felt would resonate with his Anglophone readers. These 
included short fiction by Yao Xueyin (Yao Hsueh-yin 姚雪垠), Bai Pingjie (Pai 
Ping-chei 白屏阶), S.M (a pseudonym for Ah Long 阿垅, or Chen Shoumei) 
and a second story by Zhang. All had been written during a period of relative 
optimism in the war against Japan, when China was unified under the Second 
United Front. 
The underlying narrative theme in these works is the shifting consciousness 
of the Chinese people, particularly the peasantry who are seen taking up arms 
against a common enemy in rural areas as guerilla fighters. The stories suggest a 
populace that is awakening, and seeking to overcome its shortcomings, to play 
its part in the war. A sharp satire by Zhang (his second short story in TPNW) 
takes a swipe at the ineptitude and moral corruption of certain types of Nation-
alist government officials. While there is a strong underlying leftist agenda to 
the stories, for Lehmann, any propaganda value had to be outweighed by liter-
ary qualities. 
The need for representations which brought the people of China to life in the 
West had been highlighted by the American journalist and writer, Emily Hahn, 
in 1937 when she pleaded for her Anglophone readers to see China as ‘a living 
sister’ rather than a ‘dead ancestor’. Xiao Qian similarly criticised those who 
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viewed China as a ‘heap of bones and stones’. Using satire, humour and sharp 
dialogue, the stories in TPNW conveyed the country’s unity and the dynamism 
of its people and by doing so they also pushed against Western archetypes of 
Chinese soldiers as inept, badly led and ineffective, of officials as inhumane and 
of the people as passive or backward.
From the end of the war Lehmann published short stories by Chinese writ-
ers living in Britain and writing in English, including by that time, Ye, but also 
Kenneth Lo, (Lo Hsiao Chien 羅孝建), best known today as author of 40 Chi-
nese cookery books and the restaurateur behind Memories of China. Lo’s tale 
in TPNW 24 (July 1945) was a short story based on the extraordinary real life 
account of the Chinese seaman Poon Lim (Pan Lian 潘濂) who had become 
a global celebrity after he survived for what was then a record 133 days adrift 
on a raft in the South Atlantic Ocean. In Lo’s story, Lim is described as orderly, 
physically and psychologically capable, calm and rational and as an individ-
ual whose Chinese upbringing had equipped him to endure what few others 
had ever managed. This representation of Lim ran very much counter to press 
reports of marauding Chinese seamen, commonly found in newspaper reports 
around the time. As a Chinese liaison for Chinese seamen based in Liverpool 
during the war, Lo had been in a position to observe and document their lives 
and was keenly aware of the prejudices and injustices they suffered while serv-
ing on British merchant ships. 
Fig 4.4.a: Ye Junjian (Chun-chan Yeh). Courtesy of Ye’s son Nienlun Yeh with 
kind permission.
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Ye travelled to Britain in 1944 at the behest of the British Ministry of Infor-
mation to raise morale ahead of the Normandy landings with tales of Chinese 
resistance. During the time he spent in Britain, until 1949, Lehmann supported 
and promoted Ye’s writing career and welcomed him into his literary network. 
When Ye came to publish his own short stories and his first novel in English 
they received glowing reviews in the literary press. His two short stories pub-
lished in TPNW after the war reflect on the tension between traditional and 
modern China and the brutality of the old ways. 
By publishing works of modern Chinese literature by unknown Chinese 
writers alongside established British, European, and Russian writers, Lehmann 
sought to elevate modern Chinese literature for his Anglophone readers 
around the world. His archived correspondence from this period in Austin, 
Texas, is explicit about his intention to elicit sympathy for China’s cause by 
publishing the work of living Chinese writers. His efforts attracted the atten-
tion of George Orwell, then at the BBC’s Eastern Service, who ran a series of 
broadcasts about China’s modern literature after reading stories in Lehmann’s 
journals. Acton was among those in Lehmann’s China network who shared his 
enthusiasm for China’s contemporary literature and in an article about liter-
ary developments in the country for TPNW 15 (1943), Acton highlighted its 
innovative qualities.
Fig 4.4.b: Kenneth Lo, Cambridge 1936–1941. Courtesy of Lo’s family with 
kind permission. 
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This period was the first time in Britain that a body of Chinese writers rep-
resented themselves and their country. The trajectory of Ye’s (and several other 
Chinese writers’) literary careers, is suggestive of an openness towards and 
interest in more nuanced representations of China in Britain. Lehmann, TPNW 
and his Chinese network had a fascinating role to play in these unofficial Sino-







Memory is crucial in the process of heritage making, and is ‘vital for individu-
als, groups and communities in forming collective identities’ (Apaydin 2020, 1). 
The negotiation around its meaning, however, is by no means easy. In  critical 
heritage studies this is addressed as the ‘problem of memory’, given that such 
a process can generate forgetting, manipulation, appropriations, contrasting 
visions around commemorations, or even destruction or removal of heritage 
objects for the sake of eliminating those memories (Harrison 2013). It is worth 
reminding ourselves of the fortunate definition by Laurajane Smith that  heritage 
is not (only) an object but rather ‘an active process engaged with the construc-
tion and negotiation of meaning through remembering’ (Smith 2006, 66).
As the four articles in this section demonstrate, heritage is deeply ingrained 
in policy making and shaped by evident, or relatively hidden, economical 
interests and agendas. It is for this reason that the process of heritage-making, 
alongside the selective memory that this implies, might be quite controversial 
in contemporary China, and therefore worth investigation.
Harriet Evans introduces the increasing conflicts between top-down prac-
tices of cultural heritage in China and a variety of grassroots voices. The aim 
is to highlight the interesting emergence of creative practices around heritage, 
beyond ‘a binary relationship between state and locality’, and to understand a 
multiplicity of heritages on the ground. This sheds light into the exceptional 
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dynamism of localities in China (including commercial enterprises, tourism 
and local communities) in claiming their heritage, while also questioning their 
approaches to heritage reinvention and authenticity. 
Philipp Demgenski focuses on intangible cultural heritage (ICH) prac-
tices, showing the increasing attention around this in China, since the coun-
try joined the UNESCO Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible 
 Cultural  Heritage of Humanity in 2004. As also argued in the previous post, 
the  government plays a central role in heritage production, in this case in the 
process of identifying and listing ICH, which remains pretty much a matter of 
the state. On the other hand, this is often seen as an opportunity for local com-
munities to engage actively with ICH, not least for the legitimate attempt to 
improve their livelihood.
Paul Kendall focuses instead on an interesting case of memory’s omission, 
using as a case study the park created to commemorate the Third Front, a 1960s 
Maoist military industrial project in Kaili, Guizhou. Here, the process of her-
itage-making around this industrial legacy has been unpopular leading to the 
closure of the park, given the recent rebranding strategy of the town around 
its ethnic Miao and Dong minorities. It remains to be seen whether this failed 
attempt was originally motivated by genuine, or more instrumental, intentions 
to give visibility to the industrial workers’ history.
The final piece from Lisheng Zhang introduces the Jianchuan Museum Clus-
ter, China’s largest non-state museum, in Chengdu, Sichuan. The collection is a 
material culture repository of China’s twentieth century history, which includes 
objects of controversial periods, such as the resistance war against Japan and 
the Cultural Revolution, representing contentious memories of a recent past 
yet to be fully disclosed. 
In bringing together these pieces a sense of unresolved tension between offi-
cial and other memories, and similarly, between state-led and more spontane-
ous forms of heritage-making, emerges. One might therefore legitimately ask 
whether this is a typical trait of contemporary China or part of a more general, 
and international, discussion around heritage. 
Indeed, the grand narrative of modern nation states, and the monumental-
ity of their heritage, has been associated with a self-referential and dominant 
‘authorised discourse of heritage’ (ADH) (Smith 2006), as opposed to ‘everyday 
heritage’, a people-led practice of heritage-making that shapes ordinary, yet no 
less important, historic landscapes and places (Mosler 2019). ADH, however, 
has historic roots in the western practice of material heritage classification and 
preservation (Choay 1992), which, being so pervasive and widespread, has 
actually been prevented for a long time from appreciating a variety of unortho-
dox approaches emerging in other contexts (Verdini 2017). Asian countries, 
Japan in primis, has struggled since the early 1990s in the recognition of other 
notions of immaterial authenticity, and they have played an important role in 
challenging the dominant western discourse, resulting in the affirmation of 
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alternative and intangible forms of heritage more suitable for their tradition 
(Taylor and Verdini, forthcoming). 
Moreover, this is not the only arena of renegotiation around heritage in the 
international debate. A similar role has been played by emerging landscape 
approaches to heritage, such as on the cultural landscapes and, more recently, 
on the historic urban landscape (Taylor 2018). In essence, there has been a 
broad shift of attention from the monumental to the ordinary, from the tan-
gible to the intangible, from objects to processes, and this emerging discur-
sive practice, no longer shaped by monolithic identities or fixed memories, has 
found hostility everywhere.
To put it bluntly, what is found in China is common in many other parts of 
the world, especially when centralised systems of heritage management still 
persist, or new nationalistic discourses surge (see the brilliant Heritage and 
Brexit of Pendlebury and Veldpaus 2018) with the results of minority voices 
and memories being marginalised and silenced in the heritage arena. Yet, the 
question of what is different about China remains. This would not serve 
the purpose for backing a supposed Chinese exceptionalism, which is increas-
ingly used as an annoying rhetoric of greatness in the new Chinese nationalist 
discourse (Ho 2014). Rather, this will be used, in the final notes that follow, 
to highlight a few points to contextualise Chinese approaches to heritage, and 
to suggest the idea that every scholarly judgment about China should take into 
account various aspects of its complexity, not least the scales of the phenomena 
observed. These points are about: cultural soft power, cultural heritage and eco-
nomic development, and authenticity in heritage making.
Let’s first address cultural soft power. China’s efforts to revert, in a few years, 
an image of polluted industrialising ‘world factory’ into an advanced economy, 
investing in culture, innovation and creativity is probably unprecedented. 
Heritage, both tangible and intangible, has played a major role in this (Zhu 
and Maags 2020). The list of Chinese world heritage sites has exponentially 
increased; and similarly the support to all kinds of UNESCO programmes. The 
number of culture and creative-led conservation projects promoted literally in 
every city, as well as museums, events, and cultural performances within them, 
is countless. For a country that has modernised very fast at the expense of 
its traditional culture, let alone the still painful memory of the Cultural Revolu-
tion, it is a remarkable achievement that could serve as a model for other fast 
urbanising countries of Asia and Africa.
When it comes to cultural heritage and economic development, there is a 
sense of a certain instrumentalism in every project of heritage conservation or 
promotion in China. It is part of a very effective entrepreneurial governance, 
accompanied by ad hoc city branding strategies that push localities to com-
pete and to seek for economic gains at all levels, implying large scale heritage 
regeneration, and aggressive promotion and marketing of cultural resources. 
However, as some pieces have explained (Evans and Demgenski in particular), 
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this often finds local communities allied in this process, given the promise of 
an improved livelihood. It is nevertheless hard to distinguish in China whether 
projects are motivated by genuine intention to bring benefits to communities 
or by pure economic calculus, in the hands of few, due to the lack of account-
ability of policy-making.
Finally, when it comes to authenticity in heritage-making, the process of 
selection of memory, and material objects, behind any heritage-making pro-
cess (see for example Kendall and Zhang) is often unclear. So is the question 
of whether heritage represents the multiplicity of existing voices or, on the 
contrary, it is subject to a process of authentication which lacks inclusion and 
diversity, under the diktat of the state’s propaganda.
In dealing with China, even after many years, I am always hesitant to reach 
any black or white conclusion. In respect to heritage and memory, one might 
argue that China is no different from many other countries, in the  ever-present 
negotiations or clash between dominant and emerging discourses around 
 heritage. When looking at the big picture, and in observing how much the 
country has evolved in recent years, one can simply appreciate such endeav-
our. Where the analysis becomes more granular there is no doubt that some 
 controversies arise.
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5.1 Grassroots Values and Local Cultural Heritage in China
Harriet Evans
What is cultural heritage in China today? Dominant top-down practices of cul-
tural heritage in China are accompanied by the massive construction of muse-
ums, competition for UNESCO recognition, and projects of heritage tourism 
increasingly associated with the One Belt One Road initiative and designed to 
boost regional and local incomes. But how do local communities both impli-
cated in these large-scale projects and their discursive effects approach the 
issue of what to preserve? How do local people’s memories of their past cultural 
experiences inform local projects of cultural preservation?
Grassroots Values and Local Cultural Heritage in China is a collection of papers 
that emerged out of a three-year research grant awarded by the  Leverhulme 
Trust, for a project titled ‘Conflicts in Cultural Value: Localities and Heritage 
in Southwest China’. The papers in this volume move beyond the southwest 
to include areas stretching from Tibet, northern Yunnan and Anren, Sichuan, to 
Huangshan in Anhui and Quanzhou on the south-eastern  seaboard. Together 
they offer an ethnographic exploration of diverse places and practices, under-
taken largely by young Chinese scholars. The overall aim is to foreground the 
local as a site of negotiation between state, entrepreneurial and local  community 
interests in an economic, political, and cultural context in which heritage prac-
tice in China has been transforming local social, economic, and cultural life and 
reshaping domestic and global notions of China’s national identity. 
We approach the local not as a fixed spatial definition of place but as a  shifting 
arena of everyday life and belonging underpinning ordinary social interac-
tions. Heritage emerges as a series of creative practices and  possibilities that by 
 definition are multiple. Given the pervasive power and appeal of the state’s ambi-
tious projects of museum building and world heritage  recognition, a  dominant 
heritage discourse of ‘文化遗产’ (wenhua yichan) has  percolated through to 
local people’s experience of how they negotiate ideas about  preservation and 
conservation of local cultural value. The complex picture of heritage across 
our different sites cannot be explained by a binary relationship between state 
and locality, particularly if the latter is inscribed with ideas of resistance and 
 subversion of state power. Rather, multiple heritages are operating at different 
levels and through different modes of encounter and memory between state, 
commercial enterprise, tourism, and local communities. Potential sites of con-
flict between locality and state lead to negotiated redefinitions of heritage—to 
heritage alternatives—to accommodate desires both to maximise economic 
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benefit from heritage construction and to preserve locally-centred ritual and 
cultural practices. It would be mistaken to think that the local is not concerned 
with economic benefit; the desire for material well-being is locally as well as 
centrally defined. Rather than see the economic as contrasted with local rit-
ual/cultural practices, it is a matter of accommodating the varying desires and 
hopes whose political, economic/material, spiritual, and ethical implications 
come into contact with each other, leading to a redefinition of heritage and the 
remaking of the local. Crossing our different sites of enquiry this volume shows 
a diversity of ‘locals’—the remote rural, the urban neighbourhood, the sacred 
mountain, mainstream heritage sites, and the museum town—as different and 
alternative heritage practices spanning Han and ethnic minority practices. 
From powerful centres of national heritage value, such as Quanzhou, through 
to small Naxi communities off the beaten track in northern Yunnan, wenhua 
yichan has thus brought a new focus to people’s ideas about what they think 
is valuable, and what then becomes a value of loss. It has brought a precision 
to local questions about what people need/who people are that may be under 
threat and therefore in danger of losing. It also redefines tradition in light of the 
new heritage projects that have been emerging across the sites of our research 
and beyond, leading to what can be thought of as ‘the newness of tradition’.
One crucial dimension of the alternatives that are emerging in this process is 
the framing of moral/ethical ideals and realities, often around claims, explicit 
Fig 5.1.a: Baishuitai, Yunnan. Photo by the author.
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or implicit, to authenticity. Some scholars argue that the ‘authentic’ (yuansheng-
tai 原生态) may be best understood as a component of a national discourse of 
cultural authority shored up by tradition. In conditions where  cultural  heritage 
offers substantial economic returns, the evocation of ‘authentic traditions’ 
may cement a subjective and collective sense of belonging and memory that 
 paradoxically both reproduces and seeks to resolve possibly violent competition 
for resources. Such competition is also fed by the state’s increasing interest in 
asserting control over ‘cultures’ by investing more and more in heritage build-
ing projects. Again, claims to authenticity may be prescribed by appeals to the 
outside, in the form of bringing in expertise of local intellectuals and heritage 
practitioners, or of appealing to diasporic yearnings of belonging. In the pro-
cess of such appeals, the local becomes separate and assumes a distinct identity. 
Elsewhere, such claims may be associated with practices of what some might 
term the ‘deep rural’, or increasingly marginalised landscapes and places linked 
to ancestral legacies of a deep past which exists in memories and fragments of 
ritual practices retrieved from recent decades of violence and  destruction.
Fig 5.1.b: Baishuitai, Yunnan. Photo by the author.
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All these alternative heritages converge in their concern for the right to pre-
serve and conserve for the future. At one level this concern forms part of a 
shared yet contested discourse about how and what to preserve —what old 
things to preserve and what new things to construct. It is also present in an 
ethical value of remembering as a creative process involving the return of peo-
ple to their hometown/village of origin to invest in honouring their ancestry. 
Ideas of preserving and remembering may also be associated with loss and fear 
of humiliation. They also have to distinguish between different things/entities 
that are being preserved and remembered at different levels in the relationships 
between people, things, ideas and places. All these create different heritage val-
ues that operate in different ways, with different meanings, creating differently 
embodied and spatialised notions of subjecthood and cultural value.
5.2 ‘When It Comes to Intangible Cultural Heritage, Everyone 
Is Always Happy’: Some Thoughts on the Chinese Life  
of a UNESCO Convention
Philipp Demgenski
In early 2017, I joined the UNESCO Frictions Project (UNESCO Frictions n.d.) 
and set out to study how the UNESCO 2003 Convention for the Safeguarding of 
the Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity (UNESCO 2016) is implemented 
in China. In this post I reflect upon some of my experiences and findings. 
The 2003 Convention defines Intangible Cultural Heritage (ICH) as ‘the 
practices, representations, expressions, knowledge, skills—as well as the instru-
ments, objects, artefacts and cultural spaces associated therewith—that com-
munities, groups and, in some cases, individuals recognise as part of their 
 cultural heritage’ (UNESCO 2016, Article 2). Accordingly, cultural heritage is 
not (only) material, fossilised and monumental, but dynamic and subjective. 
Also, it is the so-called ‘heritage bearers’ and not experts who are to define 
heritage, imbue it with meaning and value and work towards its safeguarding 
and management. By focusing on heritage communities, on ideas of participa-
tion and self-representation, the founding fathers (Proschan 2018) of the 2003 
Convention also particularly envisioned this convention as a tool for good gov-
ernance and the protection of human rights.
China was among the first countries to ratify it in 2004. Since then, impressive 
amounts of ICH elements have been identified domestically, legal texts have 
been devised and the ICH concept has found much resonance in the media and 
among the general public. China was also quick in setting up its own admin-
istrative and institutional framework. It now has a comprehensive national 
inventory system for ICH elements at four administrative levels (national, pro-
vincial, municipal and district/county) and an additional four-tier inventory 
for so-called ‘Representative ICH Transmitters,’ (daibiaoxing chuancheng ren 
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代表性传承人) (ihchina.cn). Locally known as fei yi 非遗 (lit. ‘non-heritage,’ 
see Fig 5.2.a.), ICH is indeed everywhere, especially when one actively looks 
for it. During fieldwork, I found it at airports, in train stations, shopping malls, 
on mobile APPs, in the media, in specially designed ICH expos, in academia 
and, above all, in political discourse. I heard many proud remarks about China 
being particularly rich in ICH. Bringing up ICH seemed like a cue for people 
to ascertain that ICH and China simply belong together. A Chinese folklorist 
who also advises the government on ICH matters once told me: ‘Normally, it’s 
always either the people that are not happy about the government or the gov-
ernment that is not happy about the people. Only in ICH, everyone is always 
happy: government, scholars, people’. As of early 2020, China has 40 elements 
inscribed in the UNESCO ICH lists, more than any other country (Zheng and 
Qing 2020). 
There are a number of reasons for this ‘ICH fever’ (fei yi re 非遗热). The 2003 
Convention and with it the ICH concept entered China precisely at a point 
when notions of ‘traditional culture’ (chuantong wenhua 传统文化) or ‘folk 
customs’ (minsu 民俗) re-emerged in the political and public discourse, after 
having been under attack during the Cultural Revolution and largely ignored 
during the early ‘reform years’. In 2002, then President Jiang Zemin famously 
called for ‘the protection of major cultural heritage and outstanding folk arts’ 
(Jiang 2002) and hereby heralded the beginning of a new identity for cultural 
heritage as not being antithetical to, but very much compatible with the goals 
of economic growth and modernisation. ICH presented the state with a dis-
tinct value framework to appraise, control, but also to legitimise many cultural 
practices and traditions that were previously discarded as undesired supersti-
tions. Under this newly gained umbrella of legitimacy, officially-endorsed ICH 
could then also be exploited for the growing domestic tourist industry and the 
increasing desire of people to travel and consume ‘culture’. Especially in recent 
years, ICH transmitters have been urged to innovate and tailor their respective 
Fig 5.2.a: Example of ‘non-heritage’ discourse. Photo by the author.
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products to market demands (Hu 2017); there now exist a number of mobile 
APPs that sell ICH products as luxury goods. Internationally, the introduction 
of ICH has allowed China to further engage in cultural diplomacy, consoli-
date its soft-power and to spread a specific image of ‘cultural China’ around the 
globe; being a member of an international legislation has also helped the state 
to legitimate policies at home. 
It is clear: ICH matters in and to China and it is ubiquitous in everyday life. 
But looking at domestic understandings, both on the level of legislation and 
public discourse, there exists a rather stark discrepancy vis-à-vis the UNE-
SCO definition described above. A scholar and ICH advisor to the Ministry 
of  Culture and Tourism once even told me that ‘ICH in China is not actually 
ICH’. Rather than defining ICH as something ephemeral, mobile, and sponta-
neous that belongs to the communities whose heritage is at stake, China’s own 
ICH Law from 2011 (State Council 2011), for example, ‘is formulated for the 
purposes of inheriting and promoting the distinguished traditional culture of 
the Chinese nation…’ The law also refers to the idea of ‘authenticity’ (ibid., 
Article 4), which had deliberately been excluded from the 2003 Convention. 
Chinese ICH is, in fact, conceptually much closer to the World Heritage Con-
vention from 1972 and allows for external actors (scholars, officials) to evalu-
ate and authenticate heritage. The law is also largely void of the key ideas of 
community participation, merely stating that ‘the State shall encourage and 
support its citizens, legal persons and other organisations to participate in the 
work concerning the protection of intangible cultural heritage’ (ibid., Article 9, 
emphasis added). Someone closely working with the Ministry of Culture once 
stated half-jokingly that ‘in China, if they don’t control or regulate you, your 
participation is already quite significant’, explaining that the idea of community 
participation is really only something understood and used by experts who 
have a good grasp of heritage terminology (Bortolotto et. al 2020). Generally 
and little surprisingly, Chinese ICH is essentially a matter of the state. In the 
absence of the political ideals of good governance and human rights that per-
meate the discourse at UNESCO, Chinese ICH is largely reduced to a general 
idea of ‘culture’ and even though many actors involved in the ICH field see the 
need to ‘keep this culture alive’, it is essentially the state that not only decides 
how this should be done, but also what ICH is and who it belongs to. 
At the same time, recalling the above quote about everyone in ICH being happy, 
the introduction of this concept has also been an enabling and  empowering 
force. For example, many practitioners and official ICH transmitters in China 
conveyed to me that they are indeed happy about the existence of the ICH frame-
work, that they feel ‘more recognised’ and, most commonly-heard, that ICH has 
allowed them to earn money and make a livelihood from their cultural practices 
to a degree that was not possible before. So within the broader  political econ-
omy of China, we may say that ICH has provided many  practitioners with an 
opportunity to participate in and benefit from national economic  development 
and modernisation. This form of participation may be  different from that 
Heritage and Memory 95
 envisioned by the 2003 Convention, but it would be  erroneous to jump to the 
conclusion that China’s ‘take’ on ICH is somehow wrong. After all, even though 
politics are often seen as standing in the way of genuine safeguarding and pres-
ervation work (ironically often by those who most passionately believe in the 
political potential of the 2003 Convention), ICH is by definition political and it 
is also never neutral. When cultural  practices and traditions are ‘diagnosed’ as 
ICH (Hafstein 2015), they are subject to a new value system, which is inevitably 
also transformative, whether in China or elsewhere. How this transformation 
takes place and what it looks like can only be evaluated within specific socio-
political and cultural contexts. Maintaining this degree of detachedness has, 
however, been the biggest challenge in my fieldwork as I was always treading 
the narrow path between ‘UNESCO extremes’ and ‘China extremes’. 
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5.3 Ruins on Ruins: Forgetting, Commemorating,  
and Re-Forgetting the Third Front
Paul Kendall
During 2011 and 2012, I did fieldwork in the small city of Kaili studying—
among other things—its branding as a tourist destination of singing and danc-
ing ethnic minorities. Branding turned out to be pervasive in this autonomous 
prefectural capital of southeast Guizhou, including the physical imprint of eth-
nic minority motifs upon nearly all official leisure spaces (see Kendall 2019). 
I was therefore surprised in 2013 to learn that a small park had been built in 
Kaili to celebrate not ethnic minorities but the Third Front, a 1960s Maoist 
military–industrial project constructed in response to the threat of nuclear war 
amid some of China’s most inhospitable terrain, including the mountain valleys 
around Kaili. On a further trip in 2018, I returned to find the park in ruins. In 
the following paragraphs, I analyse the park’s rapid rise and fall as a manifesta-
tion of tensions between recent nationwide efforts to repackage the Third Front 
as industrial heritage and a city brand that stresses rural minority culture rather 
than Maoist industry. 
During the 1960s and ‘70s, 11 Third Front factories were constructed at a 
distance of around 5–10 km from the (then) small town of Kaili in accordance 
with a central directive that these war factories should be dispersed, hidden and 
located in mountain valleys. During the post-Mao era, in contrast, the munici-
pal government has marketed Kaili as a tourist destination of exotic minority 
culture, while all but one Third Front factory has relocated or gone bankrupt. 
City brands are synecdoches (following Massey 2007, 41–2 on London’s ‘strat-
egy of synecdoche’), in the sense that a preferred part (or ‘unique selling point’) 
provides a simplified representation of a complex whole. In the branding of 
Kaili, the preferred part has been the exoticised cultural practices of the Miao 
and Dong minorities, while the Third Front has been almost entirely over-
looked. Indeed, there is a tension between images of industrial spaces—with 
their contemporary associations of homogeneity and pollution—and Kaili’s 
brand as a place to escape the stress of the big city and experience untainted 
rural minority culture. Monikers attached to Kaili, such as the ‘homeland of 100 
festivals’ (baijie zhi xiang 百节之乡), refer to the festivals of minority groups 
who have long been associated with the rural and the primitive, rather than 
with industrial production. There is also a certain hostility towards the Third 
Front in Kaili, with some local residents remembering factory workers–many 
of whom came from big cities—as aloof and arrogant. 
I was therefore surprised in 2013 to come across a couple of online articles 
which described the ongoing construction of a Third Front park in Kaili. Later 
that year, I visited this unexpected commemoration to industrial heritage. The 
small park was located far outside the city centre next to the ruins of a former 
Third Front factory. A towering, renovated Mao statue visually dominated the 
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park, with visual support provided by mock tanks and guns as well as com-
memorative plaques. The park was deserted, difficult-to-reach, and only occa-
sionally depicted in local media, in contrast to ethnicised spaces such as the 
Nationalities Stadium which have featured heavily alongside pictures of Miao 
villages in touristic representations of Kaili. Nevertheless, the park’s mere exist-
ence fascinated me, given the lack of representation that the Third Front had 
previously been accorded within the built environment of the city. 
Looking beyond Kaili, this neglect of the Third Front has not been representa-
tive of recent governmental approaches in southwest China. In fact, many local 
governments and businesses have come to regard the Third Front as exploitable 
heritage, given its visually striking combination of industrial architecture and 
picturesque rural surroundings, as well as its narrative of heroic patriotic work-
ers. Discourse is always on the move, and understandings of the Third Front 
have become intertwined with the rampant production of national heritage, 
as it extends even to include Maoist industry. Thus, the municipal government 
of neighbouring Duyun in south Guizhou has transformed one former fac-
tory site into a Third Front museum. And in the suburbs of Guiyang, another 
 former factory site has been shaped into a variation on the 798 Art Zone theme, 
as a site of consumption and commemoration including museum, art gallery, 
shopping mall and cinema. 
A city brand typically stresses the unique selling point of a place. It shapes 
and promotes a tamed, managed form of difference. However, there is also a 
defensive, hedging quality to many city brands, so that a unique selling point 
may be complemented—or even contradicted—by emulations of other cities’ 
unique selling points. So if Guiyang has been developing its reputation as a big 
data city, then Kaili develops its own big data centre. And if multiple cities in 
Guizhou have Third Front commemorative sites, then it would be best for Kaili 
to avoid being different, even if difference is what makes a city brand stand out. 
When I visited Kaili in 2018, I found that the park—a commemoration 
to ruined factories—had itself fallen into ruin. Grass and flower beds were 
untended while plaques were faded or broken. The Mao statue also seemed to 
Fig 5.3.a: Third Front park. Photos by the author.
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be facing in the opposite direction to how I remembered. In 2013, Mao’s face 
and upraised hand could be seen from the road that passed in front of the park, 
with the factory’s ruins to the rear of the park. In 2018, the road provided a 
view of Mao’s backside in one direction and a view of a new luxury residen-
tial complex in the other direction. It eventually dawned on me that the road 
had been moved so that it now cut through where part of the park had previ-
ously been located, while the residential complex stood where the ruins of Fac-
tory 210 had been located. On the residential side of the road was an impeccably 
tended space of greenery, in contrast to the semi-abandoned Third Front park.
In 2013, a huge billboard close to the park had advertised the impending 
arrival of this residential complex, whose name ‘Mountain and City’ (shan yu 
cheng 山与城) encapsulated a tricky PR balancing act of depicting the complex 
as not only surrounded by greenery but also close to urban amenities. Fortui-
tously, a park constitutes both greenery and urban amenity, and the complex’s 
profile must have been enhanced during initial advertising by the presence of 
the new park at its main entrance. In 2015, the residential complex’s profile was 
further boosted by the announcement—covered by Kaili Online (Kaili wang 凯
里网) —that the existing 58-mu park would be expanded into a 260-mu park 
including Third Front-style buildings, a museum, underground car park and, 
of course, ethnic minority architecture. It would be ‘constructed according 
to the AAAA standards for scenic sites’, although, as of 2019, it did not feature 
in the Guizhou Government’s official directory of AAAA sites. 
Fig 5.3.b: Mao statue and residential complex, Kaili. Photo by the author.
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In 2016, Civilised Kaili Online (Kaili wenming wang 凯里文明网) reported 
that work on the first stage of this new Third Front commemorative project was 
80% complete. On my 2018 trip, work looked nowhere near complete. In 2020, 
the promoters have seemingly gone not so much for a soft business opening 
as a silent opening, with no online indication that the new park has formally 
opened. Regardless of physical realities, Kaili is now frequently mentioned 
when online articles on the Third Front provide lists of cities that have Third 
Front commemorative sites. However, it remains to be seen to what extent the 
project will represent a genuine branding attempt to recognise the complexities 
of Kaili’s urban development, as built not just on the brand of ethnic tourism 
but also the construction efforts of Third Front workers. 
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5.4 Complex Collections, Contentious Memories: Reflections 
on the Jianchuan Museum Cluster
Lisheng Zhang
The first item visitors see in the Jianchuan Museum Complex (JMC), China’s 
largest non-state museum, is a red gantry crane. In its overwhelming immen-
sity, the 20 x 12 metre steel structure, acquired from a city stricken during the 
2008 Wenchuan Earthquake, serves as the museum’s entrance gate, bearing 
the name ‘Jianchuan Museum Complex’ (Jianchuan Bowuguan Juluo 建川博
物馆聚落), in the handwriting of its founder and director, Mr. Fan Jianchuan. 
The sheer scale of its entrance distinguishes the JMC from the landscape of its 
locale, a historic small town called Anren, just outside Chengdu, in Sichuan 
Province, southwestern China. Through the crane stands a statue of a gun-
holding soldier, erected on top of a 40-ton Second World War Japanese bunker 
shipped from Tianjin, a northern port city some 1850 kilometres away. Behind 
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it, a 1000-metre drive, lined with giant bamboo towering exuberantly over a 
narrow footpath on each side, leads to the main compound of over 82 acres, 
housing 30 individual museums, each dedicated to a specific theme related to 
the memories of the Resistance War against Japan (1931–1945), the Mao Era 
(1949–1976), the 2008 Wenchuan Earthquake and Chinese folk culture in the 
past hundred years. 
Developed since 2003, the JMC is built upon the personal collection of Fan 
Jianchuan, a self-made multimillionaire and collector who has amassed over 
eight million items over the past 30 years. His collection ranges from retired 
tanks, missiles, and airplanes to suicide notes, personal diaries, and photo-
graphs from the Cultural Revolution. While the museums display only a small 
portion of the collection, the majority is stored in a huge warehouse that opens 
exclusively to invited guests and employees. 
From 2015 to 2017, I spent 15 months as a voluntary worker at the JMC 
conducting fieldwork for my PhD research as part of the Leverhulme-funded 
project Conflict in Cultural Value: Localities and Heritage in Southwest China, 
and had the opportunity of visiting the museum warehouse a few times. 
Being in the presence of the entire collection is a formidable experience. 
Stepping into the warehouse, one is immersed in long lines of shelves of Mao 
busts, clocks, teacups, radios, and mirrors from the Maoist period. Along the 
walls, huge piles of vintage posters and newspapers reach up to the high ceil-
ing. Going further, one comes across lines of closed bookshelves with A4 signs 
noting ‘Cultural Revolution Materials’ in bold. These shelves are stuffed with 
Fig 5.4.a: Entrance to the Jianchuan Museum Complex. Photo by the author.
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documents wrapped in plastic bags, containing personal profiles, trial records, 
self-criticism letters, complaint documents, rehabilitation documents, and so 
on. Mostly handwritten, these crisp and yellowish pieces of paper were items 
that had the power to have people imprisoned, persecuted, and their fami-
lies broken. I remember myself breathing heavily while walking amongst the 
shelves, pondering the number of individuals being documented here by what 
lay quietly and banally in front of me. Yet the questions that really matter seem 
to be ‘who were they?’ and ‘where are they now?’
Equally worth considering as the destiny of their authors is the destiny of the 
documents themselves. Upstairs, there are six full rooms of photo albums and 
diaries Fan collected during home clearances in the 1990s. These images of total 
strangers, and brief or lengthy accounts of their days, are of the most ordinary 
hence familiar contents: trips to the park on a sunny day, family gatherings, the 
first day back to school after holidays, significant moments in a relationship. I 
refrained from photographing these diaries and photographs, for I found them 
simply too private, too intimate for some random spectator like myself.
With the earliest acquisitions made during and shortly after the Cultural 
Revolution, Fan’s collecting took on momentum in the early 1990s with the 
emergence of antique markets across the country, where he travelled exten-
sively and frequently. Over the years Fan cultivated a countrywide network of 
antique traders specialising in twentieth century collectibles. The museum’s 
50,000 Mao-era mirrors were acquired by 20 of his contacts going through vil-
lages in different parts of China with loudspeakers looping the voice message 
‘there is a crazy guy from Sichuan who wants to trade new mirrors for your old 
Fig 5.4.b: Fan Jianchuan’s collection warehouse. Photo by the author.
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ones and give you five yuan!’ Since 2009, the JMC has been running an annual 
Red Collectors Forum (Hongse shoucang jiaoliuhui 红色收藏交流会) where 
these traders gather to showcase their collections, network, and most impor-
tantly, sell their items to the museum. Given the quantity and miscellany of its 
collection, the JMC’s cataloguing process has never been able to keep up with 
its acquisition, and only about 15% of its collection were catalogued by 2017.
The JMC is one of the very few museums in the country that has ever been 
able to address some of its most politically contentious memories. The early 
museums in the complex, opened from 2005 to 2010, are engaged with ‘sensi-
tive’ topics such as the Chinese Nationalist Party (Guomindang 国民党) and 
the Cultural Revolution that have been largely marginalised or completely 
obliterated in official museum narratives. Highlighting the power of ‘real arte-
facts’, which the JMC possesses abundantly and often displays in unusually 
large quantities, with contextual explanations kept to a minimum, these muse-
ums create uniquely affective and evocative experiences.
In the meantime, the project has also been developed as a profitable business 
since around 2010. It now welcomes close to two million visitors a year and 
has successfully branched out to museum planning and construction, working 
with local governments across the country. In 2018, it opened another group 
of eight museums in the nearby megalopolis, Chongqing. Therefore, though 
non-state, it is deeply enmeshed with government authority in political and 
economic terms. 
The largest non-state material culture repository of China’s twentieth cen-
tury history, the JMC speaks amply of the moral and political complexities in 
remembering, collecting as well as understanding the museum and heritage 
industry in China today. And yet the vast majority of its collection remains 
unavailable for research or display, and the future of this unprecedented and 





In September 2020, mass protests took place across Inner Mongolia after the 
Chinese state announced plans to replace the language of instruction in Inner 
Mongolian schools from Mongolian to Putonghua 普通话, or ‘standard man-
darin Chinese’. The proposals, which the Chinese state argued would improve 
employment chances and enhance ethnic unity, led hundreds of students, par-
ents, and language activists in Inner Mongolia to fear that they had become the 
latest target in the Chinese state’s attempts to further assimilate ethnic minori-
ties into Han Chinese culture (Davidson 2020).
The state’s actions in Inner Mongolia represent the latest instance in recent 
decades of increasing restrictions on language instruction to be introduced 
across the PRC. In 2010, local officials in Qinghai province pushed for reforms 
of the ‘bilingual’ education system that effectively relegated Tibetan language to 
the status of a subject in an otherwise Putonghua-medium curriculum. Schools 
across Xinjiang have also faced a similar ‘restructuring’ of ‘bilingual’ educa-
tion, while reports of Uyghurs and other Muslim minorities in the region’s 
extensive network of detention camps describe forced training in Putonghua 
and  standard Chinese characters (Roche 2020). Language activism and media 
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programming in non-Putonghua languages across these regions and elsewhere 
have also been met with increased crackdowns under Xi Jinping, all in the 
name of ‘stability maintenance’.
Such developments throw into sharp relief the longstanding everyday inter-
section of language and politics in the PRC. Since 1955, Putonghua, literally 
‘the common language’, has been promoted, often aggressively, in the PRC 
as the official national language of government, education, mass media, pub-
lic service, and all other formal purposes. 65 years on and efforts to make the 
‘common language’ more common are very much ongoing, In 2007, Putonghua 
was only spoken by only 53% of the population, rising to 70% in 2015, while 
in September 2020, as part of the country’s 23rd annual week-long nationwide 
campaign to promote Putonghua, the Ministry of Education declared that 
just over 80% of the population now speak the language, though this falls 
to just 61% in impoverished areas (CGTN 2020). This persistent drive to pro-
mote the ‘national language’, as one professor at Minzu University recently 
told the Global Times (2021), is ‘to ensure the unity and integrity of the country 
and the smooth flow of government orders’.
The articles in this section examine linguistic practice and governance in 
both modern and contemporary China. Whether in the case of ‘ethnic minor-
ity’ languages, ‘dialect’, (un)gendered pronouns, or even research ecosystems, 
our contributors showcase the myriad ways in which language politics have 
always been at the heart of China’s nation-building project, central to its quest 
for modernity, and increasingly, part of its broader soft-power efforts.
As we have seen above, Putonghua promulgation often goes hand in hand 
with suppression of languages spoken by the state’s 55 officially recognised 
ethnic minority (shaoshu minzu 少数民族) populations. In the first article of 
this section, Grey describes how a key part of the problem lies in the fact that 
shaoshu minzu languages are only constitutionally afforded ‘the freedom to 
use and develop their own spoken and written languages,’ which does not 
require state action for its vindication. In contrast to Putonghua, the pri-
macy of which is enshrined in the constitution in far less ambiguous terms, 
shaoshu minzu languages are characterised as a matter of group responsibility 
and choice, rather than a duty of the state. It is also important to examine the 
changing systems of values about language through which these language laws 
are now being interpreted. Grey identifies a distinct and growing tendency of 
the state to assess language value on the basis of its contribution to national 
development, which is mainly understood in economic terms. According to 
Hillman (2016), efforts to promote minzu languages are further pitted against 
pressures to encourage ideological loyalty and social stability at the expense of 
local language practices. As such, while Putonghua is seen as the solution to 
various social and economic inequalities, shaoshu minzu languages are often 
characterised as the obstacles. 
Shaoshu minzu language endangerment is not just about subordination to the 
national language; it is also about practices of active erasure. Linguistic  policy 
Language Politics 105
in the PRC is guided by the state’s imagining of ethnic minority  languages 
as 55 ‘linguistically homogenous blocs’ (Roche 2019, 493). In contrast, lin-
guists have identified between 130 and 302 languages spoken among shaoshu 
minzu, though there are likely far more. In Inner Mongolia, for example, there 
are at least six distinct languages, but only ‘standard Mongolian’ is officially 
 recognised and even this, as we have already seen, is under threat (494). Speak-
ers of unrecognised languages have no standing within the law and do not offi-
cially exist. Regional variants of Mandarin Chinese, or fangyan 方言, such as 
Shanghainese, Cantonese, and dozens of others that are categorically differ-
ent from Putonghua, often find themselves in a similar position (Luqiu 2018). 
However, as Tam argues in her piece in this section, the interests of national and 
local government, and those of fangyan movements, can variously overlap and 
converge. Indeed, while the state’s promulgation of Putonghua as the primary 
national language is unambiguous, efforts at the level of local government, 
sometimes backed by the state itself, can be both supportive of and responsive 
to local language needs. Promoting fangyan as a form of local cultural heritage 
preservation, for instance, can be used to showcase official commitment in this 
area (see Section Five in this collection), while at the same time affirming the 
supremacy of Putonghua as the ‘national language’ of socialist modernisation.
As the dominant language, Putonghua is also the subject of much scrutiny 
and meticulous management. The incorporation of loanwords into the lan-
guage, for instance, has regularly been the subject of scorn across the pages of 
state media for ‘harming the purity and health’ of the national language (China 
Daily 2014). Rhetoric of this kind, as well as the various laws in the PRC that 
restrict the use of foreign loan words, neglect the ways in which languages have 
always and continue to undergo phonological, lexical and syntactic change 
(Li 2004). We see this clearly in Jortay’s article where she describes the heated 
debates surrounding pronominal politics in the late Republican period and the 
early years of the PRC. She shows how, as early as 1920, writers and activists 
argued over whether or not a new set of gender-differentiated pronouns should 
be introduced in the name of visibilising women. By 1953, these same pro-
nouns had become the object of explicit party directives aimed at regulating 
how to ‘properly’ refer to men and women.
The politics of language within the PRC also extend well beyond the coun-
try’s borders. As Zhou (2019) has argued, there exists clear linguistic associa-
tion between China’s domestic drive and global outreach since the turn of the 
century, perhaps most evident in the Confucius Institute project. This is also the 
subject of the final article of this section, where MoChridhe connects changing 
language policy in China’s research evaluation reform with the state’s growing 
power and confidence on the global stage. He explains why the Chinese state 
shifted to emphasising Mandarin-language publications in early 2020, putting 
Mandarin-language journals on an even footing with English-language ones in 
domestic assessments. While the move has some scholars in China concerned 
that journals published in Mandarin will be inaccessible to international 
106 Cultural China 2020: The Contemporary China Centre Review
scholars, MoChridhe wonders whether Mandarin might one day sit alongside 
 English in a bilingual research ecosystem and what this would mean for the 
language politics of research in China and around the world.
The ideas and insights shared across and between these articles give us much 
to think about in terms of how language governance, ideologies, and genealo-
gies unfold and intersect at local, regional, and national levels across the PRC. 
There is much more to be said about how the insights and questions shared here 
relate (or do not) to understandings of cultural china more broadly. How, for 
instance, do the language politics explored in this section compare, contrast, 
and interact with language practices in Taiwan, Hong Kong, and in the dias-
pora? How do references to a ‘Chinese language’, so often found in the media, 
classrooms, policy and everyday conversation around the world, fit into such 
discussions and to what extent does this normalise and reinforce the hegemony 
of Putonghua as a ‘national language’? So often ‘Chinese language’ is used in 
monolithic terms, reproducing what Chow (1998) described in the 1990s as 
the ‘myth of ‘standard Chinese’’ and reifying notions of a homogenous, unified, 
and univocal China. Today, as the PRC becomes ever more assertive in ‘tell-
ing China’s story well’ internationally, it has become increasingly important to 
critically examine the ways in which ‘Chinese language’ neatly packs away and 
conceals the various forms of linguistic diversity, change, continuity, tensions, 
and erasures that have always been core to the lived realities and politics of cul-
tural china. In this light, perhaps the clearest takeaway from this section is that 
no single version of a ‘Chinese language’, whether Putonghua or otherwise, has 
ever or could ever in any way adequately represent Cultural China and that it is 
more vital than ever to resist any such assertion.
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6.1 China’s Minority Language Rights: No Bulwark  
Against Upcoming Change
Alexandra Grey
China sees linguistic diversity and language use as matters to be governed. It has 
therefore enacted laws and promulgated official policies about  (non-Mandarin) 
minority languages, national standardised Mandarin (Putonghua 普通话) and 
Mandarin dialects over the course of the twentieth century.
First, fundamental minority language protection is enshrined in the  cur-
rent (1982) Constitution. It is expressed as a freedom to use and develop (offi-
cially recognised) minority languages. This current protection follows the 
inclusion of more or less the same provision in each of the three  preceding 
constitutions (Article 3, 1954; Article 4, 1975; Article 4, 1978) and in the 
1949  Common Program  (Article 53), which served as the constitution from 
the throes of the PRC’s founding in 1949 until 1954. A minority language free-
dom is one of the types of language right found in laws around the world. This 
form of language right has its own legal limitations, but expressing such a lan-
guage right in the  Constitution  is nevertheless part of a commitment by the 
State to protect the interests of China’s 55 official minority minzu.
Second, from the turn of this century onwards, there has been an impor-
tant piece of national legislation (National People’s Congress 2000) underpin-
ning a suite of protective and promotional policies relating to Putonghua. It is 
extensive and detailed, and it mobilises legal authority to monopolise certain 
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domains of language use for Putonghua. Moreover, this law expresses a positive 
right to learn and use Putonghua. This law enshrines what was already devel-
oping in practice: the lingua franca usage of Putonghua across the nation. It 
builds on historic state practices of language standardisation; before the PRC, 
the Imperial and Republican Chinese states also prescribed varieties of Manda-
rin as their official, national language.
There are also a number of more specific, derivative language rights in 
various national, regional, and local laws. These include rather toothless crimi-
nal penalties for state employees who seriously encroach on minority cultural 
 customs, a legal permission for schools in minority areas to use a minority 
language for instruction in the early years – the legal weakness of which is 
clear from the current, contentious reductions to bilingual schooling in Inner 
Mongolia  (Baioud 2020) – and a legal obligation on schools to popularise 
Putonghua.
There is a tension between China’s minority and majority language rights. Yet 
both underpin China’s state practice in regards to language.
A long-standing flaw (or design feature, depending on your perspective) 
of the legal system is that it does not empower individuals or even minority 
groups to take much agency in the future of the languages they speak, nor does 
it offer much of a resource if people wish to fight against encroachments on 
their free language use. The legal framework is sensitive to top-down beliefs 
about languages, and these, of course, have changed markedly.
While official language policies get updated, the laws about minority lan-
guages have remained virtually unchanged. And yet the linguistic and 
Fig 6.1.a: Dong Xiwen 董希文. 1956. The Founding of the Nation. Source: 
China Visual Arts Project, University of Westminster. 
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 socio-economic contexts in which those laws operate has changed markedly 
since 1949. Intrigued by this, I began researching Chinese minority language 
laws and policies in practice in 2013. I have looked at the overarching national 
framework and then delved into the specifics of the governance and practice of 
Zhuang (zhuang yu 壮语), the language associated with China’s largest official 
minority, the Zhuangzu (zhuangzu 壮族). The Zhuangzu was not one of the 
‘five nations’ foundational to the politics of the Republic of China. Iredale and 
Guo (2003, 8) report that in the 1949 pre-census, people nominated themselves 
as falling into over 400 ethnic groups with Zhuang not among them; Zhuangzu 
was introduced by the state as a category on the 1954 Yunnan census (Mul-
laney 2006, 142).
Thus, the social significance of Zhuang language changed alongside changes 
in the lead up to the founding of the PRC, and continued to evolve once the 
PRC was established. This was true of the social significance of linguistic diver-
sity more generally.
The politics of diverse languages—by the 1950s, diverse  officially-recognised 
‘shaoshu minzu’ 少数民族 (minority) languages—fell prey to the perception 
that ethno-linguistic difference was threatening during the Cultural Revolution. 
Perceptions changed again with Opening and Reform. Opening and Reform 
paved the way for an ongoing drive towards ‘modernisation’. Modernisation 
also loosened the tight binding between people and place through the rural 
and urban household residency system, and developed structures by which 
Fig 6.1.b: Artist unknown. n.d. The Census is Everyone’s Duty. Source: China 
Visual Arts Project, University of Westminster.
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employment and welfare could be organised other than through workplaces. 
Migration—mainly to the quickly-growing cities of East China—resulted from 
this structural modernisation and from relaxing the central control over both 
university placements and the job market. This started to create—and is still 
creating—minority diasporas, rather than tightly concentrated communities 
sharing languages. This affects language use and creates divergence between 
where minority languages are believed to be in place and thus to be governed, 
and where the people who can speak them actually live.
As the modernisation progressed, the current era of globalisation emerged. 
Globalisation manifested in China in many ways including the state-backed 
but also highly commercial spread of English language teaching and learning.
English was not the only language to spread as modernisation and globali-
sation fused in China; Putonghua did too. By the turn of this century, Zhou 
and Ross (2004, 16) observed that ‘coupled with globalisation and the forces 
of  market economy, China’s modernisation drive appears to favour only two 
dominant languages, [Putonghua] Chinese as the national commonly-used 
 language and English as the world language’. Moreover, as the twenty-first cen-
tury began, China was preoccupied with harmonising a nation-wide society. 
In this  context, the old fear of ethno-linguistic difference as threat re-emerged, 
gradually hardening into securitised language policy, especially in areas of 
unrest in the North-West. Thus, in my view, even as a ‘pluralistic’ language 
policy phase was being named by scholars in the 1990s-2000s, a new and more 
minoritising phase was emerging.
Moreover, ethnolinguistic minoritisation still tends to intersect with poverty, 
even as China’s overall wealth has vastly increased, and the current patterns 
of residency also mean that more change is coming for most minority peo-
ples. Adamson and Feng (2009, 322) report that the minority minzu are mainly 
‘living in 155 largely resource-rich but economically under-developed ethnic 
autonomous areas, many of which are located near the country’s frontiers’. 
Change is afoot within these very areas and in terms of their centrality to the 
nation. In the era of international trade (including Belt and Road), these areas’ 
border locations make them strategically important, and they now have greater 
potential for extractive industries and urban settlement than the already indus-
trialised, densely-populated East.
A possibility for ‘double domination’ of Putonghua and English over Zhuang 
and other minority languages is created by these changes (Grey 2018[2017], 
58). Yet this is not what China’s mid-twentieth century language laws and poli-
cies were designed to respond to. We may wonder what sort of sociolinguistic 
orders the minority language governance framework is now aspiring to, repro-
ducing or resisting. Within what system of values or beliefs about language are 
language laws now being interpreted?
It is a system of beliefs about heritage protection, rather than about main-
taining minority languages as valuable and viable parts of modern life. This is 
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seen in China’s new, national Yubao 语保 ‘Language Protection’ project. Shen 
and Gao (2019, 7) explain that Yubao explicitly and officially frames linguistic 
diversity as a resource and ‘is supposed to address the problems that may be 
generated by [the state’s] commitment to unity, such as disappearing diversity’. 
Yubao considers only some languages as resources to maintain for interna-
tional economic exchange (but not many minority languages), but considers 
all language to be cultural resources. To operationalise this belief, it focuses 
on documenting minority languages as they disappear. This Yubao approach 
builds on the ‘developmentalist’ beliefs about language which I have argued 
have been embedded in the legal framework all along; minority languages are 
valuable, and worthy of the State’s backing, only in so far as they contribute 
to national (primarily economic) development. Thus, in my view, China’s lan-
guage rights now produce, or at least allow, ‘aspiring monolingualism’, to bor-
row the apt phrase that Hult (2014, 209) used in the context of another massive 
nation, the USA.
Will Yubao’s resulting, disembodied records of minority languages – historic 
language artefacts – remain meaningful as cultural and identity resources in 
the future, if people do not also still speak those languages?
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6.2 Linguistic Hierarchies and Mandarin Promulgation: An 
Excerpt from Dialect and Nationalism in China, 1860–1960
Gina Anne Tam 
This excerpt is from my book Dialect and Nationalism in China, 1860–1960 
(Cambridge UP, 2020). The book centres the history of the Chinese nation and 
national identity on fangyan—languages like Shanghainese, Cantonese, and doz-
ens of others that are categorically different from the Chinese national  language, 
Mandarin. I trace how, from the late Qing through the height of the Maoist 
period, fangyan were framed as playing two disparate, but intertwined roles in 
Chinese-nation building: on the one hand, linguists, policy-makers, bureaucrats, 
and workaday educators framed fangyan as non-standard ‘variants’ of the Chi-
nese language, subsidiary in symbolic importance to standard Mandarin; on 
the other hand, many others, such as folksong collectors, playwrights, hip-hop 
artists, and popular protestors, argued that fangyan were more authentic and 
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 representative of China’s national history and culture than the national language 
itself. These two visions of the Chinese nation—one spoken in one voice, one spo-
ken in many—have shaped the shared basis for collective national identity for 
over a century, and their legacies are still significant to the ongoing construction 
of nationhood today. The section below looks at these contemporary legacies, 
examining how PRC language policy today reflects a long-established state-driven 
emphasis on the political, cultural, and linguistic hierarchy between Chinese fang-
yan and the Chinese national language. 
In 2003, a local journalist filed a report on language reform in seaside Qing-
dao. The largest city in Shandong province, it is known among linguists as a 
distinct branch of the Guanhua 官话 dialect region—mutually intelligible 
with Putonghua 普通话, the Chinese national language known commonly as 
Mandarin, but unique in its phonetics and tones. The journalist was tasked 
with measuring the effects of Putonghua promulgation by interviewing a line of 
workaday bank tellers, hotel concierges, and nurses. ‘Why are you not speaking 
Putonghua?’ the reporter asked a bank teller incredulously. The equally per-
plexed man stated, ‘I am speaking Putonghua, no?’ She moved on to a handful 
of middle-aged workers, demanding to know why they did not speak in the 
national language. These things come slowly, they maintained with a hint of 
defensiveness. Some remained confused as to why a journalist would challenge 
their claims about the language they were speaking. Still others simply laughed 
sheepishly at her questions. In concluding the piece, the journalist interviewed 
a younger Qingdao resident, who, in perfect Putonghua, expressed outrage over 
falling standards. If its residents cannot properly speak the nation’s common 
language, she asked, ‘how could Qingdao claim to be a modern city, ready to be 
featured on a global stage?’ Qingdao, the two summised, was falling short of its 
responsibility to properly represent the Chinese nation (Tuiguang Putonghua 
推广普通话 2003).
This report, a bizarre mix of investigative journalism and public shaming, 
had a clear message: speaking Putonghua was an expectation for being part of 
modern Chinese society. Its message also poignantly reflects current govern-
ment priorities. While the PRC’s government deemed Putonghua the national 
 language in 1956—defined as ‘Beijing’s pronunciation as standard pronuncia-
tion, Northern dialect as the base dialect, and modern vernacular literature as 
standard structure, vocabulary, and grammar’— the push for Putonghua prom-
ulgation became more targeted, ubiquitous, and aggressive in recent decades. 
The 1982 constitution declared that the state was responsible for promoting 
Putonghua as the nation’s language, paving the way for a series of local and 
national policies targeting education, public service, and art (Article 19, 2004). 
Today, Putonghua is taught in all schools, dominates public announcements, 
and is the sole focus of language learning initiatives abroad. Teachers and broad-
casters are required to pass a Putonghua proficiency exam with high marks. 
These measures have been matched by crackdowns on non-standard language 
use in the early 2000s. In 2001, a new language law designated  Putonghua for 
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public use, and other non-Chinese languages, called fangyan 方言 in Chinese, 
for private use (Zhonghua Renmin 中华人民, 2005). In 2005, a new media law 
sought to eliminate overly vernacular language and  code-switching. While 
content performed entirely in some fangyan is permitted in certain  contexts, 
journalists, media personalities and actors are no longer permitted to pepper 
their language with phrases or slang from other tongues (Liu 2013, 69; 79).
It would be easy to interpret these policies and accompanying media reports 
as state attempts at linguistic erasure. Despite laws explicitly permitting fang-
yan use, it is entirely unambiguous which one the state sees as the national 
representative. Yet other evidence imply that the central government has 
not attempted to eradicate fangyan entirely. In contrast, local governments, 
with support from Beijing, have unveiled events meant to ‘save the dialects’ 
from the fast-paced urbanisation threatening the vagaries of local culture. In 
Suzhou, some primary schools, in collaboration with a ‘Suzhou fangyan train-
ing center,’ began experimenting with short daily lessons in Suzhou fangyan 
(Suzhou fangyan 苏州方言2012). In Beijing in 2014, the subway was adorned 
with public service announcements teaching passersby vocabulary particular 
to ‘Beijinghua’ (or ‘Beijing-ese). In 2015, the city of Leizhou, in conjunction 
with hot-sauce syndicate Modocom, hosted its first annual ‘Zurong Fangyan 
Film Festival’. Offering awards for films made exclusively in Chinese fangyan, 
they summarized their goals in a short sentence: ‘Zurong Village Dialect Film 
Festival from beginning to end expressed the following idea: Love fangyan, love 
cinema, love home’ (Zurong fangyan 足荣方言 (Zurong Dialect), 2016). Chi-
nese academia has also contributed to these efforts. In 2013, the State Council’s 
National Social Science Fund of China approved a research project to create 
a ‘sound digital database of Chinese fangyan’. The database, designed to ‘save’ 
China’s fangyan, is guided by the belief that it is the responsibility of the schol-
ars and the state to protect their nation’s heritage (Quanguo 全国 2015).
While at first blush these ‘save the dialect’ measures seem at odds with state 
efforts to promulgate Putonghua, I argue that both serve the same underlying 
goal: the promotion of a stark hierarchy between a standardised national lan-
guage and all other Chinese fangyan. The hierarchy between national language 
and fangyan in China has its roots in the late nineteenth century. In the final years 
of the Qing dynasty, a state beleaguered by foreign imperialism and domestic 
turmoil, modern Chinese elites proclaimed that the nation’s survival depended 
upon its ability to transform into a modern nation. For many of them, modern 
nations had a national language, and a lack of one was seen as proof of China’s 
lack of national modernity. After decades of debate about the constitution of 
such a national standard, in 1925 reformers designated Beijing’s language as the 
national standard; in so doing, what had once been one fangyan among many 
was suddenly transformed into the sole linguistic representative of the Chinese 
nation. The language’s unique political status quickly seeped into the discourse 
of elites and the structures they built, quietly reinforcing and  normalising the 
notion that the national language, because of its  relationship with modern 
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state-building, stood apart from all others. And as evidenced by the report from 
Qingdao and the policies it supports, the legacies of these earlier discourses still 
inform state actions today. By seeking to outlaw code switching and seamless 
mixing, or demonstrating disdain towards  poorly-spoken Putonghua, the state 
and its affiliates continue to promote the strict hierarchical separation of Puton-
ghua and fangyan just as their predecessors had done. 
Fangyan preservation efforts also reinforce that same hierarchy. These meas-
ures are not meant to make fangyan serve the same communicative, cultural, 
or subjective roles as Putonghua; rather, they are geared towards preserv-
ing them solely as historical legacies. This framing has roots in early PRC 
language policy. After the Communist revolution of 1949, scholars associated 
with the new state began to justify the promulgation of a standard language—and 
the framing of fangyan as subsidiary branches—through a Stalinst model of 
history and language. This teleological view of history saw languages as direct 
representatives of the communities that spoke them, and maintained that only 
Fig 6.2.a: ‘Leng shenr: Beijinghua’. Advertisement in Yonghegong subway sta-
tion, December 6, 2014. Photo by the author.
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national languages could ‘progress and develop’, whereas dialects could only be 
remnants of a stagnant past, curios to be placed in museums. ‘Save the dialects’ 
activities today reflect this view of history, presenting dialects as part of the 
nation’s history but only significant insofar as they contribute to a teleological 
narrative of eventual national unity. Even those advocating for the preservation 
of Suzhou fangyan confirmed this distinction: ‘Putonghua and fangyan, one is 
our country’s common language and script, the other is an important linguistic 
resource’ (Suzhou 2012).
In short, aggressive Putonghua promulgation strategies, including though 
certainly not limited to on-camera shaming, exalt Putonghua as the national 
language, while measures to ‘save’ China’s dialects subtly institutionalise fang-
yan exclusively as local cultural heritage. These policies are but two sides of the 
same coin. They draw a clear divide between the language that serves as national 
representative, and local manifestations of that national culture that should be 
preserved for posterity and little more. As the state and its allies have actively 
promulgated Putonghua as an archetype of Chinese national identity and care-
fully curated fangyan as little more than data, heritage, or private  curiosities, 
the apotheosis of the hierarchy between national language and fangyan lives on. 
It is critical to remember that the implications of these policies extend far 
beyond language. Designating fangyan as subsidiary ‘dialects’ and Putonghua 
as the ‘common language of the Chinese people’ implies that Putonghua can 
represent a unified sense of national identity and citizenship in a way that no 
fangyan could. Our Qingdao journalist and our ‘save the dialect’ afficiona-
dos are not simply concerned with linguistic taxonomies —it is a hierarchy of 
identity they wish to maintain. And in their actions, they ultimately reinforce 
today’s vision of Chinese identity under the current PRC state: an essentialised, 
homogenous identity where other representatives of national identity are held 
as subsidiary to the state-defined standard. 
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6.3 The Hidden Language Policy of China’s Research  
Evaluation Reform
Race MoChridhe
In February, China’s Ministries of Education and of Science and Technology 
released two documents that reshaped the research landscape: ‘Some Sugges-
tions on Standardising the Use of SCI Paper Indexes’ and “Some Measures to 
Eliminate the Bad Orientation of “Papers Only”’ (Ministry of Education and 
Ministry of Science and Technology 2020). Elaborating the academic reform 
that President Xi has pursued since 2016, they provide the first detailed steps 
for dramatically reducing the role of the Science Citation Index (SCI) in evalu-
ating Chinese research (Sharma 2020).
For twenty years, the SCI—a prestige listing of ‘high impact’ scientific 
 journals—controlled the careers of Chinese researchers. It and various derived 
indices are commonly used for university rankings and research evaluation 
(the UK, for example, uses SCI-derived data to allocate funding) (REF 2018), 
but China relied on the SCI to an unusual degree (Huang 2020). There, quotas 
for publishing in SCI journals governed hiring and advancement, pay bonuses, 
and even graduation from doctoral programs. In using the SCI as a ‘gold stand-
ard’, Chinese administrators sought to increase productivity, enhance national 
prestige, and benchmark the closure of gaps between China’s research sector 
and cutting-edge work internationally.
To a significant extent, these goals have been met. China has risen rapidly 
up international rankings, and Chinese research productivity routinely exceeds 
the world average (Li and Wang 2019). Since 2016, China has been the world’s 
largest producer of published research (Tollefson 2018), accounting for over 
a third of all global activity (Xie and Freeman 2018, 2). Since 2017, Chinese 
research has been the second-most cited (after US research). The Nature Index 
now ranks Beijing as the world’s number one ‘science city’, with Shanghai as 
number five (the other three are American) (Jia 2020). Despite US status as the 
world leader for the past several decades, one analysis (Lee and Haupt 2020) 
concluded that US research outputs would have fallen over the last five years 
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except for collaborations with Chinese researchers, while Chinese outputs 
would have grown regardless.
So why change a winning formula? The ministries’ announcements have 
focused on eliminating perverse incentives created by over-reliance on the SCI 
that saw researchers prioritising quantity over quality, nepotistically inflating 
citation counts, and falling prey to predatory journals (Mallapaty 2020). The 
Chinese government has, accordingly, allocated tens of millions of dollars to 
initiatives for improving Chinese journal quality and combating corrupt pub-
lishing practices (Cyranoski 2019). At the same time, commentators have noted 
the potential cost savings of de-centering SCI metrics (Creus 2020).
Another factor, however, has been largely overlooked. Ninety-seven percent 
of papers indexed in the SCI are in English (Liu 2016)—the lingua franca of sci-
entific communication. To remain competitive in major international journals, 
almost all of the top research-producing countries now publish the majority of 
their articles in English, with the share of native-language publications declin-
ing every year in virtually every country (Van Weijen 2012)—except China.
This is not for lack of trying. The Chinese government has done everything 
in its power to channel its research outputs into English to boost their global 
impact, but, although it has been a decade since China technically became the 
world’s largest English-speaking country (Coonan 2009), the quality of ESL 
instruction remains uneven (Baldi 2016). Studies show that even the most 
advanced L2 speakers of English experience disproportionate rejection rates in 
scholarly publishing (Pearce 2002), as well as a slew of other systemic barriers 
(Huttner-Koros 2015), compared to their native-English-speaking peers, and 
most of China’s English students never reach such advanced proficiencies to 
begin with.
Moreover, the growth of ESL capacity in China has simply been outstripped 
by the growth in research. As Xie and Freeman (2018, 7) noted, between 2000 
and 2016, ‘China more than doubled its number of faculty and tripled its num-
ber of researchers—all of whom had to find venues for publishing’. China now 
graduates twice as many university students per year as the US and employs 
the largest number of laboratory scientists of any nation on Earth (Han and 
Appelbaum 2018), with the result that China is now the only country whose 
native-language scientific publication in domestic journals is rising alongside its 
growth in international, English-language publications (Xie and Freeman 2018, 
5). China simply needs—and is creating—new university faculty and new labs 
far faster than it can create new English speakers, and it can no longer afford to 
limit growth in the former category to meet metrics that depend on the latter.
Reading between those lines, the shift in language policy embedded in 
the new assessment policy becomes clear, as it does not merely eliminate 
requirements to publish in SCI journals, but adds requirements that at least 
 one-third of the publications used for evaluating researchers must be published 
in domestic journals (Xu 2020). Not all domestic journals publish in Man-
darin, but nearly half of those identified as priority venues in the Ministry’s 
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action plan do (Tao 2020), and, given the constraints in China’s ESL systems, 
the  Mandarin-language journal sector will doubtless expand faster than the 
domestic English-language one, such that a substantial increase in Mandarin-
language publications is almost guaranteed.
Chinese authorities have repeatedly shown themselves willing, if not eager, 
to rewrite the rules of the international game. One thinks of efforts to chal-
lenge the dollar’s status as global reserve currency (Bansal 2020) and notes that 
the status of English as scientific lingua franca poses a similar constraint 
on Chinese ambitions, bottlenecking new research capacity and disadvantag-
ing Chinese researchers in the international arena. As one engineering profes-
sor expressed it, by encouraging Mandarin-language publications, ‘This [policy 
change] will, to some extent, isolate the Chinese researchers from the global 
research community’ (Mallapaty 2020)—a sentiment echoed by the chief 
managing editor of the Chinese journal Research, who suggested that Chinese 
researchers would still largely eschew journals published in Mandarin owing to 
their ‘inaccessibility… to international scholars’ (Jia 2019).
Such pessimism assumes, however, that China can only emerge into the 
world and not change it. For most of modern history, there was no single scien-
tific lingua franca (Gordin 2015). Until the Second World War, English, French, 
and German all held substantial shares of global research activity, and a reading 
knowledge of two, if not all three, of those languages was a common expecta-
tion of professional researchers. After the war, German and French receded, 
but Russian remained a viable competitor to English in many fields through the 
middle of the century. Only in the 1970s did English emerge as the language of 
science. Unleashing China’s full potential would not require replacing English 
as the hegemonic standard for scientific communication, but only establishing 
Mandarin alongside it in a bilingual research ecosystem, effectively claiming 
for the 2020s the role that German and French held in the 1920s.
If the Chinese Communist Party can establish the country as a world leader 
in AI, data science, robotics, and other twenty-first-century fields (Cher 2020), 
the world will not be able to ignore a third (or more) of its total research output, 
no matter what language it is published in, and the Party knows this. Putting 
Mandarin-language journals on an even footing with English-language ones 
in domestic assessments may be a modest first step, but it opens onto a road 
whose destination was envisioned years ago by academics like Chun-Hua Yan, 
the former associate editor-in-chief of the Beijing-based Journal of Rare Earths, 
who dreamed that journals published in Mandarin would one day be ‘followed 
by scientists around the world’ (Cyranoski 2012).
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6.4 War of Words and Gender: Pronominal Feuds  
of the Republican Period and the Early PRC
Coraline Jortay
Let us consider for a minute this 1953 new-style New Year’s print (nianhua 年
画) captioned ‘His labouring work is the best’. On a first level, the print was 
described by its contemporaries as representing women washing clothes in a 
creek and chatting, while admiring a rather strong fellow among a mutual-aid 
team of male labourers coming back from the fields (Li 1954). The image was said 
to embody women’s newfound freedom to contemplate better,  self-determined 
marriage prospects under the new Marriage Law of the People’s Republic 
of China (PRC). On a second level, the visual tension between two kinds of 
labour (the men tending to the fields and the women washing clothes) present 
in the image is echoed in its caption through the archetypal characterisation of 
the character 他 (ta) as ‘him’: his (the man’s) labour is the best, a question that 
ties back to what was considered ‘labour’ (laodong 劳动), and what kind of 
women’s labour was valued in the early PRC and beyond (Hershatter 2013, 195).
What is interesting then, to the historian of Chinese language politics, is 
that the very linguistic underpinning upon which rests both of these levels of 
 interpretation— 他 as meaning unequivocally ‘him’ in referring to a man—was 
merely 30 years old at the time. What is more, in 1953 pronouns were still the 
object of explicit party directives aimed at regulating how to ‘properly’ refer 
to men and women. Not only would this caption not have made much sense 
as recently as three decades earlier: this seemingly most mundane word (他 
Fig 6.4.a: Shang Husheng 尚沪生. 1953. His Labouring Work Is the Best. 
Source: China Visual Arts Project, University of Westminster. 
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for ‘he,’ and only ‘he,’ with another differentiated pronoun for ‘she’) was the 
subject of heated debates throughout the Republican period and the early PRC 
– debates the crux of which was not too far removed from today’s questions of 
gender-inclusive language. 
But let us rewind.
Prior to 1917, there was no third person feminine pronoun in Chinese as 
an unequivocal translational equivalent for ‘she’. In his 1933 Kaiming English 
Grammar, the great master of humour Lin Yutang discussed the colliding 
course that linguistic gender and social representations of gender could take 
in different societies: 
It is strange also that, while the Chinese talk so much about sex distinc-
tions (男女有別 [nan nü you bie]), they have not developed a distinction 
between he and she in their language, while the European people who talk 
so much about sexual equality should insist on this he-she distinction. The 
Chinese character for ‘she’ (她 [ta]) dates back only to 1917 (Lin 1933, 
103–4)
Of course, that is not to say that speakers did not have vastly nuanced ways of 
referring to a third person feminine prior to 1917, especially given the promi-
nent importance of gendered terms of kinship and occupation which de facto 
functioned as pronouns in an open-ended lexical category. However, ‘pro-
nouns’ as a closed system of first/second/third person had not been an opera-
tional category prior to missionaries’ attempts at moulding the language onto 
the grammatical structures of Latin, English, or other languages which were 
most familiar to them. And indeed, the apparent ‘lack’ of gender concord and 
clear-cut gendered pronouns bothered missionaries very much, as is apparent 
in the words of American missionary Arthur Smith in Chinese Characteristics 
(1894, 86). Many bilingual dictionaries throughout the nineteenth and early 
twentieth century registered similar hesitations and colonialist hints at the 
view that Chinese would somehow be an ‘imprecise’ language because linguis-
tic gender functioned differently than it did in other languages (Figure 6.4.b.).
This view that linguistic gender was somehow ‘lacking’—and acutely so 
in the pronominal system – came to infuse the textbooks of a generation of 
 educated children who would grow up to become prominent linguists and 
writers, the proponents of ‘new literature’ and its Europeanised grammar in 
the May Fourth era. Figure 6.4.c. shows the English textbook that Liu Ban-
nong – the famed ‘inventor’ of the Chinese character for ‘she’ and a prominent 
linguist who first recorded the oscillatory patterns of tones of various topolects 
– used as a teenager to learn English. In this 1893 textbook, He, she, and it are 
translated using the same character, which is then followed by an explanation 
‘[when] designating men,’ ‘[when] designating women,’ and ‘[when] designat-
ing things and beasts’ (Tenney 1893, 11).
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Fig 6.4.b: Entry for ‘Her’ in Robert Morrison, A Dictionary of the Chinese 
 Language (1822).
Fig 6.4.c: Pronominal Table in C.D. Tenney’s 1893 Yingwen Facheng.
As for the origins of ‘she’ in Chinese, the story goes that Liu Bannong – facing 
difficulties translating fiction heavily laden with pronominal density – proposed 
the new pronoun during an editorial board meeting of New Youth as a way to 
forego recourse to expressions such as ‘this woman said’ instead of ‘she said’. 
Other writers proposed a few alternatives of their own, some inflected with 
Japanese, some with Wu topolects, before new literature settled on using 她 as 
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‘she’. Recent research on the topic acknowledges some degree of  opposition to 
the new pronoun, but concludes that ‘she’ was quickly coopted on the road to 
‘linguistic modernity,’ especially by women writers keen to make use of a new 
visibilising tool amidst the centrality of the ‘woman question’ (Huang 2009).
My research shows quite a different story: as early as 1920, a number 
of writers and activists were appalled by the hierarchies that the new set of 
 gender-differentiated pronouns introduced in the language in the name 
of visibilising women. A frequent concern was that the ‘woman’ radical on the 
left-handside of the pronoun (nü 女in 她) introduced a pronominal hierar-
chy wherein men owned the ‘person’ radical (ren 亻in 他, formerly a general 
third  pronoun) while women were now ‘just women’ and animals and things 
were ‘cows’ (niu 牜in ta 牠). Many saw this pronominal hierarchy as intrin-
sically sexist, even asking whether marking linguistic gender was warranted 
at all. Anarcho-communist circles in the early 1920s rejected the masculine/
feminine/neuter division and proposed their own ‘common gender’ pronoun. 
Essayist Zhu Ziqing reported that girl students often crossed off the ‘person’ 
radical in the new masculine pronoun, replacing it with a masculine (nan 男) 
out of spite (Zhu 1928, 109–110). The notable novelist Cheng Zhanlu argued 
that gendering pronouns inevitably pigeonholed people who eschewed the 
gender binary such as eunuchs into a forcible ‘masculine’ or ‘feminine’ (Cheng 
1924). So many more examples could be cited, from playwrights decrying hav-
ing to deal with discrepancies between how pronouns were to be voiced (ta 
in all cases) and how they were written in scripts (differentiated pronouns) to 
poets such as Liu Dabai using alternative pronouns in poetry where gender-
inclusivity or  indeterminacy required so.
Meanwhile, as soon as the he/she/it pronominal split became mainstream in 
the late 1920s, constructions akin to ‘he or she’, ‘she/he’, ‘(s)he’, or even concat-
enated plural forms started to appear in the periodical press. They effectively 
worked to re-introduce an inclusivity or ambiguity that was the norm barely 15 
years before. Many of these constructions lived in the periodical press through-
out the 1930s and 1940s, although they always seem to have been the result of 
individual contributors’ linguistic politics rather than any widespread editorial 
policy. If quantitative corpus studies would be needed to ascertain exactly how 
widespread they were, they had gained enough ground by the early 1950s to 
warrant their own set of directives when the central government started calling 
for the ‘purification’ of Chinese grammar and vocabulary (Altehenger 2017, 
634) doing away with ‘excessive’ Europeanised grammatical features. Programs 
for normalising the written language were directly spearheaded by Mao’s aide 
Hu Qiaomu, leading to the compilation of Lü Shuxiang and Zhu Dexi’s 1952 
Talks on Grammar and Rhetoric (Yufa xiuci jianghua 语法修辞讲话), which 
devotes an entire section to the question of ‘he and she’. The manual specifies 
that forms such as ‘he and she,’ ‘he (she),’ ‘he or she’ and concatenated plural 
forms should be thoroughly banned, and that forms such as ‘men and women 
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workers’ (nan nü gongrenmen 男女工人们) could be used as substitutes when 
the context required that emphasis on women be made. The Talks on Grammar 
and Rhetoric went on to become the manual of prescribed style for normalising 
all forms of writing for editors across the country.
In a similar fashion, in the lead-up to the drafting of the first Scheme for 
Simplifying Chinese Characters in the early 1950s, the possible re-simplification 
of gendered third-person pronouns into a single, pre-1917 gender-inclusive 
pronoun was debated, but in fine never materialised. When the First Table of 
Verified Allographs was jointly promulgated by the Commission of Chinese 
Script Reform and the Ministry of Culture in 1956, other gendered pronouns 
were abolished (the feminine second-person pronoun ni 妳 and the neuter 
third-person pronoun ta 牠). Interestingly however, the masculine/feminine 
pronominal dichotomy had been deemed – despite all the initial pushback 
initiated in anarcho-communist circles in the early 1920s – a category useful 
enough for the young PRC to keep...
Through all of these debates, Chinese language politics invite us to rethink 
familiar debates of our time on pronouns and gender-inclusive writing, whether 
they concern the singular they in English, the interpunct in French, or the -x 
ending in Spanish. These very controversies, which we generally assume to be 
recent predominantly Western, battles (and perhaps a whim of late-twentieth 
and twenty-first century feminists?) effectively took place in China starting one 
century ago. In this regard, China’s pronominal feuds are illuminating: there, 
the gendering of pronouns and the pushback occurred over such a short period 
of time that no one could have argued that pronominal gender binaries were 
part of any ‘natural and immutable’ law of the language. 
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How Wee Ng and Séagh Kehoe
When we reflect on the profound ways in which Covid-19 impacted our lives in 
2020, it is difficult to know where to begin. Much has been written about how 
the pandemic has disrupted, halted, and even transformed ‘normal’  everyday 
life in the form of millions of deaths, economic loss, as well as unprecedented 
curbs on social interaction. Rupture, however, is only one part of the story. Inte-
gral to the ongoing devastation of Covid-19 are the continuities and retrench-
ments of many deep-seated patterns of oppression and exploitation (Hagen and 
Elliot 2021). We saw this in the PRC when the public anger and frustration 
that ensued after the tragic death of Li Wenliang, the doctor who first warned 
of the outbreak of a new deadly virus and was told by police to ‘stop making 
false comments’, was swiftly met with a familiar pattern of censorship, crack-
down, and nationalist reframing by the state (Zhang 2020). We also saw it in 
Hong Kong, where the government’s restriction of public gatherings through 
disease control regulation became the latest in a string of measures designed 
to securitise and criminalise protestors as part of the ongoing political crisis 
(Ismangil and Lee 2020). And we saw it again in the orientalist rhetoric across 
politics and media about the management of the pandemic by the PRC, Tai-
wan, Hong Kong, Singapore, the use by Trump and many others of  racist terms 
to talk about the virus, and surge of Sinophobic attacks around the world on 
people who ‘look Chinese/Asian’, all of which put into sharp relief  longstanding 
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 racisms in the UK, US, and across Europe. Indeed, disasters are not ‘bolts from 
the blue’ but have long histories with deep roots within social life (Turner 1978).
The articles in this section examine how these dynamics of rupture and con-
tinuity have unfolded across Chinese and Sinophone worlds in 2020. From 
celebrity politics to economic pressures of Tibetan migrant workers, to the dis-
courses and feminist activism around menstruation, what is explored here are 
the many ways in which pre-existing polarities and divisions have been further 
illuminated and exacerbated because of the ongoing pandemic.
During the early days of the pandemic, WeChat group chats and other social 
media spaces became key sites where citizens of the PRC, both at home and 
abroad, found and shared information with friends and family about case 
numbers, prevention and treatment strategies, governmental efforts, rumours, 
and much more (Chen 2020). Influencers and other celebrities occupied an 
important part of this discourse. Some, for example, used social media to ini-
tiate vernacular trends to protect against Covid-19, such as social distancing 
and good hygiene practices (Abidin, Lee and Miao 2021). Others, however, 
received backlash for boasting about overseas travel experiences, even when 
mass isolation regulations were in place, and for their ‘donation stinginess’ to 
the Covid-response. As Xu and Jeffreys argue in the first article in this section, 
such activities provide a remarkable context for thinking about celebrity-gov-
ernment-public relations and celebrity politics in China. By exploring both the 
wave of public support for and the tsunami of criticism of celebrity behaviours 
during the pandemic, they demonstrate how the PRC’s legacy of state controls 
over mass media entertainment, the promotion of socialist role models, and 
informal fan networks all collude to ensure that celebrity behaviour is regulated 
and used to promote government policy agendas.
The intersection of power, media and Covid-19 is seen again in Fan Yang’s 
article in this section. Yang explores how during the pandemic menstruation 
became a site of power negotiations between the state, hospital managers, 
and feminists. She describes how hashtag activism helped to mainstream the 
discourse of menstruation in order to challenge a pervasive culture of period 
shaming. Yang also draws our attention to the ‘hero’-making project, and its 
distinctly masculinity dimensions, at the core of so much state propaganda 
during the pandemic. Indeed, as Xie and Zhou (2021) have explored, state nar-
ratives of China’s ‘ordinary heroes’ are a well-established state narrative that 
seek to rewrite public memory during moments of national disasters. 
While Fan Yang’s piece reflects on some of the gendered dynamics of the 
pandemic, Sonam Lhundrop examines the ways in which ethnicity and migra-
tion have converged in rTa’u, a Tibetan area of western Sichuan. In February 
2020, rTa’u became a centre of attention in China and around the world due 
to the large number of coronavirus cases in the area. While some Tibetans saw 
the spike in cases as a form of karmic retribution for the economic activities 
of local residents, Lhundrop argues that this response was not only rooted in 
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prejudice, but also concealed the many ways in which the spread of the virus 
in the area was directly connected to migratory practices as a result of poor 
economic opportunity. This resonates with much of the work we have seen on 
how the already precarious lives of migrant workers have been disproportion-
ately affected by the pandemic. Che, Du and Chan (2020), for example, have 
shown that at least 30–50 million migrants lost their jobs in late March 2020, 
far more than the local urban workers. For Song, Wu, Dong and Wang (2021) 
such experiences illustrate the systemic economic vulnerabilities, labour mar-
ket inequalities and gender inequalities that migrant workers experience and 
the ways in which such oppressions have been exacerbated by Covid-19.
The relative neglect of the ways in which, during the pandemic,  pre-existing 
inequalities have left some in far more precarious positions than others is far 
from unique to the PRC. Here in the UK, we have heard much about  Covid-19 
as the ‘great equaliser’ and of endless lockdowns as a story of  everyone ‘being 
in this together’, but nothing could be further from the truth. Covid-19, like 
all disasters, has intensified socioeconomic inequalities (Wilson, Dwivedi and 
Gámez-Fernández 2020) as well as racial and class-based health disparities 
and vulnerabilities around the world (Sandset 2021). Sam Phan, in his article 
in this section, turns our attention to the ways in which Covid-19 has been 
linked with China and with people who ‘look East Asian’ and how this has ena-
bled some to justify and normalise their racism towards China and East Asians 
in the UK and around the world. Phan’s article echoes observations by Yeh (2020) 
that such problems facing Chinese communities worldwide – and responses 
to them – today ‘cannot be contained within the borders of Chineseness’.
The more things change, the more they stay the same? Covid-19, far from 
a clean rupture with the world as we knew it, has re-entrenched many of the 
same, old patterns of power and oppression. None of this has gone unchal-
lenged. Grassroots activists have adapted to the realities of the pandemic, as they 
always have done, by finding creative ways to continue confronting  structures 
of injustice. We see this in this section in the case of the collective critiques of 
celebrity exceptionalism, tax evasion and wealth, the hashtag movements that 
challenged and sought to reframe the gender dynamics in China, the produc-
tion of health information videos in rT’au local language in an effort to stem the 
spread of the virus, and the call for action to name and end Sinophobic rhetoric 
around the world. The fight to build a different world may have been forced to 
change tack, but it continues onwards, nonetheless.
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7.1 Celebrity Politics in Covid-19 China:  
‘Celebrities Can’t Save the Country’
Jian Xu and Elaine Jeffreys
The Covid-19 pandemic provides a remarkable context and compelling case for 
thinking about celebrity politics in China. International celebrities have played 
an important role in poverty alleviation and disaster-relief efforts  historically. 
Yet celebrity humanitarianism is often criticised as a ‘self-serving’ personal 
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branding exercise that promotes ‘neoliberal capitalism’ and perpetuates ‘global 
inequality’ (Kapoor 2012). 
Celebrity humanitarianism has attracted major media and public attention 
in the context of the global Covid-19 pandemic. The most notable instance is 
perhaps the all-star ‘One World: Together at Home’ virtual concert organised 
by pop star Lady Gaga in April 2020. The concert raised US$127 million for the 
World Health Organisation and its coronavirus response efforts (Beaumont-
Thomas 2020). Around the same time, Madonna attracted negative publicity 
for describing the pandemic as a ‘great equaliser’ while sitting in a bathtub filled 
with rose petals (Lewis 2020).
Celebrity responses to Covid-19 in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) 
have attracted a wave of public support and a tsunami of criticism on social 
media. Singer Han Hong, founder of the Han Hong Love Charity Foundation, 
became a national heroine for raising over US$19 million in donations from 
hundreds of celebrities to support healthcare efforts in Wuhan—the original 
epicentre of the coronavirus outbreak (Zheng 2020). However, many other 
celebrities have been accused of lacking patriotism and social responsibility, as 
we explain below.
What do online discussions of PRC celebrities in the Covid-19 context reveal 
about celebrity-government-public relations and celebrity politics in China?
Disgruntled netizens immediately started questioning the patriotism of 
celebrities as national public figures because some celebrities had left or alleg-
edly ‘deserted’ China at the start of the coronavirus outbreak. In late January 
2020, the PRC government called on Chinese citizens to quarantine themselves 
or self-isolate at home during the lunar New Year holidays. Yet many celebrities 
had travelled overseas with families or friends around the same time, and were 
accused of trying to escape the virus. Some celebrities, including actors Lu Yi 
and Xiang Zuo and singer Yang Chaoyue, posted their vacation photographs 
while expressing support for people living in Wuhan on their Twitter-like 
Weibo accounts. Their actions sparked an online outcry from fans and other 
interested audiences quarantined in China (Sina 2020a).
The online criticisms increased in scale when netizens started posting 
photographs taken at airports of alleged ‘celebrity deserters’ returning to China 
as the pandemic escalated overseas and the domestic situation improved (Sina 
2020b). Such celebrities, including singers Cai Xukun, Han Geng and Wu 
Yifan, were negatively contrasted with Han Hong, who had stayed at home 
and raised money to assist the medical workers who were saving people’s 
lives at the risk of losing their own. Netizens condemned the celebrities who 
had left and then returned to China as ‘renegades’ and ‘traitors’, whereas Han 
was upheld as a patriot and good social role model, and called for a ban on 
the public dissemination of products and performances associated with the 
so-called traitors.
Online outcry subsequently centred on the question of whether celebrities’ 
donations to the Covid-19 response matched their sky-high salaries. Netizens 
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compiled a list of celebrity donors, ranking them according to the extent of 
their donations (Jiemian 2020). The Weibo accounts of celebrities who were 
identified as not donating, or not donating enough, were then bombarded with 
posts accusing them of ‘donation stinginess’. Such criticisms replicated pub-
lic complaints about the perceived limited nature of celebrity donations when 
compared to their astronomical salaries following the 2008 Sichuan Earth-
quake. They also reiterated public criticisms of high celebrity salaries when 
compared to the salaries of ordinary Chinese workers surrounding the 2018 
Fan Bingbing tax evasion scandal. Celebrity salaries became a renewed hot 
topic in the coronavirus context as netizens rebuked super-rich stars for failing 
to support China and the Chinese people through publicised donations in a 
time of national crisis.
Online calls for cuts to celebrity salaries, and higher salaries and public 
esteem for professionals in medicine and the sciences, coalesced around the 
slogan ‘Celebrities can’t save the country’. Professor Li Lanjuan, a Chinese 
 epidemiologist who is regarded as a Covid-19 heroine, coined this slogan dur-
ing a press interview. She said, ‘I hope that after the pandemic, the  government 
will give high salaries to frontline scientists … Celebrities can’t make our 
 country stronger … The prosperity of [China] doesn’t depend on celebrities, 
but rather on the talented people in science, education and medicine’ (Daynews 
2020). In other words, celebrities are overvalued; their failure to ‘step up’ at 
a time of national crisis shows they do not deserve the income derived from 
public acclaim.
The recent expansion of formal controls over the PRC’s celebrity and 
 entertainment industries, and the political importance of online public senti-
ment, adds weight to what might otherwise be viewed as simply ‘sour grape’ 
criticisms. In October 2014, President Xi Jinping delivered a speech stating 
that literature and arts should promote ‘core socialist values’, be creative and 
 people-orientated, and serve the political agenda of the Chinese Commu-
nist Party. Artists and cultural workers are expected to pursue ‘professional 
 excellence and moral integrity’ (de yi shuang xin 德艺双馨), an ideal that the 
Communist Party has promoted since the Mao era (Xu and Yang 2021). How-
ever, Xi’s speech was followed by new regulatory initiatives designed to promote 
professional ethics and social responsibility in the entertainment industries. 
Regulations issued in 2014 enjoined film, television, and radio employees to 
disseminate ‘positive energy’ by providing excellent products and presenting a 
good public image, and banned the appearance on broadcasting platforms of 
‘misdeed artists’ (lie ji yi ren 劣迹艺人), that is, actors, directors, and screen-
writers convicted by the public security forces for engaging in drug, prostitu-
tion or other offences (Reuters 2014). The PRC’s first Film Industry Promotion 
Law of 2017, for example, stipulates that actors, directors, and other persons in 
film should uphold virtue and art, comply with laws and regulations, respect 
social morality, abide by professional ethics, adopt self-discipline measures, and 
establish a positive social image (China Daily 2017). China’s first draft radio and 
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television law released in March 2021, which is currently seeking public advice, 
stipulates the National Radio and Television Administration (NRTA) has the 
right to restrict broadcasting of programmes associated with misdeed artists 
(Sohu 2021), which has made the comeback of the misdeed artists to the public 
eye harder than ever. 
Government demands that celebrities display a positive social persona in 
exchange for a continuing career are reinforced by similar public expectations. 
The tax evasion scandal associated with Fan Bingbing, once China’s highest-
paid movie star, is a case in point. Online outcry over Fan’s alleged use of 
 ‘yin-yang contracts’ to evade tax, and thus failure to meet her citizen obliga-
tions, prompted a government investigation and resulted in Fan being ordered 
to pay US$ 129 million in late and evaded taxes (Gittleson 2018). The NRTA 
then issued a Notice recommending major pay cuts for radio and television 
stars. The strength of public condemnation has ensured that efforts by Fan to 
re-establish her online presence have not been received positively to date. Pub-
lic anger over the perceived failure of high income-earners to ‘give back’ to 
society has been reignited in the Covid-19 context because many people have 
lost their jobs or had their salaries reduced.
The dual exercise of top-down government regulation and bottom-up 
online public supervision ensures that China’s celebrities have inherent ‘star 
vulnerability’ rather than ‘star power’ (Yu 2012). Scholars of celebrity politics 
in  western societies have variously refuted the argument that celebrities are a 
‘powerless elite’ because they have limited access to real institutional and politi-
cal power (Alberoni 1962). Instead, they contend that contemporary celebrities 
have economic and social power that extends to the political realm because 
they can influence audiences and political agendas through media publicity, 
especially given the mediatisation of western democratic politics. In contrast, 
the PRC’s legacy of state controls over mass media entertainment and promo-
tion of socialist role models has ensured that even contemporary celebrities 
are expected to promote government policy agendas. This expectation is being 
reinforced not only though regulatory frameworks, but also through the infor-
mal means provided by digitally equipped netizens – fans, anti-fans and other 
interested audiences – who are keen to supervise celebrity behaviours.
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7.2 Mediated Menstruation: A Gender Perspective  
in the Time of Coronavirus
Fan Yang
Throughout the medical response to Covid-19 in the People’s Republic of 
China, over 50% of doctors and 90% of nurses were women. However, across 
the rhetoric of ‘soldiers fighting in the national crisis’, representations of medi-
cal workers across mainstream media sidelined and even erased femininity in 
order to serve the masculine cause. There was much publicity around female 
medical workers having their heads shaved before their departure to Wuhan, 
the city in China that experienced the highest number of Covid-19 infections, 
and around a nurse coming back to work 10 days after experiencing a mis-
carriage and claiming the title of ‘macho-man’ for self-encouragement. In this 
masculinised morale-boosting propaganda that circulated nationwide, the 
physiology of female medical workers was rendered expendable, thus invisible 
and unattended. It was not until the hashtag activism # Sisters Fight Against 
Coronavirus in Comfort that was launched by feminist blogger Liang Yu on 
Weibo, the most popular social media platform in China, that companies and 
philanthropic funding began to deliver sanitary goods to hospitals in Hubei 
province. This hashtag activism not only catered to the real needs of female 
medical workers, but also brought women’s menstruation to the fore of public 
discussion. I will argue that during the pandemic, menstruation became a site 
of power negotiations between the state, hospital managers and feminists. The 
hashtag activism helped to mainstream the discourse of menstruation and was 
intended to challenge the culture of period shaming. However, as we will see, 
the discussion of menstruation did not take place in an inclusive way, failing 
to take account of women who do not menstruate and people of other genders 
who do. In this way, the cisgender binary remained unchallenged across these 
public discussions.
Chinese state media ignored and sidelined the issue of menstruation among 
female medical workers. On February 17th, a nurse in Wuhan mentioned men-
struation during her interview on CCTV13 but this reference was later cut out 
in the afternoon re-run. On the one hand, non-menstruating female medical 
workers fit the narrative of the masculine hero across publicity campaigns. 
‘Girl talk’ such as menstruation should be confined to the private sphere rather 
than being made public, it appeared. On the other hand, if the menstruation of 
female medical workers was not visible, their material need for sanitary goods 
could thus be neglected. Sanitary goods for women were not included in the 
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governmental supply of anti-pandemic necessities. These necessities priori-
tised personal protective equipment, which claimed to be gender neutral, yet 
were actually based on male standards. For instance, the supply of only large 
sized protective clothes failed to take into consideration small-sized women, 
which increased their risk of infection given that the poor fitting protective 
gear allowed in air.
Hospitals functioned as legal recipients for donations of sanitary goods. 
But the elimination of menstruation from mainstream media representations 
blinded hospital managers, usually male, to the needs of female medical work-
ers. As pointed out by Liang Yu, hospital managers at first turned down offers 
of sanitary goods by saying that ‘these are not necessary’ (Pan 2020). It was left 
to hospital managers to decide whether sanitary goods could be successfully 
distributed to female medical workers who were in urgent need of them but 
felt too awkward to bring it up. The power dynamics between male superiors 
and female inferiors as well as masculine ideals over ‘shameful’ female physiol-
ogy were intensified across hospital spaces during the crisis. The interference 
by male hospital managers in the distribution of sanitary goods also included 
re-distribution of some sanitary goods intended for women to male medical 
workers. Period diapers were taken away by men for use during long work-
ing hours, despite the fact that they were not intended to be used in that way. 
Female medical workers had to ask Liang to request donations of sanitary pads 
instead of period diapers, as the latter would only end up going to male col-
leagues, causing a scarcity of sanitary resources for women. From rejecting to 
dividing up donations of sanitary goods, hospital managers inherited the logic 
from the state, that is, of ignoring women’s physiology. The masculinisation 
strategy from the state to hospitals during the Covid-19 crisis neglected the 
particular needs of female medical workers.
The hashtag activism # Sisters Fight Against Coronavirus in Comfort was 
launched by Liang Yu, a feminist blogger on Weibo, on February 6th. After the 
case of the Feminist Five in 2015, in which five feminist activists were arrested 
because of their public campaign against sexual harassment, feminist activ-
ism in China shifted from offline to online. Weibo became the major social 
media platform for hundreds of thousands of grassroot feminist bloggers, 
with different scales of followers discussing and debating women issues. As of 
March 22nd, the hashtag mobilisation of donating sanitary goods succeeded 
in collecting 2,532,044.88 RMB, benefiting over 84,500 women (Liang 2020). 
The volunteers involved in fundraising the purchase and delivery of sanitary 
goods were mostly women. This female alliance was formed under the slogan 
‘sisters save themselves’, which emphasised the marginalised status of female 
voices and the absence of governmental support for female medical workers 
during the pandemic. The highly efficient hashtag activism was credited by 
China Women’s Development Foundation, the official charity organisation for 
 poverty-alleviation and women’s development under All-China Women’s Fed-
eration (ACWF), in its post on Weibo. The dialogue between the grassroots and 
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the state could also be seen in ACWF’s announcement of its agenda to include 
sanitary goods in the list of official emergency provisions (Huang 2020). The 
resistance against this instance of feminist activism was not from the state, but 
from anti-feminism networks on Weibo. These male bloggers attacked Liang 
and female volunteers for their high-profile campaign highlighting women’s 
rights, which, to them, equated with man-hating. Although their verbal attacks 
bothered women involved in the hashtag activism, they were not discouraged, 
as they received discursive and emotional support from numerous feminist 
bloggers fighting back against misogyny on Weibo.
Since the wide circulation of the hashtag, feminist activism on social media 
has put menstruation, or ‘the trifle under women’s pants’ (a comment on Liang’s 
Weibo from a male blogger), on the table, and the donation of sanitary goods 
has even extended into a new campaign against menstruation-shaming. Vari-
ous hashtag campaigns were launched on Weibo, such as # I’m a Woman and I 
Menstruate and # Menstruation Not Hidden to normalise the visibility of men-
struation. Corporate powers, such as Libresses, also participated in and helped 
mainstream the campaign by exhibiting new commercials about sanitary pads 
under the slogan of ‘menstruation not hidden’. The blue water used in previous 
commercials, exposed by feminists as a symbol of menstrual blood taboo, was 
replaced with red.
The visibility of menstruation is significant because, for many, it repre-
sents the visibility of femaleness, thus the visibility of women. In the publicity 
 surrounding medical workers fighting like macho soldiers in a battle against 
the virus, female medical workers could only be seen when wearing mascu-
line  masquerade. The power negotiations around women’s menstruation rested 
on the  legitimacy of femininity in the masculine cause of fighting coronavi-
rus. The related erasure of femininity led directly to the erasure of the contri-
butions made by female medical workers, as shown in the all-male publicity 
of ‘anti-pandemic heroes’ and state nominations of anti-pandemic heroes in 
which 20% male medical workers seized over 50% of awards. To restore female-
ness, feminist bloggers on Weibo launched hashtag activism. They not only 
 successfully collected donations for sanitary goods, but also disseminated femi-
nist discourses to resist the period shaming of patriarchal culture. These numer-
ous sporadic grassroot feminist activities were the pivotal power to reframe 
the gender dynamics in China during the Covid-19. The binary categorisation 
of gender that dominated both state and feminist discourse, however, should 
also prompt reflection in order to further feminist critique of gender essential-
ism in patriarchal society.
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7.3 The ‘Wounded Weanling’: An Introduction to Daofu,  
the Epicenter of the Coronavirus Epidemic in the Tibetan 
Regions of China
Sonam Lhundrop
The name rTa’u (Daofu in Chinese) means ‘weanling’ – a young foal that has 
just been weaned. This county in the Tibetan area of western Sichuan is not 
well-known, but has recently become a centre of attention in China and around 
the world, due to the large number of coronavirus cases there. Suddenly, the 
county’s name seems apt: the place and its people have become fragile and 
 vulnerable, like an unsteady weanling.
Until February 19th, the only information on the situation in Daofu con-
sisted of daily government reports of the number of people infected in the 
county. But on February 19th, the Central Television News published an inter-
view transcript titled ‘One Prefecture, 62 Reported Cases! Why Is There Such 
a High Concentration in Daofu (Ganzi Prefecture, Sichuan Province)?’ (Ganzi 
Daofu yangguang shui an 甘孜道孚阳光水 2020).
The following is an excerpt translated from the  published transcripts, 
 containing an interview with the head manager of the Ganzi coronavirus pre-
vention team of Daofu county.
17th February. Ganzi Prefecture, Sichuan, has 5 newly-reported cases, all from 
Daofu County. As of midnight on the 17th of February, there have been a total of 
62 reported cases, among which 57 are from Daofu County.
Question:  What is the current coronavirus situation in Ganzi prefecture, and 
particularly in Daofu County?
Answer:  Outside Daofu, there are five cases in total in three counties, which 
are Kangding, Seda, and Daocheng, all of which came from Wuhan 
(i.e., non-natives). As of midnight on February 17th, 57 cases have 
been reported in Daofu: two have been discharged from hospital. 
Additionally, there are 11 suspected cases and 16 asymptomatic 
cases, which may well turn into infected cases soon. All cases 
reported from Daofu belong to five townships and one town: Mazi, 
Kongse, Gexi, Geka, and Wari townships, and Xianshui Town, the 
county seat.
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 Upon discovering the first case on the 24th of January, inspec-
tion work has been systematically conducted, including identifying 
and separating those who had close contact with the infected. This 
work has enabled us to identify two sources for the initial spread 
of the epidemic. One is from a Mr. Luo who, before experiencing 
symptoms, traveled to places like Chengdu, Nanchong and Meishan, 
and returned to Daofu on the 18th. Subsequently, he attended 
multiple gatherings, resulting in several families becoming infected. 
This is identified as the main source of the epidemic. Another 
source is a truck driver, Mr. Jiang, who traveled to places like Ya’an 
and Chengdu around the 20th  of January and who infected his 
 co-driver.
Question: What are some preventive programs that have been implemented?
Answer:  Based on initial data, all intimate and distant social contacts of the 
infected people from the above five townships and one town have 
been separated either in hospitals or at home. Thus, to prevent fur-
ther infection, by midnight on the 17th of February, 339 intimate 
social contacts had been quarantined and medically inspected; 
1,908 distant social contacts were being quarantined at home and 
medically inspected. A total of 8,463 social contacts, with or with-
out symptoms, were medically examined. We have modified our 
‘wait until symptoms’ method to ‘Check all in advance,’ so as to 
identify all sources of infection in the shortest possible period. 
 According to the medical examination results, since February, all 
infected individuals were identified among the 8,463 contacts. Until 
midnight on the 17th of February, a total of 7,018 contacts were 
medically examined, among whom there are 57 with initial symp-
toms. Results for 1,445 contacts are yet to come out.
Starting from the 17th of February, to enforce preventive meas-
ures, all in-coming and out-going vehicles are prohibited from 
 driving through Daofu County; within Daofu County, all routes 
from and to those five townships and one town have checkpoints.
Daofu is located about 550km west of Sichuan’s provincial capital, Chengdu, 
and about 250km northeast of Ganzi’s prefectural seat, Kangding. It is on the 
southeast edge of Tibetan Plateau, and borders Kangding Municipality to 
the southeast, Danba County to the east, Luhuo County to the west, and Jin-
chuan County of Aba Prefecture to the north. It had a population of 56,943 in 
2015, of whom 89% were Tibetans, and almost a third (27.4%) were urbanites 
(Daofu xian renmin zhengfu 道孚县人民政府 2017). The county has an aver-
age altitude of 3,245 meters and is divided into three ecological zones: in the 
east of the county are the Bamei grasslands and hills, inhabited by both nomads 
and farmers; in the south are the Zhaba canyons, occupied by farmers, and in 
the north are the Yuke high altitude grasslands, occupied primarily by nomads.
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The coronavirus crisis has seen an outpouring of generosity from all corners 
of society, including efforts to disseminate public health information. Amongst 
Tibetans, an important part of this effort has been dedicated to  translating 
public health information  to people who speak minoritised languages that 
are different from standard Tibetan (Yu 2020). There have been several videos 
directed to Tibetans in Daofu who speak a language named after the county—
rTa’u—a Tibeto-Burman language that is incomprehensible to neighbouring 
Tibetans, who refer to the language as ‘Ghost Language’ (Tunzhi 2019).
These videos are of great benefit to the 45,000 Tibetans who speak rTa’u. 
As a speaker of rTa’u language, I have conversed with several people from 
Daofu about these videos (Zangdi yangguang 藏地阳光 2020). Most of them 
expressed surprise, since there is practically no media in the language. One 
person said, ‘It is such a wonderful feeling that people we do not even know 
would make such an effort to produce these videos in our mother-tongue, to 
educate us about this epidemic’. Another elderly man told me he was genu-
inely excited to hear the information in his mother-tongue, because it sounded 
more trustworthy.
There has been an outpouring of love and support towards Daofu people 
from other Tibetan areas, since Daofu has not only the highest infection rate in 
Tibetan areas, but also ranks second in the whole of Sichuan province, right after 
Chengdu City, the provincial capital. The following is a translated poem that 
was written to show support for Daofu people (A Guoluo yangguang geci ping-
tai A果洛阳光歌词平台 2020).
Daofu: The Delightful Dharma-holder
by Tshering Norbu
Franky, I call this place The Delightful Dharma-holders
It is an achieved name:
where Dharma is wholeheartedly adored and karma is protected as the eyes
where unity is as undifferentiated as the fingers of one hand,
where wild animals befriend humans, and thus are conferred freedom,
where fathers behold wisdom and mothers soften the wildest souls,
where sons engage in trading and daughters are prized for their elegance.
Often, when the pilgrims (to Lhasa) arrive in Daofu
they are struck by the beauty
and wishes are made to be reborn in this place.
Oh! A snowless, sorrowful winter,
a terrifying epidemic engulfs this place,
daily increasing numbers reflect your worried face,
like an increasing flame slowly diminishing.
—continuing
Many Tibetans have sought answers as to why Daofu, in particular, has 
emerged as the epicentre of the coronavirus outbreak. Unfortunately, many of 
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their explanations are rooted in prejudices and shrouded in misunderstandings 
of Buddhist philosophy, which constitutes the core of the perceptual and ideo-
logical world of Tibetan farmers and nomads. In WeChat discussions, many 
Tibetans have interpreted Daofu’s misfortune as karmic retribution for inhab-
itants’ supposed lack of piety, as reflected in their economic activities: many 
Daofu Tibetans are traders and entrepreneurs.
It is true that Daofu people are good at business, but it is not clear whether 
this has anything to do with the spread of the coronavirus in Daofu. Perhaps 
instead we need to look at local history to understand the situation. In the 
1980s, when the local economy firstq opened to the outside, Daofu became 
home to a booming timber industry. Although the lumber companies were 
owned by outsiders, people in Daofu exploited this opportunity by transport-
ing logs to Chengdu. Then, when this industry was closed down in the early 
2000s by strict environmental regulations, many Daofu people stayed in the 
transport industry, working for local mines and other industries.
In this context, it is certainly significant that both of Daofu’s ‘patient zeros’ 
were local people who had been travelling for business immediately before they 
brought the epidemic home. It is perhaps a lack of local economic opportunity, 
rather than a fatal character flaw, which has wounded the weanling, and left this 
place and its people particularly vulnerable.
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7.4 Reflections on the Racialised Discourse  
Surrounding Covid-19
Sam Phan
The language that we use is extremely powerful and can influence the ways 
in which we perceive reality. Think about those times when immigrants have 
been intentionally referred to as ‘swarms’ or ‘invasions’, resulting in the dehu-
manisation and discrimination of millions of immigrants across the world. 
It was this same phenomenon that produced ideas of a ‘Chinese Invasion’ in 
the 1800s (San Francisco Chronicle 1873) that eventually led to the exclusion 
of Chinese people from the United States. We see the same old fears newly 
revived today.
Donald Trump, as well as a string of other Republican  politicians, have 
adopted the term ‘Chinese Virus’ despite the World Health Organisation inten-
tionally naming it Covid-19 in order to avoid the stigmatisation of a certain 
ethnic group or country (Kuo 2020; Gabbatt 2020). This racialisation of the 
virus stokes xenophobia and flames the already growing racism against Chi-
nese people, home and abroad. It also echoes centuries-old ideas of the ‘Yellow 
Peril’ trope that depicts people of East Asian descent as an existential threat 
to the Western world. It was this fear that ultimately allowed U.S. Congress to 
pass the Page Act of 1875, a law that restricted Asian immigration, as well as 
the Chinese Exclusion Act in 1882, the first American law that explicitly pre-
vented all members of a specific group from immigrating on the sole basis of 
their ethnicity. In the present day, calling Covid-19 the ‘Chinese Virus’ can be 
just as dangerous.
Despite the epicentre of Covid-19 moving away from China months ago 
and the virus not being confined to a particular place or people, Covid-19 is 
still being linked with China and with people who look East Asian. The virus 
has been painted as an inherently Chinese phenomenon which has conse-
quently enabled some people to justify and normalise their racism towards 
China and East Asians. This has then resulted in various instances of racism, 
including White House officials referring to the virus as the ‘Kung-Flu’ (Jiang 
2020), Mike Pompeo tweeting that ‘China has a history of infecting the world’ 
(Pompeo 2020) and Donald Trump telling an Asian American reporter that 
she ‘should ask China’ when faced with a question concerning the coronavirus 
(ITV News 2020). If government officials adopt this racialised rhetoric when 
talking about Covid-19, then the connection between the virus and Chinese 
people will be reinforced.
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It is precisely this racialisation of Covid-19—the linking of an entire eth-
nic group with a virus that has killed hundreds of thousands – that has led 
to the verbal and physical discrimination of East and Southeast Asians across 
the globe. In my own experience (Phan 2020), I have been verbally abused by 
strangers asking ‘if I liked to eat Chinese bat soup’ and have even had someone 
raise their hand to hit me whilst shouting ‘don’t give me the coronavirus!’ In my 
two decades of living in Britain, I have never felt so alien or violently discrimi-
nated against. And I am not alone in feeling like this.
Around the world, attacks against East Asians have been a common occur-
rence during this pandemic. Examples in Britain include Chinese takea-
way owners being spat at (Ng 2020), an NHS nurse attacked on her way to an 
overtime shift (Staples 2020) and students being beaten up in racially motivated 
attacks (BBC News 2020; Bains and McGee 2020). Recent police data revealed 
that in Britain, hate crimes against Chinese people have tripled during the cor-
onavirus outbreak (Lovett 2020). One thing has become clear, a racialised virus 
has resulted in racialised attacks.
Towards the beginning of the outbreak, some newspaper headlines were 
quick to racialise the virus, with French newspaper  Courrier Picard’s  head-
line ‘coronavirus chinois: ALERTE JAUNE’  (Chinese coronavirus: YELLOW 
ALERT) (Courrier Picard 2020), the German newspaper Der Spiegel running 
the headline ‘Corona-virus: Made in China’ (Der Spiegel 2020) as well as a 
headline from The Wall Street Journal calling China the ‘Real Sick man of Asia’ 
(Mead 2020). These derogatory headlines draw specifically on historical lan-
guage that make reference to concepts and ideas of China being subordinate, 
inferior and a threat to the world.
Moreover, the speculation around how Covid-19 originated is also heavily 
tinged with racist ideas of Chinese people being the ‘exotic’ and ‘uncivilised’ 
other who have caused this pandemic. It is still a commonly held belief that 
it was the ‘exotic eating habits’ of Chinese people that led to the emergence of 
Covid-19. Michael Caputo, the spokesperson for the US Department of Health 
and Human Services wrote in now-deleted tweets ‘millions of Chinese suck the 
blood out of rabid bats as an appetiser and eat the ass out of anteaters’ (Kac-
zynski et al. 2020). For Asians everywhere, these misguided perceptions are not 
unfamiliar, and it is clear how patterns of Sinophobia and racist ideas have been 
recycled to fit current narratives.
Another consequence of racialising Covid-19 is that it shifts the blame 
towards China, and thus fails to look introspectively at the failures and short-
comings of our own governments in addressing the pandemic. The pandemic 
has revealed so much about the underlying systemic racism and inequality that 
exists within our own structures. Finger-pointing only acts as a distraction 
from these problems and adds to the plethora of misinformation and misun-
derstandings that surround the coronavirus.
The implications of the coronavirus are already exhausting enough for East 
Asians without having to face coronavirus-related racism. The choice to  racialise 
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the virus is intentional and has devastating real-life consequences. We are all 
impacted by the coronavirus and it is important that we work together to end 
it, rather than allowing divisive language to incite blame, fear and  xenophobia.
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Chinese posters—such as the several hundred in the University of Westmin-
ster’s archive of the China Visual Arts Project— are invariably referred to both 
in China and abroad under the generic category of ‘propaganda posters’ (xuan-
chuanhua 宣传画). One key assumption informing such a description is that 
between their image and slogan, posters conveyed a clear message, the mean-
ing of which was immediately transparent to its viewers. Stephanie Donald 
argued that posters in the Mao era mediated the relationship between party 
propaganda and everyday experience by constituting a ‘red sea’, ‘an immersive 
aesthetic field through which the Party disseminated extraordinarily powerful 
visual metaphors for the revolution-in-progress’ (Donald 2014, 658).
Thinking about posters through this lens, however, is problematic, for a 
number of reasons. Recent scholarship has explored how propaganda should 
be seen as much more than a tool of coercive top- down governance: ‘it was 
also a window through which society became more legible, predictable and 
controllable’ to the political and bureaucratic elite (Farley and Johnson 2021, 4). 
Nor was there any automatic linear link between the intentions of propaganda 
producers and their publics. As Pang Laikwan argues, the ‘making of the prop-
aganda involved much contestation and negotiation, and the reception and 
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production of it created even more discrepancies from central ideology’ (Pang 
2017, 14). Any cursory perusal of the posters in Westminster’s collection, or for 
that matter in Stefan Landsberger’s (1995), could support this argument. While 
most, if not all poster images, were accompanied by captions and slogans urg-
ing a particular response from the viewer, their immense variety—aesthetically, 
technically, in use of colour, and of course thematically—as well as the diversity 
of publics to whom they appealed would imply the impossibility of a uniform 
relationship between the poster and its multiple viewers. While the ultimate 
conceit in centrally directed poster production and dissemination might have 
been to thwart responses ‘such as critique, desire, irony or resistance’ (Donald 
2014, 661), the public was far from the docile subject of such controls. 
Little research has been conducted into viewers’ responses to posters of the 
time, but there is some empirical evidence to support this argument. For exam-
ple, Pang Laikwan (2017, 109) refers to how images of the beautiful female 
bare-foot doctor could evoke passionate longings on the part of a young man 
in the 1970s. A similar longing was described by male viewers’ fan mail to Pan 
Jiajun, artist of the famous 1972 oil painting ‘I am a petrel’ (Wo shi haiyan 我是
海燕) that I discussed in an earlier publication (Evans 2016, 94–95). Another 
reference is the evidence from the well-known Cantonese poster artist Zhang 
Shaocheng that choice of colour, line, and composition in conditions when edi-
torial guidelines were extremely strict, could convey desires and longings that 
were obscured in the surface image of the poster, thereby creating space for 
different audience responses (Evans 2016, 97–98). In a more recent publication, 
Landsberger notes that peasants largely turned ‘a blind eye to [the] political 
messages’ of posters (Landsberger 2019, 214).
So, given the diversity and multiplicity of poster images across time, aes-
thetic composition and theme, what generalisations can be made about their 
status as powerful items of the visual culture throughout the entire Mao era? 
As  Stephanie Donald and I (1999, 1–6) argued, the ubiquity of posters in pub-
lic, work, and domestic spaces throughout the Mao era constituted them as a 
 powerful visual discourse producing knowledge about key aspects of political 
and social life. One common thread running through all of them concerns their 
temporality. Whether in depictions of collective agriculture, industrial labour, 
health  education, childcare or family life, posters all celebrated the bright future 
of socialism in images of hard work and commitment supported by symbolic 
 references to transcendental authority depicted by rays of the red sun. Of course, 
one  interpretation of this would derive from what one might call a postcolo-
nial reading of the poster images, as a particular aesthetic component of the 
 politics of culture celebrated by the newly independent government of the PRC. 
The postcolonial theorist and historian Robert Young argued some time ago 
that postcolonialism can be seen as ‘a wide-ranging political project to recon-
struct Western formations, reorient ethical norms, turn the power structures 
of the world upside down, refashion the world from below’ (Young 2012, 20). 
In the proud moments of the early 1950s when many in China, and by no 
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means just the national leaders, were celebrating their ascendancy to a newly 
independent national stage, having defeated the forces of imperialism and colo-
nialism, the poster scenes of crowds of energetic young workers and peasants 
marching towards a bright future could become images of celebration, or even 
happiness, as Maria-Caterina Bellinetti argues in her article included in this 
collection. Resituated in the context of their times they can be read as trium-
phant images of national and political success in taking on and challenging the 
international forces that since the nineteenth century had forcibly maintained 
China’s subordination. Political and military victory was assured, if not by the 
bright red sun in the east, then certainly by the collective strength of class and 
ethnic unity. Alongside such scenes of celebration and pride, the grubbiness 
and scarcity of the present was absented from all images. The enemy, whether 
military or class, was only ever implied, unless it appeared in metaphorical or 
cartoon form.
Reflecting on the posters at the time of their production and display, there 
is thus a striking paradox between repeated references to them as fixed ‘propa-
ganda’ and their diversity and complexity as an aesthetic form. This paradox is 
implicit in Amy Barnes’ analysis of the British Library Collection of Chinese 
Posters, in which her generic reference to the propaganda of posters cannot 
account for the diverse range of styles and themes included in this small col-
lection (Barnes 2020). It takes on a particularly poignant form when associated 
with the brutal distance between idealised poster images of abundance and 
fertility and ordinary people’s real lives during the famine years of 1959–1962 
(Galikowski 1998, 93–6) Cassie Lin’s reflections included in this Review also 
show how posters from the less fraught period of the 1980s can trigger memo-
ries about a less difficult personal history and upbringing. These images from 
the 1980s are less often noted in the literature but seen together with earlier 
images, they provide interesting insights into changes in colour use and com-
position following the end of the Cultural Revolution. 
Fast forward to the afterlife of the posters in the twenty-first century, a further 
paradox concerns why the images of posters repurposed and reproduced for 
commercial, artistic and educational purposes, have been reduced from their 
initial diversity and multiplicity to what appears to be a truly limited range. This 
range is coterminous with the dominant soundbites about the Mao era: the gen-
der neutrality of bodily images, the uniformity of dress, and the predominance 
of an impassioned youth. Much the same is true of the countless artistic reimag-
inings (by many of the same artists) of Mao’s image, which also work around a 
tiny cluster of themes. Mediated and remediated over the years for purposes as 
diverse as nightclub publicity, patriotic education, film, and fine art, the multi-
layered meanings offered by the intricate and mobile combination of colour, line, 
composition, and slogan have effectively been distilled into dominant images 
of exuberant youth, arms raised in anticipation of future victory. Compare for 
example, the aesthetic of Westminster’s image  ‘Revolutionary proletarian right 
to rebel troops unite!’ with Wang Guangyi’s ‘Great  Criticism WTO’ (2005) (see 
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Fig 8.0.a.). It is worth bearing in mind, moreover, that these images appear in 
a cultural, media, and political environment in which critical public discussion 
about the Cultural Revolution is not permitted. Nor does the mainstream media 
environment in the West seem particularly interested in bringing to light the 
complex issues buried in unspoken memories and experiences of the recent 
past in China. It is therefore through this reduced range of images that young 
 people growing up in China today, as well as non-specialist commentators in the 
West, come to comprehend what the Cultural Revolution was about. Given 
the widespread media slippage between the Cultural Revolution and the Mao 
era, the implications of this in narrowing down the historical narrative available 
to young people growing up in China today are even more serious.
Then there is the commodified, political and affective repurposing of post-
ers as items within the generic category of China’s ‘red legacy’. Emily Williams 
(2017) has discussed the work of China’s officially approved Red Collectors’ 
associations and suggests that far from producing a coherent narrative of the 
Red Era, their efforts to collect and display ‘red relics’ ‘fragment the very idea 
of narratives altogether’. For some collectors, it is quantity and taxonomical 
techniques that occupy pride of place in their collections. By contrast, the well-
known pioneering collector Mr. Dong Zhongchao is inspired by a nostalgic 
desire to bring poster and ‘relic’ to life by pairing up poster image with the 
material object depicted in it and temporarily abandoning the contemporary 
emphasis on individual competition to return to a moment of greater equality 
associated with the Mao years (Williams 2017). 
‘Authentic’ red relics now fetch sometimes spectacular prices, and indicate 
the extent to which the ‘red’ has ironically morphed into a fully commodi-
fied and profitable entity in which workers and peasants are no longer proud 
messengers of a new world, but reminders of a past that is politically silenced 
Fig 8.0.a: Left: National Fine Art Red Revolutionary Rebels Liaison Station. 
1966. Revolutionary Proletarian Right to Rebel Troops Unite! Source: China 
Visual Arts Project, University of Westminster. Right: Great Criticism WTO 
(2005), by Wang Guangyi. Reproduced with the permission of the artist.
Chinese Propaganda Posters 153
as a site of critical enquiry. We recall the argument of the prominent Beijing-
based feminist cultural critic Dai Jinhua who describes in her text ‘Imagined 
Nostalgia’ how nostalgic images represent a longing produced by the prevalent 
anxiety that imbues society and provide a temporary space of relief where the 
present is allocated to an imagined past (Dai 1997). Nostalgia and commercial 
interest are inextricably enmeshed in the work of the red collectors. If they are 
united in approaching collecting as a moral project linking the past with the 
present, this is not inconsistent in their view with their pursuit of commercial 
interests or political patronage (Williams 2017).
As the Chinese Communist Party celebrates its centenary year, the poster 
retains the aesthetic qualities that inspired its initial production, but is 
 refashioned for audiences unable and unwilling to attempt to excavate what it 
signified at the time. However, it retains an importance as part of an invaluable 
historical archive that needs to be preserved, the painstaking work of which 
Freja Howat described in her article in this section. As direct references to the 
Cultural Revolution and the Great Leap Forward famine are excised in the new 
edition of A Brief History of the Communist Party of China, recently published 
to celebrate the CCP’s centenary, the significance of the poster as a source of 
insights into a complex and difficult history becomes even more crucial to 
record and analyse. While the repurposing of poster art across different sites 
of creativity and market exchange—from fine art, the hospitality industry, to 
the treasured displays of the red collectors—cloaks the poster in mantles and 
temporalities that effectively disguise its initial purpose and focus on futurity, it 
points to ways in which different constituencies in contemporary China are in 
their different ways attempting to reveal rather than hide a difficult recent past.
References
Barnes, A. J. 2020. Chinese Propaganda Posters at the British Library. Visual 
Resources, 36 (2), 124–147.
Dai, J. H. 1997. Imagined Nostalgia. Boundary 2, 24 (3), 143–161. 
Donald, S. H. 2014. Red Aesthetics, Intermediality and the Use of Posters in 
Chinese Cinema after 1949. Asian Studies Review, 38 (4), 658–675.
Evans, H. 2016. Ambiguities of Address: Cultural Revolution Posters and Their 
Post-Mao Appeal. In: J. Li and E. Zhang (Eds.), Red Legacies in China: Cul-
tural Afterlives of the Communist Revolution, pp. 87–114. Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press.
Evans, H. and Donald, S. 1999. Introducing Posters of China’s Cultural Revo-
lution. In: H. Evans and S. Donald (Eds.), Picturing Power in the People’s 
Republic of China: Posters of the Cultural Revolution, pp. 1–26. Lanham, 
MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
Farley, J. and Johnson, M. D. 2021. Introduction. In: J. Farley and M. D. Johnson 
(Eds.), Redefining Propaganda in Modern China: The Mao Era and Its Lega-
cies, pp. 1–20. London: Routledge.
154 Cultural China 2020: The Contemporary China Centre Review
Galikowski, M. 1998. Art and Politics in China 1949–1984. Hong Kong: The 
Chinese University of Hong Kong Press.
Landsberger, S. 2019. Collecting Chinese Propaganda Posters. In: R. E. Iskin 
and B. Salsbury (Eds.), Collecting Prints, Posters, and Ephemera Perspectives 
in a Global World, pp. 212–227. London: Bloomsbury Visual Arts.
Landsberger, S. 1995. Chinese Propaganda Posters: From Revolution to Moderni-
zation. Amsterdam: Pepin Press.
Pang, L. K. 2017. The Art of Cloning: Creative Production During China’s 
 Cultural Revolution. London and New York: Verso.
Williams, E. 2017. Collecting the Red Era in Contemporary China. Made in 
China Journal, September 24. Retrieved from: https://madeinchinajournal 
.com/2017/09/24/collecting-the-red-era-in-contemporary-china.
Xue, X. S. 2021. Beijing Revises ‘Correct’ Version of Party History Ahead of 
Centenary. Radio Free Asia, April 15. Retrieved from: https://www.rfa.org 
/english/news/china/history-04152021091451.html.
Young, R. 2012. Postcolonial Remains. New Literary History, 43 (1), 19–42.
8.1 The Chinese Visual Arts Project: Graduate Work  
in Records and Archives
Freja Howat
Working over a period of five months in 2018–19, I joined the Records and 
Archives team at the University of Westminster to help implement the digitisa-
tion and digital preservation of its collections. Founded as the UK’s first poly-
technic institution, the University has collections spanning over 170 years. My 
role was, needless to say, varied.
When I told people that I worked in an archive, most people imagined me 
seated among a load of boxes in a dark, dusty strongroom. This was partly true, 
but popular visions of archives are based on myths that do not do service to the 
active labour that goes into providing access to collections via outreach and 
digitisation. Archives are not static repositories—the work around the Univer-
sity’s Chinese Visual Arts Project exemplifies this point.
Founded in 1977 by the writer and journalist John Gittings, then Senior Lec-
turer in Chinese at the Polytechnic of Central London (now the University of 
Westminster), the collection comprises a staggering 843 posters acquired from 
Hong Kong and mainland China, dating from the 1940s to the 1980s, alongside 
a wealth of books, objects, and ephemera. The collection was used and built 
upon as a teaching aid for the Polytechnic’s classes in Chinese language and 
politics and is still used today for similar purposes by Senior Archivist Anna 
McNally for a range of courses at the University of Westminster engaging with 
visual and material cultures. I worked with Anna to deliver outreach sessions 
designed to offer students a deeper understanding of the ways in which archives 
are constructed, and how collections are attributed with meaning and value.
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Fig 8.1.a: Central Academy of Fine Arts Combat Team. 1967. Smash the Old 
World and Build a New One. Source: China Visual Arts Project, University 
of Westminster.
These sessions often engaged with the propaganda posters, which encompass 
a wide range of styles, responding to the frequent changes in the political cli-
mate. Created in the red and black graphic woodblock style that has become 
so synonymous with the Cultural Revolution, posters such as ‘Smash the Old 
World and Build a New Nne’ (1967) (Fig 8.1.a.) portray the elimination of Chi-
na’s old traditions under the Communist regime. By the mid-1970s, these post-
ers began to shift in style. More posters began to promote healthcare, education 
and industry such as ‘Put Birth Control into Practice for the Revolution’ (1974) 
(Fig 8.1.b.), a message that took on new significance following the introduction 
of the one child policy (1979–2015).
Accompanying these posters are a number of propagandist toys such as a 
puzzle cube of Vietnamese children planting a bomb for American soldiers 
(Fig 8.1.c.) and a pair of dolls that depict the Red Guards, a mass paramilitary 
social movement mobilised by Mao in 1966 and 1967, during the first phase 
of the Cultural Revolution (Fig 4). There are also objects that detail the every-
day, such as bus tickets and receipts; pins featuring Mao; matchbooks depicting 
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Fig 8.1.c: Puzzle cube. c.1970. Source: China Visual Arts Project, University of 
Westminster. 
Chinese monuments and lingerie (Fig 5). These materials have received less 
interest than the posters, yet they resonated with me as I felt they had just as 
much to say about the culture and politics of China during this period.
Whilst considering the transformation of political narratives overtime, stu-
dents also reflected on the wider context by which the collection was formed 
and how it portrayed China from Western perspectives. It is for this reason 
that I became involved with digitising this aspect of the collection; to increase 
the visibility of the collection as a whole, which when seen in its wider context 
as a teaching aid also raises questions about what was then the Polytechnic of 
Central London; Why were these materials collected?; How and why did they 
inform study about China and its peoples? Questions surrounding the nature 
of the collection and how it came into being continue to grow and evolve as the 
collection is catalogued, distributed, and engaged with.
I set to work photographing these objects and played around with 3D model-
ling. Although we thought it could be an interesting way for researchers over-
seas to get an idea of the materiality of an object (Fig 6), producing 3D models 
Fig 8.1.b: Artist unknown. 1974. Put Birth Control into Practice for the Revo-
lution. Source: China Visual Arts Project, University of Westminster.
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Fig 8.1.d: Red Guards, c.1967. Source: China Visual Arts Project, University of 
Westminster. 
Fig 8.1.e: Bra. c.1966–1976. Source: China Visual Arts Project, University of 
Westminster. 
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was not without its issues. Firstly, a 3D model does not replace the materiality 
of engaging with an object first-hand; secondly, not everyone has the expenses 
or access to a machine that is powerful enough to produce or view 3D models. 
This led me to think about lower tech solutions such as .gif making; acces-
sible to anyone with a mobile phone. Without being able to physically handle 
the materials first-hand, this would at the very least improve access to the col-
lection. In addition to this, the University of Westminster has recently imple-
mented a new online catalogue which enables users the choice between English 
and Chinese. This is a development that will fundamentally alter the ways in 
which audiences engage with the collection and how it is managed.
By considering the ways in which this collection has been acquired and 
the channels by which it continues to be distributed, audiences are offered a 
new context for viewing the collection. It allows us to think critically about 
the appropriation of the word ‘archive’, about differences between digital and 
physical objects, and also about the accessibility of material and the impacts of 
digitisation on non-European collections that have been attributed Western-
ised standards of archival value.
Note
A version of this piece was previously published on the History of Art and 
Design Blog, University of Brighton.
Fig 8.1.f: Work in progress 3D Model of Red Guard Doll. Source: China Visual 
Arts Project, University of Westminster. 
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8.2 Women Model Workers and The Duty of Happiness  
in Chinese Propaganda Posters
Maria-Caterina Bellinetti
On February 14th, the death of Liang Jun was reported by international media 
(BBC 2020). Liang, a woman born from a peasant family in Heilongjiang in 
1930, became a Chinese national hero thanks to her work as a tractor driver. 
During her life, Liang was glorified by state propaganda as a model worker and, 
in 1962, she became the face of the one yuan banknote where she is portrayed 
while driving her tractor. The glorification of working women was systemati-
cally employed by the CCP in its propaganda strategies in order to promote the 
Socialist cause and bring more women into the workforce. The story of Liang 
Jun, her popularity, and the use of her image prompts us to wonder what it 
means to look at the representation of women in Chinese propaganda posters 
on International Women’s Day. 
Women have been a central part of modern Chinese political discourse since 
the May 4th Movement between 1910 and 1920. Right from its birth in 1921 
in Shanghai, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) welcomed the feminist 
ideology of the Movement and included in its political agenda the promotion 
of women’s rights. In 1922, the Party embraced the celebrations for Interna-
tional Women’s Day and with it the call for gender equality and the right for 
women to vote. A few years before, in 1919, a young Mao Zedong, also influ-
enced by the May 4th Movement, had criticised the ways in which traditional 
Chinese society treated women. In his famous essay Miss Zhao’s Suicide, Mao 
argued that Miss Zhao, a young girl promised in marriage to an old widower, 
did not actually commit suicide but was murdered by society. The three cir-
cumstances in which Miss Zhao found herself caged were Chinese society, her 
family, and the family of the man she did not want to marry. ‘Within these 
triangular iron nets, however much Miss Zhao sought life, there was no way 
for her to go on living,’ noted Mao (1919), ‘The opposite of life is death, and so 
Miss Zhao was obliged to die’. 
Despite the proclaimed good intentions and the attempts, some success-
ful, to include and ameliorate women’s living conditions, the Party fell short. 
Women’s issues were frequently dismissed in favour of the Socialist Revolution 
or the freedom of the country—especially during the war against Japan—and 
this contributed to the prolonged, hard-to-overcome existence of patriarchy. 
Propaganda posters, just like other forms of visual representation such as 
woodcuts and photographs, were not an exception. Created by a Party and an 
ideology that were male-oriented, the posters presented a view on the world of 
women that did not correspond to and eventually failed to alter the status quo 
of Chinese society. Women’s representation in posters was constructed through 
a male-gaze: when women were represented as leaders, they were in charge 
of other women, not men; when they were learning how to read and write, 
they were usually taught by their sons. Even if the Party was advocating for 
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Fig 8.2.a: Han Meilin 韩美琳. 1960. Hard Working Sister-in-law. Source: 
China Visual Arts Project, University of Westminster. 
women’s equality, the visual representation of women remained stuck in the old 
 narrative that presented them through their primary roles as mothers, sisters, 
and wives.
In the posters, women were predominantly young and beautiful, and their 
work efforts were directed to the family or the State. More interestingly though, 
Fig 8.2.b: Fan Zhenjia 范振家. 1964. If You Want Blossoms Full of Foliage, 
Study Good Management Techniques. Source: China Visual Arts Project, 
University of Westminster. 
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they were always happy. When working in the fields or chiselling stone blocks 
with perfectly combed hair and red cheeks, a happy and determined smile 
appeared on their faces. Similarly, when women were portrayed while taking 
care of the family and performing their duties as wives, mothers, and daugh-
ters, they looked happy and gracious. In Communist visual propaganda, hap-
piness lost its private connotation and became a public, national affair. Women 
were happy because, and thanks to, their work for the country and the Party. 
Being happy, therefore, became a duty. 
The duty of happiness reads like an oxymoron, but, according to Gerda 
 Wielander (2018), it was and still is a central part of the Chinese propaganda 
system. While, as Wielander (2018) argues, in the 1950s the focus of the 
Party was on ‘building a happy society,’ in more recent years ‘social stability 
and regime maintenance have become the main goal’. The importance of hap-
piness can be seen as part of the emotion work that characterised the CCP’s 
propaganda efforts since the Anti-Japanese War (1937–45). Defined by Arlie R. 
Fig 8.2.c: Wang Dawei. 1975. Women can hold up half the sky; surely the face 
of nature can be transformed. Source: China Visual Arts Project, University 
of Westminster. 
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Hochschild (1979, 561) as ‘the act of trying to change in degree or quality an 
emotion or feeling,’ emotion work was frequently used by the Party to create a 
sense of unity in the people and the hope for a bright, happy future under the 
guidance of the CCP. In her essay Moving the Masses: Emotion Work in the Chi-
nese Revolution, Elizabeth J. Perry (2002, 120) noted that Mao Zedong believed 
that ‘mass ecstasy [...] was efficacious not only for revolutionary struggle, but 
for dramatic economic breakthroughs as well’. 
Over the decades, women like Liang Jun were glorified by the Party for 
their work and family achievements and portrayed accordingly. Based on the 
 awareness that a positive attitude and contagious enthusiasm were strong psy-
chological weapons to mobilise the people in political and economic campaigns, 
the Party systematically exploited happiness throughout its visual propaganda. 
Women’s reality was not as joyous as modern Chinese propaganda depicted in 
the posters. Behind the smiles, the perfectly combed hair, and the rosy cheeks, 
Chinese women fought, struggled, and suffered as many of them have narrated 
in their memoirs. If in propaganda posters women’s happiness became a duty, in 
the real world it was too frequently an unreachable state or at least a very ardu-
ous journey. 
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8.3 A Throw Back to School Days
Cassie Lin
Going to school in China can be quite different from the UK. The first time I 
noticed these differences was during my early days living in England.  It was 
3.30 p.m. on a weekday. I saw a bunch of schoolgirls storming through a shop-
ping mall in the city centre, in their cute winter school uniform, nicely fitted 
Chinese Propaganda Posters 163
jacket, check skirt, white shirt and tie. They were all wearing make-up, beautiful 
long hair styled in different fashions, and shiny nail polish on their fingertips.
I was a little surprised for two reasons: 1. It was only 3.30 in the afternoon, 
are these girls are off school already? 2. Make-up is allowed?
I couldn’t help but recall my own school days back  in China. I spent six 
good years in one of the best secondary schools in our province. A renowned 
 secondary educational institution, like my old school, normally comes with 
endless study hours, a hideous uniform, and countless student regulations. For 
example, having long hair was strictly forbidden; girls can only have their hair 
cut almost the same short length as boys, let alone wear make-up and accesso-
ries. And romantic relationships are not allowed; if ‘young love’ is found (that’s 
how it was written in the student regulation handbook, as funny as it sounds), 
it could cause disciplinary action.
As a student in China, at least from my personal experience, your grade is 
your life, nothing else matters. There are quite a few fixed standards for being a 
‘Good Student’ in China, but academic performance is surely the main one. In 
school, we normally start the day from 7.30 a.m. and finish by 9.30 p.m. with a 
10-minute break between each class, and two-hour lunch and dinner breaks. It 
can be worse in senior years; students must sacrifice their weekends for manda-
tory studies in school.
Fig 8.3.a: Zhang Tianfang 张天放. 1982. Comply with School Discipline, 
 Comply with Public Order, Comply with National Laws. Source: China 
 Visual Arts Project, University of Westminster. 
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In the 1980s, China established the policy of ‘Nine-Year Compulsory Educa-
tion’, which the government funds. It includes six years of primary education, 
starting at ages 6 or 7, and three years of junior secondary education (mid-
dle school) for ages 12 to 15. Most students choose to continue another three 
years of higher secondary education (high school) for ages 15 to 18. And after 
that, they will encounter the most challenging moment in their entire student 
life: The National Higher Education Entrance Examination, also known as 
gaokao 高考 in Chinese terms.
In modern China, gaokao is socially and culturally significant, and is much 
more than simply an university entrance exam. For some of the  young stu-
dents coming from a less competitive social background, gaokao is the 
‘only way out’. From the beginning of a Chinese student’s school life, they 
will encounter a concept again and again from teachers, parents and peers, 
and that’s that ‘achieving a top grade in gaokao means ‘going to good a university’, 
then ‘having a high-paid job’ after graduation, and eventually ‘securing a richer 
social status’.
Gaokao is a payback for all those long study hours, numerous textbooks 
and  papers, gender-blurred school uniforms and un-happened ‘young love’ 
over the years, if you get a good result in the end, of course. It’s an extremely 
harsh exam, with strictly secretive preparation, and immediate disqualification 
if an examinee is late or caught cheating. Gaokao gets a lot of national and inter-
national criticism in terms of the educational system it represents. It is criti-
cised for overlooking the development of creative and diverse  learning abilities 
among young students, and for encouraging monotonous repetition across a 
Fig 8.3.b: Yu Zhenli 于振立. 1982. Get to School on Time, Do Not Be Late, 
Do Not Leave Early, Do Not Play Truant. Source: China Visual Arts Project, 
University of Westminster. 
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select few academic subjects. However, in China, gaokao seems to be the only 
fair system so far, for students, coming from families rich or poor, educated in 
private or public schools, to pursue future opportunities by their own hands. 
They are placed on the same starting point when sitting this exam, their per-
formance, and the final result are the only aspects that are going to determine 
which university they are attending and nothing else.
And after years, when we’ve finally grown up, we finally realise gaokao really 
wasn’t the ‘only way out’, there are a lot more other obstacles than just a bad 
exam result in life, we look back to the school days, and think maybe those days 
filled with endless exam papers are not so bad after all.
Fig 8.3.c: Artist unknown. 1980. Study. Source: China Visual Arts Project, 
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